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Abstract  
 
Elected President on 2 November 1976, Jimmy Carter, was little known outside 
Georgia and was the first politician from the deep South to be elected since the Civil War 
and with the briefest record of public service since Woodrow Wilson. He presented 
himself as an outsider, not part of the Washington establishment, who would bring back 
an ethical, competent government. However, his devastating electoral defeat to Ronald 
Reagan in 1980, the worst for an incumbent since 1932, set the seal on what was widely 
regarded as a failed presidency. Carter’s much praised humanitarian record since he left 
office in 1981 has not prompted any serious re-evaluation by historians.  
This study dissects Carter’s domestic policies, re-evaluating the unresolved 
questions relating to Carter’s character and ideology and to put his presidency in the 
proper historic context. I will begin by reviewing the relevant historiography, the 
important issues of the decade and his early political life, including his triumph in 1976. 
I will then seek to address Carter’s leadership by analysing how his administration was 
organised, and exploring the key domestic policy issues, principally the economy, 
energy, health, welfare, labour and his approach to the social changes that dominated 
America in the 1970’s.  I will conclude with his failed attempt to be re-elected in 1980. 
In conclusion I will comment on Carter’s overall effectiveness as a leader and how he 
should be ranked against other modern Presidents. This thesis is based on a wide range 
of sources including extensive use of collections from the Jimmy Carter Presidential 
Library, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States, oral history transcripts, published papers and numerous other 
primary and secondary sources covering political, economic and social issues.  
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Introduction  
 
Presidential biographers and political historians have been harsh in their judgement of 
the Carter Presidency. Most have regarded him as a failure both in terms of his skills in 
the role and his ability to deliver on his key programmes. The few who have taken a 
revisionist position have not disagreed that he had significant failures but sought to put 
these in the context of the difficulties he faced which they argued were beyond his 
control. If his reputation as President could not be revised some have sought to unravel 
the enigma of his character and identify the basis of his ideology and beliefs in a wider 
context. 
The early historians of the Carter Presidency condemned his leadership and 
overall effectiveness, with some even questioning his character.1 Whilst Haynes Johnson 
in The Absence of Power (1980) and Burton and Scott Kaufman in The Presidency of 
James Earl Carter (2006) acknowledged the difficulties he faced, they argued that 
Carter’s failure was one of leadership style. He failed to articulate a vision for America 
and provide a coherent agenda that could deliver significant change. His 
administration’s poor relations with Congress, the press and even Washington as a 
whole, were viewed as avoidable. He failed to build relationships with key Washington 
insiders that were essential to him achieving success. His advisors lacked insider 
                                                          
1 Clark Mollenhoff, The President who Failed. Carter out of Control (London: MacMillan, 1980). 
Peter Meyer, James Earl Carter. The Man and the Myth (Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and 
McMeet, 1978). Laurence Shoup, The Carter Presidency and Beyond Power and Politics in 
1980’s (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1980). Robert Shogan Promises to Keep, Carter’s First One 
Hundred Days (New York: Crowell, 1977).    
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knowledge and political expertise. 2  They characterised Carter as a mediocre President 
who, despite having an understanding of the will of the electorate, lacked the political 
know-how to carry the country with him.3  Some, like William Leuchtenberg in The 
Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Barack Obama (2009), viewed Carter’s failure as 
inevitable as he did not take the opportunity to build upon the traditional Democratic 
coalition but tried to distance himself from his natural constituency.4 Kenneth Morris, in 
Jimmy Carter: American Moralist (1996) argued that Carter failed because he created a 
view of public morality that ultimately was too pessimistic for the public he was trying 
to influence. He tried to give personal moral leadership but was unable to support that 
with a vision to inspire the electorate.5 The deficiencies in Jimmy Carter’s character were 
the subject of several articles and biographies. In a 1983 Presidential Studies Quarterly 
article, Barbara Kellerman argued that Carter’s introverted nature hampered his ability 
to build key relationships. He acted always as the outsider. Even within his 
administration’s decision-making process he played a solitary role with his focus being 
on study rather than discussion.6 To Betty Glad, in Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great 
White House (1980), Carter was a traditional politician who argued for change but did 
little effective to achieve it. He lacked a coherent plan and he hedged his positions when 
pressed. She argued that he did not act for the public good and used public relations for 
                                                          
2 Haynes Johnson, In the Absence of Power. Governing America (New York: Viking, 1980) and 
Burton Kaufman & Scott Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2006). 
3 Ibid. 
4 William Leuchtenberg, In the Shadow of FDR. From Harry Truman to Barack Obama (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2009). 
5 Kenneth Morris, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996). 
6 Barbara Kellerman, ‘Introversion in the Oval Office’ Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol 13 
(Summer 1983): 383-399.   
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his own ends. Also, he did not take criticism well nor did he learn from mistakes, both of 
which damaged his administration.7  
The most critical of the scholars were those who studied the office of the 
Presidency in general. Fred Greenstein’s The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style 
from FDR to George W Bush (2004), John Burke’s Presidential Transitions: From Politics 
to Practice (2000), James Pfiffner’s The Modern Presidency (2008) and Richard 
Neustadt’s Presidential Power and Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from 
Roosevelt to Reagan (1990) 8 studied the key factors that made for successful 
presidencies. They argued that effectively presidents required a core set of skills such as 
being a good communicator, having a strategic sense, being persuasive, having 
managerial skills, self- discipline and emotional intelligence.9    Measured against these 
criteria, except for self-discipline, all these writers found Carter wanting.  His inability to 
persuade the public over energy and economic policy, his poor relations with Congress 
and the national press and his inability to articulate a coherent vision for his 
administration were all characteristic of a failure of leadership. Those that focussed on 
organisational issues criticised Carter’s management style. They highlighted specifically 
his failure to select staff with experience of Washington and to appoint a chief of staff 
until much later in his administration. They argued that his belief in cabinet government 
                                                          
7 Betty Glad, Jimmy Carter. In Search of the Great White House (New York: W Norton, 1980). 
8Fred Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to George W Bush 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) John P Burke, Presidential Transitions: From Politics 
to Practice (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000) James Pfiffner, The Modern Presidency (Boston: 
Wadsworth Engage Learning, 2008) and Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern 
Presidents. The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1990). 
9 Greenstein, Presidential Difference.  
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resulted in policies that failed to consider not only the political realities but often the 
views of Carter himself.10 
Revisionists’ view of the Carter Presidency did not really challenge the concept 
that Carter was an unsuccessful president. Their argument was in effect a plea for 
mitigation that given the problems he faced it would have taken someone with the skills 
of a Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) to succeed.11 In the Press and the Carter Presidency 
(1989), Mark Rozell argued that a more favourable view of Carter started in 1989. This 
was driven by recognition of Carter’s work after 1980 in comparison with the ethics of 
Ronald Reagan’s Presidency. Rozell argued that the press never really believed Carter’s 
moral stance as president but his good works after office changed their view.12 
Revisionists highlighted his achievements as the 1976 election victory, his record on the 
environment (particularly the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980), 
and his success in the Middle East. Erwin Hargrove, in Jimmy Carter as President: 
Leadership and Politics of the Public Good (1988), argued that Carter was forced to tread 
a path between what were often irreconcilable positions by promoting what he 
believed to be the ideal, comprehensive solution. Whilst criticising Carter’s political 
skills, his inability to set priorities and husband political resources, Hargrove described 
him as a ‘policy politician’ who avoided politics. However, in representing the public 
interest, he had no natural constituency, so he had to build support for each proposal 
on an ad hoc basis. To Hargrove, Carter was prescient in trying to move the Democratic 
                                                          
10 Ibid and Burke, Presidential Transitions. 
11 Stuart Eizenstat, ‘President Carter, the Democratic Party, and the Making of Domestic 
Policy’, in Herbert Rosenbaum and Alex Ugrinsky, eds, The Presidency and Domestic Policy of 
Jimmy Carter (Westport: Greenwood,1994), 15. 
12 Mark Rozell, The Press and the Carter Presidency (Boulder: Westview, 1989). 
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Party to a more neo-liberal stance by supporting equality, social justice whilst linking it 
to fiscal responsibility and efficient government. However, this approach required an 
economic recovery to fund reform which Carter was unable to achieve. Hargrove 
argued that Carter recognised the issues that were critical for the future of the 
Democratic Party and that many of these would subsequently be identified by Bill 
Clinton. He was therefore ahead of his time but as a president in transition to a more 
conservative era, he lacked the skills to change the fortunes of his party. 13 John 
Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency. A Re-evaluation (1993), argued that Carter was a ‘post 
liberal’ who sought to adjust liberalism to a new age, and although many of his policies 
were incomplete they set the scene for legislation in the future.14 In The President’s 
Agenda: Domestic Policy Kennedy-Clinton (1999), Paul Light argued that Carter did 
reasonably well with Congress, given its make-up. Criticism of him overloading his 
legislative agenda was therefore unfair as much of the programme had been initiated 
by Congress itself.15  
The historian Carl Biven stated in Jimmy Carter’s Economy: Policy in the Age of 
Limits(2002) that Carter’s economic policy, even though it was perceived as a failure, 
was a reasonable response to the conditions at the time and that his economic record 
compared favourably with the Reagan administration.16 Abernathy, Hill and Williams 
reasoned in The Carter Years: The President and Policy Making (1984)  that Carter was 
                                                          
13 Erwin Hargrove, Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and Politics of the Public Good 
(London: Louisiana State University Press, 1988). 
14 John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1993). 
15 Paul Light, The President’s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
16 W Carl Biven, Jimmy Carter’s Economy: Policy in the Age of Limits (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina, 2002).  
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a victim of the ‘Age of Limits’ in that he was the first modern Democratic President to 
operate where there was limited economic growth. This made it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to fund social programmes.17 Mark Rozell stated that although Carter did 
have a honeymoon period which lasted until the Bert Lance affair in September 1977, 
he always suffered in the eyes of the press by being compared with the activism of such 
previous Democratic Presidents as FDR, John F Kennedy (JFK) and Lyndon B Johnson 
(LBJ).  Carter did not help himself by refusing to articulate simple messages to the 
public; everything was complicated and as a result confusing. However, Rozell believed 
that Carter made changes in 1978 which improved the internal organisation of the 
White House. This learning from mistakes paid dividends with the public but this was 
not picked up on by the press.18 Julian Zelizer’s Jimmy Carter (2010), a more recent 
biography, was more positive about the Carter Presidency in highlighting his 
achievements, particularly in foreign policy and his political campaigning in 1976, but 
he did not ignore his failure to build relationships and support for his policies.19 
Some authors have tried to view the Carter Presidency from a different 
perspective. Charles Jones in Trustee President: Jimmy Carter and the United States 
Congress (1988) believed that Carter should be evaluated against the concept of a 
Trustee President. He submitted that Carter believed a president acted as the 
representative of the public good and was therefore not bound by the views of Congress 
or any special interest. The advantage of this approach was that it turned on its head 
criticism of Carter’s failure to deal effectively with Washington because in effect the 
                                                          
17 M Glen Abernathy, Dilys M Hill, and Phil Williams, The Carter Years: The President and Policy 
Making (London: Frances Pinter, 1984). 
18 Rozell, Press and the Carter Presidency. 
19 Julian Zelizer, Jimmy Carter (New York: Times Books, 2010). 
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traditional approach of working with key interest groups was not relevant. It also could 
be used to help explain the Carter antipathy to special interests, his relations with 
Congress and his leadership style. Carter believed that Congress should support him 
because he had studied an issue carefully, had public support and was unaffected by 
special interest. His administration was therefore designed to deliver the policies that 
the public needed whatever the political consequences. Congress’s role therefore was 
simply to pass legislation in the public interest. In Jones’s view the success of a Trustee 
President was dependent upon finding time to study, the political judgement of his close 
aides and finding a mechanism for establishing the public will.20 Identifying the views of 
the people outside of an election was gained directly through Carter’s Town Hall 
meetings, home visits and ‘phone in’s’. This was supplemented by his pollster Pat 
Caddell’s data and staff member Midge Constanza’s work with interest groups. 21 
Trusteeship thus became a means of explaining Carter’s approach to governing in that 
he focussed on doing what he believed was right, whether it was deliverable or not. 
Whilst Jones may have provided an explanation of Carter’s failure to deliver on his goals 
it did not consider that proactive attempts to gain the public view had largely stopped 
by 1978 when his administration, in recognition of its failings, became more open to 
working directly with Congress and interest groups.  
Whilst most writers have continued to argue that Carter could have been 
successful but ultimately failed in virtually all aspects of the role, Stephen Skowronek in 
The Politics that Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (1997) 
                                                          
20 Charles O Jones, Trustee President: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988). 
21 David Craik, US Presidents and Public Opinion: The Carter Presidency, Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, (Keele: University of Keele, 2005).  
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argued that Carter’s ability to achieve anything substantial was severely restricted. He 
submitted that presidential elections went in cycles and the Carter Presidency was in a 
transition between the end of the liberal era which started with Franklin Roosevelt and 
the beginning of a new conservative one which was to begin with Ronald Reagan.  To 
Skowronek, Carter was a ‘disjunctive’ president unable to break away from old and 
ineffective liberal policies to a new conservative paradigm. He therefore was forced to 
steer clear of ideology and focus on improving the efficiency of government with an 
emphasis on competence but without any radical change. Ultimately, he failed because 
the middle ground on which he stood had no firm constituency.22  This approach goes 
some way to explaining the issue with which historians writing on Carter had 
consistently struggled – his ideology. 
Most Carter scholars have sought to classify him in ideological terms, but it is 
striking, given the range of options put forward, how little consensus there is on the 
subject. The press and his Republican opponents believed that Carter was attempting in 
1976 to be all things to all men and generally failing to satisfy any of the groups. 23 Even 
some Democrats believed that he had no ideology but constantly shifted positions for 
political expediency. Mark Shields, Congressman Morris K Udall’s advisor, quipped that 
Carter ‘had more positions than the Kama Sutra.’24Some biographers, like Glad, based 
their critique on a psychoanalytical approach whilst others, such as Carter’s speech 
                                                          
22 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics that Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill 
Clinton (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 365-66. 
23 Dom Bonafede, ‘The Carter White House: The Shape is there but no Specifics’ National 
Journal, 25 December 1976. 
24 Shogan, Promises to Keep, 43. 
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writer James Fallows, criticised him from a liberal perspective.25 In Kennedy vs Carter: 
The 1980 Battle for the Democratic Party’s Soul (2010), Tim Stanley argued that Carter 
was a conservative in charge of a liberal coalition. Stanley strongly argued that a liberal 
programme led by Ted Kennedy would have won the election in 1980. Instead the 
electorate rejected Carter’s form of conservatism.26   
There have been some counter arguments that suggest Carter’s ideology was 
influenced by President Harry S Truman and that their styles were very similar.27 There 
is some doubt about this because although Carter did suggest during the election that 
Truman was his role model, when he had an opportunity to spend time with Truman’s 
long-term aide Clark Clifford, he did not ask one question about Truman or his 
administration.28 So if not liberal was he a conservative? His Attorney General Griffin 
Bell was in no doubt that Carter’s Administration had a conservative agenda but it was 
sabotaged by liberals inside his Executive and in Congress.29 Burton and Scott Kaufman 
argued that most of his policies were conservative but that he failed to articulate any 
overall conservative vision.30 Many of these arguments were based on an assumption of 
the inevitable rise of conservatism in the 1980s. This also underpinned a view that Carter 
was an early New Democrat, a forerunner of Bill Clinton. Stuart Eizenstat, Carter’s 
domestic policy advisor, argued that Carter was a neo-liberal who embodied a belief in 
                                                          
25 Glad, In Search of the Great White House, and James Fallows, ’The Passionless President’ 
Atlantic Monthly (May 1979): 75-81. 
26 Tim Stanley, Kennedy vs Carter: The 1980 Battle for the Democratic Party’s Soul (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2010). 
27 Reo Christenson, ’Carter and Truman. A Reappraisal of Both’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 
Vol 13 (Spring 1983): 313-23. 
28 Clark. Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), 620.  
29 Griffin Bell, and Ronald Ostrow, Taking Care of the Law (New York NY: William Morrow, 
1982). 
30 Kaufman and Kaufman, Presidency of James Earl Carter. 
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‘social justice for [the] disadvantaged with fiscal conservatism.’ 31 Iwan Morgan, in his 
2004 article, drew a comparison between Carter’s economic policy and that of President 
Bill Clinton. There were clear parallels with the emphasis on fighting inflation over 
unemployment, balancing the budget and support for monetary over fiscal policy. 
Clinton’s approach had strong echoes of Carter’s when he said, ‘The change we must 
make isn’t liberal or conservative, it’s both and it’s neither.’ 32  Others argued that Carter 
was following a form of populism. His friend Charles Kirbo described Carter’s approach 
as “correcting evils and inefficiencies and developing a system of fairness among the 
various elements of society “33This approach saw government intervention as a means 
of change and often involved a direct appeal to people over party and interest groups.34 
Some have suggested that Carter was not driven by ideology or policy goals but heavily 
influenced by his engineering and technical background. He was much more motivated 
by the method rather than the outcome. He was focussed on a process that was 
comprehensive, delivered by experts with no political input. He believed that this would 
produce policies that were uniform, simple to operate, predictable and that would 
support the public good.35 Kenneth Morris followed a similar non-ideological argument 
suggesting Carter was developing a Presidency based on his Christian beliefs. This 
motivated him to steer clear of politics by ‘doing the right thing’ whatever the 
consequences.36    
                                                          
31 Eizenstat, ‘Democratic Party and the Making of Domestic Policy’, 8. 
32 Iwan Morgan, ‘Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton and New Democratic Economics’ Historical Journal 
Vol 47 (December 2004): 1015-1039. 
33 Elizabeth Drew, American Journal. The Events of 1976 (New York: Random House, 1976), 489 
34 Eizenstat, ‘Democratic Party and the Making of Domestic Policy’, 6-7.    
35 Jack Knott, & Aaron Wildavsky, ‘Jimmy Carter’s Theory of Government’ The Wilson Quarterly 
(1976-) Vol 1 (Winter 1977): 46-67.   
36 Morris, American Moralist. 
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The improved public image of Jimmy Carter arising from his post-presidential 
achievements has not prompted any re-evaluation of his administration. The revisionist 
impulse in the historiography could best be described as more apologetic than 
revisionist and had largely fizzled out by the mid-1990’s.  In Douglas Brinkley’s case an 
interest in Carter’s post-presidency resulting from personal interviews with Carter 
caused Brinkley to abandon plans for a Carter biography, despite having written eleven 
chapters, and to write about his post-presidency.37   It is possible that Carter’s 
subsequent achievements have reinforced the image of a good man out of his depth as 
President. Was it a failure of leadership as many historians believed?  All of this leaves 
several unanswered questions about Carter’s legacy as president. Could he be described 
as such a failure when so many of the policies he attempted to implement also proved 
beyond that of his successors, as argued by the revisionist writers? How precisely should 
he be rated in comparison to other modern presidents? What was his ideology?  
Ideology or a set of beliefs is critical to understanding the behaviour of presidents. It 
drives their approach to the office and the policies that they carry out. Did Carter adhere 
to any specific ideology or was he, as Charles Jones believed, behaving as a ‘Trustee 
President’?38  In addition what was the impact of his character on this?  How far did his 
faith, his background as an engineer and his attitude to politics affect his presidency? 
Whatever their approach, historians have not successfully addressed this aspect of the 
Carter Presidency. 
                                                          
37 Douglas Brinkley, Unfinished Presidency; Jimmy Carter’s Journey Beyond the White House 
(New York: Penguin, 1998), viii. 
38 Jones, Trustee President. 
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James Earl Carter was born in 1924 and brought up in a farming community in 
Plains, Georgia. His father, Earl, was a peanut farmer and a community leader whilst his 
mother, Lillian, had been a nurse. He was educated in Georgia, but he left home when 
he joined the Naval Academy in Annapolis in 1943, graduating three years later. He 
married a local woman, Rosalynn Smith, in 1946, starting the most long lasting and 
influential relationship of his life. He served in various postings around the country 
before qualifying to command a submarine as a full lieutenant. He later joined the 
fledgling nuclear submarine programme under Captain Hyman Rickover. The illness and 
subsequent death of his father in 1953 forced him to resign from the Navy to return to 
Plains to manage the family business. During the next nine years Carter successfully 
developed his business and, following the footsteps of his father, became influential in 
his local community. Carter represented a growing breed of southern businessman 
focussed on promoting economic and social reform. At this early stage in his career he 
was a Democrat and spoke strongly in favour of racial tolerance and integration. At one 
point his business was boycotted by the local white Citizens Council because he refused 
to join them. 1n 1962 he successfully ran for the Georgia Senate and was re-elected in 
1964.39 
There were three key influences on Jimmy Carter’s adult life, the first of which 
was his wife. Carter’s marriage to Rosalynn has been the main relationship of his life. 
She ran his home and business whilst he was away campaigning and when he ran both 
for Governor and President, she became a very effective campaigner on his behalf. 
Carter discussed decisions with her and arranged for her to sit in on cabinet meetings 
                                                          
39 Gary Fink, Prelude to the Presidency. The Political Character and Legislative Style of Jimmy 
Carter (Westport: Greenwood, 1980). 
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and she has remained throughout their marriage his co-partner and main supporter. A 
second influence on Carter was his superior in the Navy, Hyman Rickover. Carter quoted 
him heavily throughout his presidential campaign. His campaign biography Why Not the 
Best? was a direct quote of Rickover’s. 40 The training Carter received as a nuclear 
engineer was reflected in his approach to problems. His obsession with being right as a 
substitute for being political was a hallmark of Rickover’s training and decision making.41 
The third and probably the most important influence on Carter was his faith. In 1966 
following electoral defeat he became a ‘born again’ Christian. His religious beliefs were 
reflected throughout his political career in his determination to do the ‘right thing’ and 
in his speeches which were laced with moral themes. His faith gave him peace and 
detachment but also influenced a political element to his campaign. His critique of 
interest groups had a strong element of ‘driving money changers from the temple of 
Washington’.42  It also brought its disadvantages, some arguing that the drive for a moral 
argument in dealing with the nation’s problems was a turn off for a public used to 
optimism and a political elite expecting to bargain. 43 Despite political disadvantages, 
Carter remained upfront about his beliefs. His campaign speeches in which he described 
who he was continued to finish with an affirmation of his Christian faith despite the 
numerous attempts of his advisor Stuart Eizenstat to delete it from earlier drafts.44  
                                                          
40 Jimmy Carter, Why Not the Best? Presidential Edition (Eastbourne: Kingsway, 1977). 
41 Peter Bourne, Jimmy Carter. A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to the Presidency (New 
York: Scribner, 1997), 77.    
42 Patrick Anderson, Electing Jimmy Carter. The Campaign of 1976 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1994), 93-94. 
43 James A Speer, ‘Jimmy Carter was a Baptist President’, in Rosenbaum, Presidency and 
Domestic Policy of Jimmy Carter, 88-92. 
44 Stuart Eizenstat, Interview Miller Center University of Virginia , https://millercenter.org/the-
presidency/presidential-oral-histories/jimmy-carter , 4-5. 
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Clark Clifford, in his autobiography, used Winston Churchill’s quote about Russia 
to describe Jimmy Carter as ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.’ 45 
According to one source, he ‘may have been the psychologically most complicated 
presidential candidate this century.’46 This complexity had consequences both for his 
staff and the public. Hamilton Jordan, his closest aide, was forced to admit about Carter 
during the 1980 campaign that ‘the American people still do not have a clear picture of 
who he was.’47 The outward image of calm was coupled with a certain ruthlessness, 
particularly with the press. Some believed that journalists like James Wooten of the New 
York Times were on a Carter enemies list.48 His National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski wrote of the famous Jimmy Carter smile being in fact three smiles, including 
the one to hide his anger.49 Carter himself encouraged this uncertainty about him by 
refusing to be categorised by the media. In his first major national speech to the National 
Press Club, in 1974, he described himself as ‘a Farmer, an Engineer, a Businessman, a 
Planner, a Scientist, a Governor and a Christian.’ 50  This description which he used 
throughout the campaign conspicuously steered clear of ideology. There was also no 
mention of being a Southerner which was a key element of his campaign. He also, unlike 
every other major presidential candidate, did not emphasise his military service except 
in the context of being an engineer. He was an ambitious politician, confident in himself 
and his political strategy. He believed in rational policies based on intense study and 
                                                          
45 Clifford, Counsel to the President, 618. 
46 Leo P Ribuffo, ‘Jimmy Carter and the Selling of the President 1976-1980’, in Rosenbaum, 
Presidency and Domestic Policy of Jimmy Carter, 144. 
47 Frye Gaillard, Prophet from Plains (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007), 15. 
48 Meyer, Man and the Myth, 146-48.    
49 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Advisor (New York: 
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983), 21-22.   
50 Address Announcing Candidacy for the Democratic Presidential Nomination at the National 
Press Club, 12 December 1974, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77821  
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analysis that would result in comprehensive solutions. He pushed himself hard to 
understand complexity; as a Georgian Senator he prided himself on reading every draft 
of a bill. 51 This approach, he believed, would be enough to persuade the electorate that 
correct legislation was being proposed without any political lobbying.  He believed that 
he could explain his policies to the electorate without simplifying issues or creating 
slogans or themes to sell the ‘message’. He was comfortable both with complexity and 
contradiction which he viewed as reconcilable and he wanted legislators to think in the 
same way.  
Jimmy Carter, both in campaigning for and being governor, demonstrated many 
of the policies he was to support and traits he was to exhibit as president. After an 
unsuccessful campaign for governor in 1966, he ran again in 1970. He was a ruthless 
campaigner in the Democratic primary against the liberal former governor Carl Sanders. 
He repositioned himself to the right in running a populist campaign contrasting himself 
in television adverts with Sanders’ alleged urbanity, aloofness and liberalism.  He 
avoided controversial issues like Civil Rights but emphasised growth and improved 
efficiency in government. He argued for reform in education, criminal justice and above 
all else the state government. Whilst he steered clear of radical change as governor, he 
recognised the importance of symbolism. Although he avoided Civil Rights as an issue 
throughout his campaign, he used his inaugural speech in 1971 to announce that the 
‘time for racial discrimination is over.’ 52This seemed a radical statement but to Carter it 
was recognition of what was reality and it was time for the south to move on. He 
                                                          
51 Hargrove, Carter as President, 1-12. 
52 Governor Carter’s Inaugural Address, 12 January 1971, 
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jimmycarterlawday1974.htm  
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followed this up with the symbolic gesture of hanging Martin Luther King’s portrait 
outside his office in the state capitol. As governor he divided the function of political 
advice and policy development between his personal staff and his commissioners and 
their staff; a model he was to follow in the White House. Carter wanted his time as 
governor to be seen as a symbol of his competence but also, he believed that his record 
in Atlanta demonstrated how he could manage Congress in Washington. Gary Fink 
described Carter’s general treatment of the Georgian Assembly as unthinking neglect. 53 
His legislative success rate was as high as 90% but he was never popular in the 
Assembly.54 However, in the passing of government reform, Carter demonstrated a 
range of effective strategies and skills from use of patronage, threats on pet projects as 
well as individual lobbying.55 Government reform may not have been a controversial 
issue, but it had no natural constituency among the Georgia electorate. So, Carter 
worked very hard to establish an advisory committee to raise awareness and to lobby 
state officials and members of the Assembly.56  He worked with business leaders and 
interest groups such as Common Cause and League of Women Voters to increase 
political pressure.57 He received great personal credit for the passage of this legislation. 
His tenacity coined a new phrase about him when he was likened to a South Georgia 
turtle pushing a log out of the way.58 It also gave Carter confidence that he could succeed 
in passing similar reform legislation in Washington. Many of the traits of the Carter 
presidency could be seen in his governorship with his emphasis on efficiency, 
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comprehensive solutions, avoidance of radical change, his attraction to symbolism and 
his abhorrence of special interests. Although he always staked out unyielding positions, 
he was prepared as governor to compromise.59 He could be stubborn but was able to 
craft an astute compromise, for example over the proposed ‘William Calley Day’ which 
he replaced with ‘America’s Fighting Man’s Day’ which left both his liberal and 
conservative supporters content on the sensitive issue of Vietnam.60  However, these 
successes did not make him popular. Bert Lance, a close friend and Georgia 
Commissioner, characterised his chances of re-election if he was stood again in 1974 as 
very poor given that he had ‘inflicted enough serious damage on himself that he was not 
viable’ as a candidate.61  
Carter’s early political years gave few consistent clues as to his ideological 
leanings. His aides Jody Powell and Hamilton Jordan were fiercely loyal to Carter but had 
no strong political views themselves whilst friends Bert Lance and Charles Kirbo were 
apolitical. Carter himself conspicuously avoided mentioning his ideology. When 
cornered on this issue early in the 1976 presidential campaign he said, ‘I never 
characterise myself as a conservative, liberal or moderate and this is what distinguishes 
me from them.’62 He deliberately avoided any mention of ideology during elections but 
adjusted his position depending on the opponent, a pattern he continued to follow in 
the presidential election in 1976. He was often linked with the new breed of Southern 
Liberal politicians. This was reinforced by his stance on Civil Rights and integration. There 
is no doubt his beliefs were strongly felt. He stood up to the White Citizens Council and 
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argued for integration within his church. His stance politically was, however, more 
nuanced. He always linked support for Civil Rights and integration with a defence of the 
south’s record and argued that it was time to move on. He also stepped very carefully 
around the conservative segregationist George Wallace. He never directly attacked 
Wallace, supporting him on bussing and speaking at Wallace Appreciation Day but he 
refrained from endorsing him in as a presidential candidate in 1972.63  
There was little evidence of strong liberal leanings despite the emphasis on 
reform and good government. The symbolic launch of his presidential campaign from 
FDR’s home in Warm Springs, Georgia was less about reviving the old New Deal coalition 
and more about better TV coverage and avoiding the traditional union Labour Day 
launch.64 There were, however, some strong indications in his early career about his 
attitude to politics. According to his aide Stuart Eizenstat, Carter saw a sharp separation 
between the politics of campaigning and the politics of governing. He certainly enjoyed 
the former but found the latter, dealing with politicians and interest groups, as 
‘tawdry’.65 However for a politician who found at least some of the process distasteful 
he was by 1976 getting rather good at it. He came to believe that he could transfer his 
methods and success as governor and as a campaigner directly to the White House.   
The 1970’s was a period of profound change in America which impacted on the 
effectiveness of the presidency. The decade saw severe damage to American prestige 
abroad and loss of public confidence at home. This was a result of two major events: the 
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Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. America’s military intervention to prevent 
what was perceived as a communist takeover of South Vietnam by its neighbours to the 
North resulted in failure and a humiliating withdrawal in 1973. Although technically war 
had never been declared, this was viewed by Americans as the first time that the country 
had lost a war. The conflict had polarised opinion and resulted in violent protest, political 
division and ultimately the toppling of Democratic President Lyndon B Johnson in 
1968.66 The Watergate scandal revealed attempts by the administration of Richard M 
Nixon to damage his political opponents in a series of illegal acts, including breaking into 
the Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate building in Washington. Nixon’s 
subsequent attempts to cover this up resulted in his resignation from office in 1974.67 
The loss of public confidence in political institutions, politicians in general and 
particularly the Presidency was dramatic. This was reflected in the decline in voting in 
national elections which dropped to the lowest since 1948.68 The level of public 
disaffection also increased with a poll in 1975 indicating that 69 percent people felt that 
over the previous ten years America’s leaders had lied to them.69 The nature of reporting 
in newspapers and on television also changed. News had become more immediate with 
a focus on investigation and reporters were sceptical in dealing with government 
information usually provided by White House staff. In this journalist were aided by 
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sources from expanded congressional staffs and leaks from low-level aides in the 
government, often reflecting different views to the White House. 70 
In response to both Vietnam and Watergate, a revitalised Congress moved to 
end what was termed the ‘Imperial Presidency’ by restricting presidential powers to 
wage war, amend budgets and limit campaign fund-raising. Changes to the political 
infrastructure were not confined to the presidency but impacted on Congress and 
political parties. Supreme Court decisions resulted in the enforcement of more 
geographically equitable congressional districts. The redrawing of these district 
boundaries resulted initially in an increased turnover of congressmen with most 
members in each House having less than six years’ experience.71 Those congressmen 
with more stable majorities had become less likely to need presidential favours. Their 
success became based on delivering services for their own constituencies and they 
began to acquire more staff to do this. There were also significant changes in 
congressional governance as reforms resulted in the creation of 165 committees and 
sub committees/special task forces. President Johnson had said that he had to deal with 
just six politicians in the House and four in the Senate who were Leaders and Committee 
Chairmen to ensure his legislation was passed.72 In addition congressional chairs were 
now elected by the party caucus and so were less dependent on presidential patronage. 
This democratisation process was continued with the two main parties, particularly the 
Democrats. Rule changes prompted by the Fraser-McGovern reform of party rules in 
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1971 sought to broaden the base of the party and increase participation at election 
conventions. It increased the number of delegates from women’s and minority groups 
whilst reducing the participation of ex officio members from state party organisations.73 
Complexity created by these new party rules and the new federal campaign funding 
made it simpler for individual states to run primary elections rather than appoint 
delegates.74 The abolition of the unit rule in primaries meant that the result was no 
longer winner take all for delegates. This potentially gave any new candidate the 
opportunity to maintain momentum and gain media attention by garnering delegates in 
the early primaries. This was a strategy Carter was to follow successfully in 1976.75 In 
the convention itself the new rules reduced the participation and the influence of 
national and state party leaders over their fragmented state delegations. These changes 
were not without their disadvantages. As governor, Carter nearly failed to attend the 
1972 Democratic Convention as he only just beat a local black college student by 15 
votes in a state delegate election.76  
There were other profound changes in both parties that occurred during the 
1970’s. The traditional Democratic New Deal coalition was continuing to fragment. The 
Republican Party was beginning to make inroads in the south as Civil Rights legislation 
had damaged Democratic support. The traditional liberal support in the north-eastern 
states was being undermined by economic decline with industries moving to the 
southern and western states. The Republican Party was becoming increasingly under the 
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influence of conservative pressure groups. These initially focussed on local protest, for 
example against property tax in California which resulted in the Proposition 13 Ballot in 
1978. However, this concern over inflation on middle-class incomes developed into 
wider resentment against government spending, especially on welfare which 
conservatives felt unfairly benefitted minority groups. Similar protests at the local level 
resulted in twelve states between 1978 and 1982 restricting state government 
spending.77  
During this period there was a revival in interest in religion with the number of 
Americans who highlighted the growing role of faith in their lives tripling.78 Evangelical 
groups became a significant part of the conservative lobby. Leaders like Pat Robertson, 
James Robinson, Jim Bakker and Jerry Falwell had an estimated 100 million followers, 
and it was Falwell who established the ‘Moral Majority’ which grew to two million 
supporters and campaigned for pro-God and family policies.79 As a political force, 
conservatives within the Republican Party campaigned in 1974 against President Gerald 
R. Ford’s choice of Nelson Rockefeller, a liberal and divorcee, as Vice President. They 
subsequently formed an effective lobby group with business to defeat pro-labour 
legislation like the Common Situs Picketing bill and campaigned against the ratification 
of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), abortion and school bussing whilst supporting 
the continuation of capital punishment. Conservatives initially coalesced around Ronald 
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Reagan‘s attempt to oust Ford in 1976 but supported their fellow evangelical, Carter, in 
the 1976 election. 
The 1960’s saw the most successful period for the US economy in terms of 
growth both domestically and trade abroad. Liberal economists such as Walter Heller 
became symbols of the belief that the economy could be managed to achieve economic 
growth, low unemployment and inflation. This New Economic Policy followed by Heller’s 
successors became part of successive administrations’ economic orthodoxy throughout 
the 1960’s and into the 1970s. However, by the late 1960’s President Johnson’s attempt 
to fund his Great Society reforms and the Vietnam War caused the economy to overheat 
and resulted in increased inflation. A decline in productivity and increased competition 
from abroad resulted in a fall in economic growth coupled with major inflation (known 
as stagflation) and higher unemployment. Successive administrations struggled to strike 
the right balance of policies to control stagflation. The current orthodoxy came under 
challenge from economists such as Milton Friedman who argued that controlling 
inflation should be the priority and that this could be defeated by control of the money 
supply whilst growth could be stimulated by deregulation. The inability of economic 
advisors to resolve these challenges meant that each new administration faced the 
decision on whether to stimulate the economy to fix a recession or impose fiscal 
restraint to reduce inflation. Whichever option was followed had serious political 
consequences and most administrations after 1968 found it difficult to follow a 
consistent line.  As a result, US financial indicators continued to deteriorate. The dollar 
28 
 
fell in value in relation to a basket of major currencies by 60 percent between 1967 and 
1980 whilst middle-class family income failed to grow for ten years after 1973.80  
During this period of economic turmoil there was one sector of the American 
economy that continued to grow: a cluster of states in the south and west known as the 
Sunbelt. The growth of the Sunbelt originated in World War Two when the government 
invested in defence industries in the region and this continued in the 1950s and 1960s 
through the award of defence contracts as a result of the Cold War and investment in 
infrastructure such as highways. The boom in cheap housing after 1945 and the 
development of air conditioning made the south and west a more attractive proposition 
for young families from the big cities in the north east. Incentives were provided to move 
South including a favourable state tax regime and ‘Right to Work’ laws which 
discouraged unions. This form of economic ‘boosterism’ under the leadership of Dale 
Bumpers, Terry Sandford and other southern politicians resulted in new industries 
flooding into the south and west. By the 1970’s the economic success of the Sunbelt 
states helped start to change the negative image of the south, particularly in the north 
where racial tension caused by riots in the late 1960s and the issue of school bussing in 
the 1970s had resulted in a more sympathetic view. The migration of professionals to 
the south and west not only provided a natural constituency for the Republicans (GOP) 
but also increased the political importance of states like Florida, Texas and California 
whose increased representation amounted to 20 percent of the total electoral college 
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vote. 81 This was matched by an electoral decline in the north-eastern states which were 
a natural constituency for the Democrats. 
The 1970s also saw major social change. The Civil Rights Movement shifted focus 
from promoting political reform and integration to agitating for economic and social 
equality. The US economic decline disproportionately affected blacks in terms of 
unemployment, urban decline and the squeeze on welfare budgets. All of this resulted 
in a growth of pressure groups representing all minorities, Black, Hispanic, Native 
American and other minorities as well as women’s and environmental groups. Most of 
these found their home in the Democratic Party and under the new delegate rules they 
had a major voice at the party conventions. There was also a dramatic rise in interest 
groups during this period. For example, nearly 2000 business lobbying groups were 
established during the 1970s. 82    In total the number of lobbyists rose from 2000 after 
World War II to over 15,000 in 1978, spending $2 billion.83 The catalyst of social change 
resulted in the increase in the lobbying of politicians, parties and Congress but the 
fragmentation of these groups, many of whom were single issue, made it more difficult 
to build the coalitions necessary to bring about legislative change.   
If the 1970s saw important changes in America, not all of these were accepted 
by the public at large. They had a major impact on the effectiveness of the presidency 
and was consequently cited by some revisionist historians as an argument for a more 
sympathetic view of the Carter Presidency. However, it was equally fair to say that 
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Jimmy Carter was able to make some of those changes work in his favour when 
campaigning to become president. His simple style, candour about religion, the ‘I will 
not lie to you ‘promise, all helped to create a calm persona that harked backed to a 
simpler time of a stable America that aimed at a more conservative electorate.84 The 
impact of these changes became more problematic when he was in office and had to 
implement his programme. Carter’s belief in ‘doing the right thing’ had to be weighed 
against a sceptical press, a more difficult Congress and a wide range of competing 
interest groups. 
Jimmy Carter’s presidential bid appeared to the Washington press as coming out 
of nowhere, but it was a product of meticulous long-term planning which took 
advantage of reforms to the political system that came into force in 1972. Within ten 
years many of these reforms were reversed, so Carter took advantage of a unique set of 
circumstances to help him get elected. He made the decision to run nearly four years 
before the election and he never wavered in his belief that he would win. He was 
supported by a level of detailed planning provided by his aide Jordan that left nothing 
to chance. Carter used the two years whilst still governor both to widen his experience 
and build a network of contacts across the country. He initiated and led trade 
delegations abroad to build up his foreign policy experience.85 In 1973 he joined an 
influential think tank called the Trilateral Commission, which enabled him to broaden 
his experience in foreign policy and gain several high-profile contacts; some twenty of 
these later joined his cabinet. 86 It was one such contact, the President of Pepsi Cola, 
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who persuaded Time magazine to put Carter and not other Southern Governors on its 
cover in 1971.87 He used his appointment as Chair of the Democratic Campaign 
Committee to gain contacts by campaigning for Democratic candidates in the 1974 
midterm elections and raise his profile across the country. Jordan and other Carter aides 
joined the Democratic National Committee, and advisor Peter Bourne joined the Drugs 
Abuse Prevention Group, to gain important experience in Washington. The 1974 
Democratic National Convention and subsequent mid-term elections were used to 
recruit future campaign workers.88 To help establish this network after these elections 
Carter wrote not only to the winners to congratulate them but also the losers to solicit 
their advice.89 These contacts once made were maintained. Mark Siegel, the Executive 
Director of his campaign, told the Washington Post: ‘At every wedding, birth and funeral 
in a Democratic family there were flowers from Jimmy.’ 90 People like Margaret ‘Midge’ 
Constanza, who Carter campaigned for in 1974, became key supporters in 1976. 
Experience gained during this campaign was extensively used by Carter and Jordan to 
build the Carter campaign book for his presidential bid. 
Carter entered the primaries with certain disadvantages. He was a relatively 
unknown southern governor with no major national backers, limited funding and no 
Washington experience. Carter was helped by being able to follow a detailed campaign 
plan put together by Jordan. It established a centrally run campaign based in Atlanta 
with little party interference, which carefully managed his scarce resources.91  There was 
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also an effective media strategy that helped raise the candidate’s profile. The early 
national coverage of Carter on the cover of Time magazine 92 and his later speech at the 
National Press Club in 1974 were the exception as his campaign team used the local 
press to raise Carter’s profile during the primary races.  He was also helped by a dearth 
of national rivals, who either did not run (Edward M Kennedy), withdrew from the race 
early (Walter Mondale) or simply followed the wrong tactics. As a result, at no point did 
he have a consistent challenger throughout the primary campaign and so his opponents 
failed to gain any momentum. Carter on the other hand utilised the new electoral rules 
in the acquisition of delegates through primaries to maximise his advantage. 93  
Following Jordan’s detailed planning, Carter used limited funding to establish 
momentum in the early primaries, and this enabled him to gain federal campaign 
funding. This was not without risk. Joel McLearly, Carter’s National Finance Director, 
admitted that there was no campaign structure beyond the Florida primary, which 
Carter had to win.94 Jordan’s strategy was to build momentum and increase media 
attention early by defeating the conservative George Wallace in the South. Jordan’s plan 
was to target Wallace’s constituency and counter his populist appeal by being better 
qualified and a more responsible alternative.95 He identified eighteen key 
journalists/opinion formers for Carter to woo. These individuals worked for national 
organisations, but many were southern born who wanted someone other than Wallace 
to succeed.96 Carter’s defeat of Wallace in Florida was helped by the more liberal 
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candidates staying away. This enabled Carter to take more conservative positions and 
help focus media attention on Wallace’s health (he had been shot in 1972).   
Carter’s success was not just about campaign strategy. As a candidate he tapped 
into the anti-Washington sentiment across the country. He stood as an outsider, a new 
face with a track record as a governor and above all else someone who could be trusted. 
He was also an excellent, resilient campaigner with a strong personal touch. This was 
highlighted on the Iowa campaign trail when talking to small groups at factory gates or 
on farms.97 There is no doubting Carter’s achievement in gaining the Democratic 
nomination given his lack of national status and major supporters. However, his primary 
campaign was not flawless. He lost nine out of the sixteen primaries he took part in and 
often when Carter visited a state to campaign his poll ratings went down. 98 The 
Democratic Party reforms had increased the importance of primaries which favoured 
Carter as an early starter, so even a defeat in New York was quickly matched by a success 
in another primary in Wisconsin.99 Jordan’s detailed planning coupled with Carter’s 
tireless campaigning ensured he arrived at the convention in New York with his 
nomination secured. The convention and the subsequent campaign would prove a 
further test of Carter’s political skills. Walking through the delegates at the convention 
to make his acceptance speech turned out to be the zenith of his campaign. His 
speechwriter Patrick Anderson commented, ‘if he had gone home and stayed there, he 
might have won by a landslide. Unfortunately, he campaigned.’100 
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Once the presidential campaign proper started, Carter persisted with the 
strategies that had brought him success. He continued to stand as an outsider from 
Washington focussing on his own character (‘I would never lie to you’) and symbolic acts 
such as launching his campaign against Ford at FDR’s home in Warm Springs. Carter also 
sought to maintain his campaigning strategy by relying on the network of volunteers 
(dubbed ‘the Peanut Brigade’) that he had built up during the primaries, but these 
groups tended to bypass the state party apparatus. The campaign was still run centrally 
by a small team in Atlanta. This was mainly to keep control of limited campaign funding. 
However, it resulted in organisational failings. This included many unanswered calls to 
party officials causing resentment that continued into his administration. The campaign 
team were slow to engage the key players in the Democratic Party. As head of his party, 
Carter needed its support and to campaign on behalf of local candidates, but this 
weakened his stance as a candidate who was an outsider.  
Carter steered away from controversial policy issues by straddling the positions 
of both parties. The team under Jack Watson who were developing issues for Carter was 
kept separate from the campaign team until much later in the election. 101 He only 
sought to be radical on non-controversial issues that did not define him ideologically like 
government reorganisation and ethics. These reforms were linked to creating a 
government ‘as good as its people’ 102 and resonated with the public disquiet arising 
from Watergate. President Ford’s campaign and the newspapers highlighted Carter’s 
‘fuzziness’. All this increased pressure on Carter to change his approach, particularly as 
his poll lead, initially 35 points, had started to evaporate alarmingly. As the campaign 
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progressed Carter was forced to move away from general themes towards specific 
campaign commitments that were very much in line with traditional New Deal values. 
He did try to reassure the public about his perceived vagueness on issues in his famous 
interview with Playboy Magazine, in September 1976. He argued that because he was 
not an ideologue, he tried to analyse each question individually. ‘I’ve taken positions 
that to me are fair and rational and sometimes my answers are complicated.’103 He 
further sought in the same interview to reassure the public about his religious beliefs as 
a ‘born again’ Christian and its potential impact on his presidency. Unfortunately, whilst 
his answers were both honest and thoughtful the article will forever be remembered for 
his use of language at the end of the interview. Phrases like ‘lusting in his heart’ and 
‘screwing around’ grabbed the headlines.104 This language shocked his conservative 
supporters and reinforced an image of strangeness with the rest of the electorate. As a 
result, his lead in the polls was cut by ten points within a single day.105  
The three televised debates were an opportunity for both candidates to promote 
their agendas. The debates   proved to be highly popular with the electorate, with 
approximately half of American households watching the first debate and over 90 % 
watching at least one of the three.106 Carter acknowledged in the first debate that this 
was an opportunity to establish in the minds of the electorate exactly where he stood 
on issues. His acceptance speech at the Democratic Convention earlier in the campaign 
had continued his anti-Washington theme but had not focussed on specific policies 
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other than vague commitments on cutting government waste, tax reform and reducing 
unemployment.107  Whilst the debate did not by any means cover all his commitments 
it did enable him to articulate the key ideas of his campaign. These included the 
reduction of unemployment to three percent supported by increased economic growth, 
controlled inflation and a balanced budget by 1981. He proposed reform of the tax 
system which he labelled a disgrace, including tax cuts for the middle and lower incomes 
but also the closing of tax loopholes. He called for reform of the government structure 
such as the reduction in the number of agencies. He made further commitments on the 
introduction of zero-based budgeting (ZBB)108 to government finances, the pardoning of 
Vietnam draft evaders and almost as an aside comprehensive energy policy.109 There is 
some discussion among political analysts about the impact of these debates on the 
result. Whilst it was generally accepted that the overall result of the three debates was 
a draw, it did give Carter a national platform to articulate policies that he would later 
seek to implement.   
By the end of the campaign Carter had taken 51 positions and made 186 pledges, 
most of which were aligned to the party platform including health, welfare, childcare 
and social security reform as well as housing subsidies. 110  This was in addition to his 
commitment to restructure the federal government and reform energy policy. This was 
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significantly more than any of his three presidential predecessors.111 It secured him 
support during the campaign from key constituencies that enabled him to win in major 
industrial states. The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) support alone provided 120,000 campaign workers, made ten 
million calls and sent out eighty million pieces of literature.112 Carter was prepared to 
compromise when necessary; his public embrace of Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago 
ensured his support in Illinois although it damaged his image for probity.113 As the 
presidential campaign progressed these more liberal commitments made Carter appear 
less of an outsider, more a mainstream politician. This damaged him in the polls as the 
gap between himself and Ford continued to close. Yet Carter did not seek to link the 
commitments of his campaign to an appealing overall theme. Walter Mondale, his 
running mate, wanted speechwriter Patrick Anderson to do this for Carter but Anderson 
was unable to persuade him. Carter continued to campaign on himself, his character and 
his overall competence which he believed were in line with the voter’s need for an 
efficient, honest government.114  In the end the result on 2 November 1976 was closer 
than many had predicted. Carter beat Ford 50 to 48 percent in the popular vote. Given 
Carter’s control of the southern states, Ford needed to win six of the eight so-called 
battleground states; he won five. Carter won the Electoral College 297-241. 
Historians have argued that being elected president was Jimmy Carter’s greatest 
political achievement. He demonstrated supreme confidence that he would win right 
                                                          
111 Light, President’s Agenda, 98. 
112 Kandy Stroud How Jimmy Won. The Victory Campaign from Plains to the White House (New 
York: William Morrow, 1977), 432.    
113 Drew, American Journal, 476-77.    
114 Anderson, Electing Jimmy Carter, 99. 
38 
 
from the start. This was backed by remarkably detailed campaign planning and an 
energetic’ effective campaigning style. He fed off the ‘national psyche’ 115 by appealing 
to voter’s deeper needs for honesty and efficiency in government in the wake of the 
Watergate scandal. However, it still turned out to be a very close election given that he 
had a 35 percent lead at the time of the Democratic Convention. Voter scepticism of 
both candidates was summed up by the acerbic William Loeb of New Hampshire‘s 
Manchester Union Leader headline in announcing the result as ‘Shifty beats Stupid’.116  
Commenting on his victory Jimmy Carter may have said that, ‘I owe special interests 
nothing. I owe the people everything.’117  This was not how those Democratic interest 
groups, or a Democratic Congress saw it. This would become a limit on the incoming 
president’s room for manoeuvre in trying to deliver on his campaign commitments.  
One caveat: it should be noted that whilst this thesis covers Carter’s major 
domestic policies it is not exhaustive. So certain issues, including deregulation, 
consumer affairs and urban reform, are not explored in depth.  In deciding which policies 
to focus on, several factors were taken into consideration. His economic policies and 
energy reform were chosen because Carter himself had identified these as critical during 
his election campaign and transition to the presidency. To Carter providing solutions to 
two of the country’s most complex problems would demonstrate his promise in the 
1976 campaign of competence. In order to explore a major theme of this study, the 
effect of ideology on Carter’s presidency, chapters have been included on his approach 
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to health, welfare and labour policy, key liberal priorities. On a similar ideological theme, 
the Culture Wars chapter reviews the major social movements of the 1970s linked to 
race, the environment, gender and religion, all of which buffeted his presidency and 
influenced his administration’s policy agenda. The thesis is completed by an analysis of 
the 1980 election. This reflected Carter’s attempt to win a second term by maintaining 
the political middle ground in the face of a conservative shift in American politics. The 
election reflected not only a popular verdict on Carter’s domestic policies, which were 
unravelling during the campaign, but on his leadership, his ideological stance and his 
vision for America. In addition to exploring Carter’s domestic policies in depth this thesis 
will start by analysing his leadership style and how he sought to organise his 
administration in order to deliver the promises he made during his presidential 
campaign. 
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Chapter One 
Organisation and Communication 
 
For a new president to become successful, he must master several roles. He is required 
not just to become the nation’s leader, but he must have or acquire skills that will make 
him an effective legislator, efficient head of his administration and its communicator-in-
chief. A president is often defined ideologically by his political friends, opponents, and 
by a proactive press. Once such a label is established expectations are set along with the 
policies it is assumed would be followed. Jimmy Carter, however, did not accept any 
ideological badge refusing to be categorised either a conservative or a liberal.  Yet he 
was not afraid of labels and throughout his campaign went out of his way to define 
himself in terms of the roles he had played in his past. ‘I am a Farmer, an Engineer, a 
Businessman, a Planner, a Scientist, a Governor and a Christian. ‘ 118 These roles had a 
profound influence on him personally and on his presidency. This chapter seeks to 
explore the key components of his presidency: how he managed his administration, 
implemented his legislative programme, dealt with the media and how he 
communicated with the public. The way Carter tackled these roles is critical to 
understanding the development of his policies which will be discussed in later chapters. 
In the 1970’s politicians were defined by their party allegiance and whether they 
were conservative or liberal. Although candidates were generally reluctant to make a 
commitment in case it alienated a section of the electorate, it was usually 
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straightforward for the press or political opponents to provide the ‘appropriate’ label. 
So, it was with Carter, despite his attempts to rule out any ideological bias. As the 
presidential campaign progressed his espousal of key policies of the Democratic Party 
created an expectation from liberals in the party that he would support their agenda in 
office. This was a fundamental misunderstanding of Carter. His personal stance against 
segregation was genuine but the assumption by northern politicians that he was liberal 
on all issues was simply wishful thinking. In a similar vein his professed link to traditional 
liberal Democratic leaders like Harry Truman was not substantiated by evidence.119 His 
commitment to many liberal issues in the election was largely driven by the need to 
secure core Democratic Party support. Carter acted as if ideology did not matter, backing 
liberal legislation in some instances, and conservative in others, pleasing neither side. 
This frustration was reflected in the press, often in the form of cartoons.120 Democrats 
like Senator Moynihan were just bemused. He told a Carter aide, ‘the problem with your 
boss is that he is conservative on domestic issues and liberal on foreign policy issues and 
he ought to be the other way around.’ 121 Suggestions by some of his staff such as Les 
Francis from congressional liaison, that he was a precursor of New Democrat Bill Clinton, 
socially liberal but strong on defence and fiscally conservative, only demonstrated the 
benefit of hindsight. Some of the measures he sought to implement could be 
categorised, many could not, and often his proposals divided the country regionally. This 
lack of ideology was reflected in the White House with Landon Donovan, one of Jordan’s 
staff, commenting that he could not remember any ideological debate whilst he was 
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there.122 Carter was often on the opposite side of the argument from the liberal majority 
in his party. He recognised this anomaly when he said, ’In many cases I feel more at 
home with conservative Democratic and Republican members of congress than I do with 
the others, although the others, the liberals, vote for me more often.’ 123 Carter did take 
what could be seen as ideological positions on some issues, but he never talked about 
them in those terms. 
So, if he did not want to be defined by political ideology did the answer lie in the 
influence of his character? Historians who have studied the question of presidential 
character124 have focussed mainly on negative aspects of presidential behaviour, for 
example the infidelities of John Kennedy, Bill Clinton and the psychology of Richard 
Nixon. Jimmy Carter, whilst lacking their vices, is an extremely complex man. His 
campaign speechwriter Patrick Anderson described the enigma of Carter as, ‘Our hope, 
our despair, leader and loose cannon. Machiavelli and Mr Rogers.’125 Carter himself did 
not see this complexity. He told Time Magazine, ‘I don’t think that I am that complex. I 
am pretty much what I seem to be.’126 He ran his presidential campaign on the issue of 
his character. He defined himself to the electorate not ideologically but in terms of 
whom he was and the roles that he had played. These meant something to him and 
helped define not just who he was but how he sought to achieve his goals. Before 
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exploring his performance in his presidential roles, a review of how he defined himself 
and the impact of this on his presidency is required.  
  A   president’s religious background had not been a controversial issue since the 
election of the Roman Catholic John F Kennedy in 1960. Since then presidential 
candidates have downplayed their religious convictions during campaigns. The 1976 
election, in the wake of Watergate, changed all that. Carter always emphasised that he 
was a ‘born again’ Christian and that it had a daily impact on his life. He rejected 
attempts by aide Eizenstat to delete his frequent reference to this in his ‘I am’ speech. 
127 As president he continued to teach Sunday school and was happy to talk about his 
personal faith at press conferences. Carter refused however to tap into the potential 
political support that being an evangelical Christian could bring. In 1976 34 percent of 
the population claimed to be ‘born again.’ 128 The growing political power of the 
evangelical movement saw Carter as their natural champion. But he came from a liberal 
Baptist tradition based around an altruistic social agenda whilst the evangelical 
movement was becoming more conservative. By the end of the decade Carter had 
become alienated from a movement that switched its support to Reagan in the 1980 
election. By 2001 the Carters had left their Church’s hierarchy (Southern Baptist 
Convention) mainly over women’s rights.129 Whilst Carter was open about his faith, he 
argued that it would not impact on his presidency: ‘I’ve been very careful not to 
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interrelate my Christian beliefs with my responsibilities as President.’ 130 He said that he 
was personally against abortion but refused to change the law. This got him into trouble 
with his own staff and the evangelical movement who together represented both sides 
of the argument. He worked hard to normalise his faith in the mind of the public by 
arguing that being ‘born again’ was a typical experience for Christians.131 He was not 
always successful. A thoughtful interview about his faith became subsumed by 
arguments about the magazine he chose (Playboy) and his off-the-cuff comments which 
proved harmful to him during the election campaign.132 
His faith did provide him with a strong moral stance on all his political activities. 
His standard campaign speech replicated the introduction he gave on the door step 
when he was a missionary in Massachusetts in the 1960’s. 133  His speeches always had 
a strong moral tone and his aversion both to ceremony and interest groups reflected 
fundamental religious teaching. In government he ensured that his administration 
stayed ethical even at times at the expense of common sense. He unnecessarily vetoed 
Federal funding for a paved road in his home town134 and refused to sanction a personal 
birthday celebration as part of a fundraiser. 135 Whether it was standing up to the White 
Citizens Council over desegregation in the 1960’s or his continued focus on doing the 
‘right thing’ whatever the political cost, Carter’s religious beliefs had a major impact on 
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his presidency. This would become an issue when Carter the ‘born again’ Christian 
conflicted with Carter the politician.   
Carter’s experience as governor of Georgia shaped his view of government. This 
demonstrated to him what could be achieved in terms of reform and gave him first-hand 
experience of how the Federal Government operated.  As governor he did not think that 
the Nixon Administration served Georgia well. He felt ignored by White House staff 136 
and was particularly unimpressed with the performance of the Corp of Engineers on 
Federal Water Projects in his state.137 This had a profound effect on both his attitude to 
government and his presidential campaign.138 Carter’s analysis of the role of the central 
government was in many ways similar to that of his great rival Ronald Reagan. Both saw 
the government as too big, inefficient and even corrupt but whilst Reagan saw 
government as ‘the problem’ that needed to be reduced if not eliminated, Carter saw it 
as a potential force for good. In his campaign he kept asking two questions: ‘Can our 
government be honest, decent, open, fair and compassionate’ and ‘Can our government 
be competent?’139 To Carter the answer was an unequivocal yes. 
Carter was concerned about the influence of interest groups. He highlighted this 
in his ‘Why not the Best’ speech on 12 December 1974: ‘The lobbyists who fill the halls 
of Congress, state capitols, county courthouses and city halls often represent well-
meaning and admirable groups. What is often forgotten is that lobbyists seldom 
represent the average citizen.’140 Carter held this view throughout his presidency; it had 
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a strong moral dimension and affected how he operated politically in Washington. He 
saw interest groups as nothing less than a challenge to his vision of an effective 
government. ‘Our commitment to these dreams has been sapped by debilitating 
compromise, acceptance of mediocrity, subservience to special interests and absence 
of executive vision and direction.’ 141 He entered the White House in the firm belief the 
he held a mandate only from the public.  
His agenda was reformist but not radical, with an emphasis on good governance 
with policies that would demonstrate competence. Stuart Eizenstat, Carter’s domestic 
policy advisor, outlined in a speech to the Washington Press Club what good governance 
meant. He talked about openness, efficiency backed by a substantial reorganisation, 
better targeting of government programmes and addressing long term fundamental 
issues.142 These policies were to be driven not by ideology, but a process derived from 
careful analysis of objective data by experts.143 The assumption by the president was 
that good policy would be accepted by legislators because the proposed solutions would 
be well researched and objective. However, such success would be dependent upon 
how effective Carter would be in another one of his roles, that of politician. 
As well as leading his administration Carter as a politician was the notional head 
of the Democratic Party. He had expertly used the electoral process to become 
president, but he was now expected to manage the political process to pass legislation 
and run the country.  Carter drew a clear distinction between electoral politics and policy 
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making. He enjoyed the campaign trail but even there he felt uncomfortable in doing 
what was politically expedient. He was embarrassed by his own aggressive campaigning 
for governor in 1970 against Carl Sanders when he was described in Macon Telegraph 
as ‘a good man whose high standards have been undermined by politics.’ 144 This drive 
to succeed was also reflected in his later campaigning; so, whilst aspiring to higher moral 
standards he was still capable of political calculation. Carter could not have been 
president without being a good politician but, ‘It was as if he didn’t like politics and 
yearned to be above both politics and politicians.’ 145 He certainly had few if any friends 
who were politicians and his relationships with senior members of Congress suggested 
he did not understand them. His Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Joe 
Califano, believed Carter had disdain for the political process.146 To his aide Lloyd Cutler 
it seemed that ‘Carter more or less had to fight himself to be a good politician.’147 This 
led to criticism that he was not capable of delivering the necessary deals or husbanding 
resources to drive through legislation in a post-Nixon Congress. There was a naivety 
about him. He saw his successes as governor, such as the reform of Georgia’s 
government, as being easily transferable to Washington.148 He admitted later that, “I 
could ignore the people in Atlanta, who were the social, business and media leaders if I 
so chose with relative impunity and deal primarily with members of the legislature.’149 
He subsequently admitted that this was a mistake when operating in Washington. Carter 
saw his political power as being based on the people not on other politicians. He saw 
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himself as a citizen politician unaffected by interest groups, who did what was right for 
the country. He said on controversial issues, ‘No country can afford men in the 
professions, in business or in politics that are more afraid of controversy than their 
conscience.’150 He therefore focussed his administration on solving the country’s most 
difficult problems whatever the political consequences. In stark contrast to his 
Democratic predecessor Lyndon Johnson, Carter did not understand how Washington 
politics operated or the consequences of ideological conflict. As a former engineer he 
fundamentally believed that all problems could be fixed.   
Carter was very proud of being an engineer; it was one of the roles he always 
mentioned in his speeches. He described himself as being ‘A trained engineer who 
prided himself on making technical judgements unburdened by ideology.’ 151 This also 
was reflected in his respect for his former boss Admiral Rickover whose opinions were 
taken seriously by his administration at Carter’s request.152 He wanted solutions to 
problems that were comprehensive, uniform, simple and predictable. He admitted that 
because of this training he liked to be personally involved ‘so I can know the thought 
processes that go into the final decisions.’ 153 There is a revealing comparison here 
between Carter and another engineer in the White House, Herbert Hoover. Like Carter, 
Hoover sought technical solutions to problems but also like Carter was widely regarded 
as a failed president. It was a comparison that the press took delight in highlighting.154 
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It was Carter the engineer who set the structure and the tone for the solutions he 
prescribed for the country’s ills. In doing so he was undeterred by the technical or 
political complexity of the problem because he believed that all problems were 
fixable.155 This philosophy which was reflected in Carter’s legislative programme, 
revealed a lack of pragmatism on his part. 
By the time of his election Carter had made many campaign commitments.156 
This in itself was not unusual but many of these largely liberal measures were forced 
upon him by his need to shore up support from his own party. New presidents were 
expected to utilise the period between their election and inaugural address to consult 
and establish a prioritised set of proposals that would turn campaign promises into 
concrete plans for legislation. Whilst Carter did consult widely during the transition, he 
displayed a marked reluctance both to prioritise his commitments and to provide an 
overall theme to sell to the electorate. He often referred to the religious philosopher 
Reinhold Neibuhr in his speeches. One of Niebuhr’s most famous prayers was, ‘God give 
us grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed, courage to change 
the things which should be changed, and the wisdom to distinguish the one from the 
other.’ 157 Carter could not do this. He freely admitted that, ‘Everybody warned me not 
to take on too many projects so early in the administration but it’s almost impossible for 
me to delay something that I see needs to be done.’158  His advisors, including Bert Lance, 
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knew this was a problem as it would create a legislative log jam in Congress. 159  
However, attempts to limit presidential goals and delay some initiatives such as the 
Panama Canal Treaty to a possible second term fell on deaf ears.160 The historian James 
McGregor Burns believed that as far as an agenda was concerned Carter had ‘strategic 
myopia’.161  
Attempts were made to develop a practical agenda. A systematic process to 
consult within the administration and with Congress started in April 1977.162 This was to 
become the first in a series of comprehensive plans over the next two years, led by Vice 
President Walter Mondale, to establish the administration’s priorities. Objectives were 
broken down into 30, 60 and 90 day plans involving Carter’s personal commitments and 
communications.163 There were several reasons why ultimately these attempts failed. 
The complexity of the legislation and the difficulty in gaining support in Congress was 
one factor. Secondly, only Carter had the authority to delay any legislation and he was 
extremely reluctant to do so. Indeed, as the process developed those measures that had 
priority tended to increase. 164 60 percent of proposed legislation that was sent to 
Congress had priority status, which resulted in many measures losing momentum.165  As 
a consequence the agreed agenda was invariably too large. For example, the 1978 
agreed agenda had 38 items on it.166 This can be contrasted with President Kennedy’s 
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focus on five ‘Must Bills’.167 Thirdly, Carter did not attempt to articulate his agenda’s key 
themes which often resulted in confusion over administration priorities. His 
Communications Director Gerald Rafshoon tried to persuade Carter in the autumn of 
1978 to promote bills to reduce waste and fraud168 but this conflicted with the work of 
the vice president who wanted priority given to themes of inflation and compassion.169 
There was also dissent within the administration with members continuing to argue that 
the administration’s agenda was overloaded. In November 1978, Jordan was expressing 
concern that the size of the agenda for the following year would not give the president 
enough time to build momentum for the 1980 election. 170 The White House, however, 
was more interested in the promotion of the volume of their legislation than its quality 
or cohesiveness. This was also reflected in Carter’s speeches which were in effect a 
check list of achievements rather than a vision of the changes he was trying to 
accomplish. 
To be effective and to project his power as president, Carter was dependent 
upon his own abilities and how well his staff and cabinet operated in supporting him. He 
therefore had to decide on the structure of his team, picking the right people and 
managing them day to day. Carter, like any other new president, had personal qualities 
that would help or hinder him as a leader. He was highly analytical, had excellent 
concentration and a passion for accuracy. His capacity for absorbing information 
became legendary; Carter wrote that he read 300 pages and 5/6 newspapers a day, 
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helped by speed reading training he and his wife received early in his administration.171 
The White House files are filled with Carter commenting on everything imaginable 
including the White House mail, staff grammar and even the subject of White House 
pens. 172  The press picked up on this theme, questioning Carter’s involvement in 
allocating use of the White House tennis court.173 For Carter finding time to do 
‘homework’ was a crucial element of the policy process because that gave him the 
detailed understanding of issues that would enable him to make the right decision. 
Critics of his administration argued that it was impossible for any president, even Carter, 
to be involved in that level of detail. Some of his cabinet found Carter’s obsession with 
detail irritating 174  but others like Bert Lance did not see it as a disadvantage.175  
However, the increase in paperwork did cause problems. Carter’s initial plan of working 
a 55-hour week with 15 hours reading had by April 1977 risen to 80 hours with 30 hours 
reading. 176 Carter recognised the problem and was regularly complaining to his staff 
who in response kept providing information on his work load 177 Carter admitted that 
although he had advice from Democratic congressional leader Tip O’Neill to cut back he 
could not do it.178 Yet in the same month he complained to staff about not being 
consulted about an obscure issue on Indian fishing rights.179 He wanted to be involved 
in everything. Carter exacerbated the problem because of his management style. He 
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preferred communication on paper  to face to face discussion 180 and as a result his aides 
like Jordan found writing memoranda was the most effective way of influencing him.181 
This resulted in an increase in the volume of memoranda sent to him as, with the 
exception of his Press Secretary Powell and his wife, all his staff put their cases in writing 
knowing the prodigiously hard-working Carter would read them and send them back 
promptly. Aide Harrison Welford said ‘the memos we send in sometimes come back with 
more comments than our original text. I don’t know how long he can keep this up, but 
he has a passion for getting involved in the details of a lot of these decisions.’182 After 
his first-year, comments on internal White House and non-policy matters declined but 
the flow of paper to him did not.  
If those were his key skills, what was his management style? Carter was not a 
natural manager of people; he was by nature solitary. He admitted that, ’When I am now 
in the White House in Washington, my greatest hunger is to be alone, away from the 
security officers, away from the press, and to be in the fields and woods again.’ 183 Bert 
Carp, a member of the Domestic Policy Group, said that Carter rarely talked to aides 
below Eizenstat or cabinet secretary level and he believed that Carter did not really like 
having staff. 184  Even with people that he had worked with for a long time he rarely 
complimented them on good work but always criticised sloppiness. 185 In keeping with 
his complex character, the Jimmy Carter who berated Jordan for the poor organisation 
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of his staff meetings186 was the same person who bantered with Powell over an amusing 
article 187 and who wrote many warm personal notes to politicians, members of the 
public and even on occasion a journalist. 188 Whatever his abilities Carter entered the 
White House with limited governmental experience and a substantial list of campaign 
commitments. Carter recognised this: ‘I have a substantial lack of experience and 
knowledge about the history of government here in Washington, the interrelationship 
among agencies, the proper division of authority and responsibility between Congress 
and the President.‘ 189 To overcome these disadvantages, he had to manage an effective 
transition to office, agree a working structure and pick a staff and a cabinet that would 
operate effectively. 
Carter was the first presidential candidate to put significant resources into 
transition planning. He appointed Georgia lawyer, Jack Watson, as its leader with 50 
staff, many of whom had Washington experience.190 Carter heavily promoted the work 
of the team to the press.191  They worked on draft policies, established a talent advisory 
group which made 27 recommendations on appointments as well as advice on staffing 
structure.192 They operated in isolation from the campaign which unfortunately proved 
the team’s undoing. When the election was over it was perceived that Watson’s 
                                                          
186 Carter to Jordan, 3 August 1979 Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, Confidential Files, Box 37, 
JCPL. 
187 Powell to Carter,21 July 1977 SS Box 35, JCPL. 
188 Carter to Sarah McClendon, 20 September 1977, SS Box 42, JCPL. 
189 Bruce Mazlish and Edwin Diamond, Jimmy Carter. A Character Portrait (New York: Simon 
and Schuster,1979), 236. 
190 Carl Brauer, Presidential Transitions: Eisenhower to Reagan (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 180-81. 
191 Shogan, Promises to Keep, 14-15. 
192 James W Riddlesperger Jr and James D King, ‘Political Constraints, Leadership Style, and 
Temporal Limits: The Administration of Jimmy Carter’, in Rosenbaum, Presidency and Domestic 
Policy of Jimmy Carter, 357. 
55 
 
recommendations on White House structure, which included appointing a chief of staff 
and a raft of policies, were a threat to Jordan as campaign manager and Eizenstat who 
was head of the campaign policy team.193 Carter was forced to arbitrate and found, not 
surprisingly, in favour of his campaign staff. This resulted in the rejection of virtually all 
the work done by the transition team and the potential advantages gained by early 
planning were lost. Carter did not even read Watson’s proposals on White House 
organisation.194 There were also delays in the appointments process caused by Carter’s 
personal involvement and insistence that there was to be a woman and a minority 
candidate for each job.195 Some major White House appointments were delayed right 
up until the inauguration. The role of the vice president was resolved quickly, however 
Walter Mondale, after the election, presented Carter with a detailed paper which not 
only defined a substantial role for himself but proposed the integration of his staff into 
the main White House structure. 196  Carter accepted his recommendations without 
amendment, paving the way for a significant role for Mondale in the new administration.  
In establishing how his staff were to operate in the White House, Carter was 
driven by one major concern: access.  He did not want intermediaries between himself 
and any of his advisors because ‘they fractured his concept of comprehensive policy 
making.’197 He therefore replicated a similar model of decentralised staffing to the one 
he had operated as governor. This was the ‘spokes of the wheel’ model with key aides 
being given access to the president both face to face and by memorandum. Carter’s 
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ability to absorb information would, he believed, prevent confusion in the policy 
process. From his viewpoint, it maximised his personal control because his aides worked 
closely under his direction and therefore only the president knew everything.198 Carter 
did not look at the White House in organisational terms. To him his staff were not there 
to help him with the business of government but to be more a family unit to support 
him. 199 He was always more comfortable dealing one to one with staff he knew and 
trusted; he never liked staff meetings. 200 He was very concerned that if he implemented 
the chief of staff role as an alternative, he would be replicating the maligned structure 
under Nixon and this would not sit well with his image of open government. Carter may 
have said that he did not want a ‘Sherman Adams in his office’201 but it was being seen 
to have a ‘Bob Haldeman’ that really worried him. In addition, the natural choice for the 
chief of staff role was Jordan who was his key advisor and was unwilling and lacked the 
administrative skills for the role. 202 Finally, having no chief of staff gave him a sense of 
being in control and he was supremely confident in his ability to deal with ten direct 
reports as well as cabinet members, the vice president and his wife. He said that, ‘Unless 
there is a holocaust I’ll take care of everything the same day it comes in.’ 203  
The success or failure of White House staff structure was invariably linked to the 
effectiveness of Carter’s concept of cabinet government. His main assumption was that 
cabinet departments would initiate policy and manage subsequent legislation. This 
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would, in theory, limit the role of White House staff but even at an early stage there 
were concerns expressed about the impact of honouring a campaign pledge for a 20 
percent cut in staff in April 1977. 204 The later head of the Office of Management of the 
Budget (OMB) James McIntyre believed these cuts caused huge disruption. 205  Carter 
himself recognised that even from his viewpoint things were not working. He 
complained about too much paper and after attempts at reform he still felt that he was 
not getting enough time to study.206 A more serious problem was how the political 
consequences of policy decisions were being addressed. According to Jordan the only 
place where politics and policy came together was with the president and that proved 
far too late in the process to prevent mistakes.207  Failure to consider properly the 
political ramifications of policy decisions made by the cabinet departments became a 
problem. The Department of Health’s launch of an anti-smoking campaign had major 
political consequences for Carter in North Carolina where Governor James Hunt was a 
key supporter.  Eizenstat, who headed up the Domestic Policy Group (DPG), urged Carter 
to ensure that White House staff played a coordinating role in ensuring policies 
developed by the cabinet did not conflict. A more coordinated approach was finally 
agreed at the Camp David Domestic Summit in May 1978 where staff concerns were 
raised, and changes made. Eizenstat got his way and the DPG started to play a role as 
coordinator and honest broker on papers sent to Carter through the process of 
Presidential Review and Decision Memoranda. 208 Jordan started running meetings of 
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policy staff to improve coordination across the administration, but Carter continued to 
maintain that a chief of staff was unnecessary. 209 Whilst approving these changes Carter 
did not appear to be very active in the debate. There was a consensus that the reforms 
brought improvements both in coordinating policy and managing the political 
consequences. 210  The development of Anne Wexler’s outreach role and her use of ‘Task 
Forces’ were also regarded as major successes. This approach, which brought together 
cabinet departments, White House staff and external support for individual policies, had 
its signature success with the passing of the Panama Canal Treaty bill.211 However, all 
parties in the White House were keen to maintain the facade that the cabinet 
government remained the way the administration did business. This continued until July 
1979. 
As presidential candidate Carter argued that his administration was going to be 
both ethical and efficient. As part of this approach to open government, he would re-
establish cabinet government. White House staff were to have a restricted role in 
advising him and he reinforced the point by cutting his staff by 20 percent. It would be 
his cabinet who would develop and implement his policies and increase efficiency by 
improving services.212 Carter sought to replicate his experience as governor where he 
developed a close working relationship with cabinet members, but the size of the task 
prevented such close relationships developing. Carter’s belief in cabinet government did 
not extend to collective responsibility. Despite the large number of meetings, fifty-nine 
in the first two years, there was no collective discussion or debate on issues in cabinet. 
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Meetings quickly deteriorated into ‘show and tell sessions.’ Cabinet members were 
however given a wide range of discretion. They were expected to run their own 
departments with no interference from the White House and they could be free to have 
the final say on appointing their own staff. 213As to the policies they were to follow, at 
Carter’s request, Cabinet members were given copies of all his major speeches 214 but 
otherwise they were left to their own devices. Carter believed that ‘the staff and Cabinet 
Officers would prefer to have minimal participation by me until the final decision point 
is reached.’215  
Carter’s relationships with individual members of the cabinet were cordial but 
not warm. Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland said it was nearly three years before 
he and his wife were invited to dinner at the White House.216 While many cabinet 
members had complaints about White House staff none had any about Carter 
personally. All at various times were asked about how easy it was to gain access to him 
and none had complaints on that score. He picked individuals from a range of 
backgrounds with only two, Cecil Andrus at the Department of the Interior and Bergland 
at Agriculture, representing any sort of interest group. Ray Marshall at Labour was 
picked against the direct advice of George Meany, head of the AFL-CIO. Carter described 
his cabinet appointments in terms of geographic diversity.217 He was also one of the first 
presidents to try to appoint women and minority groups throughout his administration. 
In terms of ideology the Carter cabinet represented a range from the liberal Secretary 
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of Labor to the conservative Attorney General, Griffin Bell.  Most were picked for their 
administrative skills rather than innovation218 and only one was a friend, Bert Lance, 
who was chosen to head up the Office of Management of the Budget (OMB).  James 
Schlesinger was picked as his special advisor on energy because Carter got on with him 
despite reservations from his team. 219  Given his later sacking in July 1979 one would 
assume that the relationship between Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare (HEW), and Carter would have been difficult but despite substantial policy 
differences they were on cordial terms. There were numerous examples of Carter 
writing notes of praise and support for Califano’s work at HEW. 220 Califano did receive 
criticism from the president but as Carter himself admitted, it was the relationship 
between Califano and Mike Blumenthal, the Secretary of the Treasury, with White 
House staff that proved critical in the eventual decision to sack them in July 1979. 221 
This area of conflict signified the unravelling of Carter’s attempt at cabinet government. 
There were problems with the operation of cabinet government from the outset. 
The degree of independence given to each member of the cabinet resulted in frequent 
conflict with the White House. The situation was made worse by the president’s failure 
to give specific guidance on the broad policy issues that he asked the departments to 
resolve. Also, there was no analysis of the political implications of any policy until after 
the proposal reached Carter’s desk. He assumed that a comprehensive solution would 
naturally win support 222 but his staff were fighting political fires from his first day in 
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office. Cabinet members were appointing individuals into departmental positions 
without consulting the relevant member of Congress. After prompting from Mondale, 
Carter instructed his cabinet to check any appointments with Jordan, 223 but the 
complaints persisted. There were also problems over communication, with each 
department issuing conflicting messages on policy. Carter wrote a personal note to the 
cabinet in April 1977 requesting one lead spokesman on major issues224 but this was not 
fully implemented until the following year when Rafshoon was appointed. Cabinet 
members were accused of leaking to the press and there was often counter leaking from 
White House staff. 225 Press comments forced Carter on more than one occasion to deny 
in public that he was unhappy with certain cabinet members.226 Discontent from White 
House staff culminated in a highly critical personal memorandum from Jordan to Carter. 
He listed the cabinet’s failures, including inability to notify the White House of decisions, 
systematic leaks to the press, not responding to Congress, and lack of support for 
presidential polices. Jordan named Transport Secretary Brock Adams, as well as Califano 
and Blumenthal, as being disloyal. He further suggested that the whole cabinet was 
working against Carter’s policy on the budget. 227 The consequence of this and a decline 
in the polls was the Camp David Domestic Summit of May 1978. Carter agreed to White 
House staff demands to give them a major role in coordinating policy and handling the 
political issues arising out of cabinet policies. This was not the death of cabinet 
government, but it curtailed the power of individual secretaries to act independently. It 
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did not stop the leaks or suggestions that staff were deliberately trying to undermine 
members of the cabinet and so mutual mistrust continued. 228  
Carter’s insistence on cabinet government had a negative effect on the White 
House staff but to many in the Washington press the problem was not the structure but 
the quality of his staff. Journalists and politicians often cited the Georgians as lacking 
experience of working in Washington as a problem.229  Once these opinions formed they 
were very difficult to shift. This was particularly true of Frank Moore and his 
congressional liaison team.230 Even the more positive cabinet members like Bergland 
regarded the administration as ‘loaded with honest amateurs.’ 231 Others questioned 
staff competence. Both Clark Clifford, a Washington insider brought in to advise Carter, 
and Attorney General Bell blamed the Bert Lance resignation on poor staff work. 232  
Lance was forced to resign over financial irregularities from his time as president of the 
National Bank of Georgia. Carter did not meet with his senior staff team in the first two 
years, preferring to work individually with people he trusted.233   He was criticised for 
appointing Georgians to six of the nine special assistants’ posts. What really mattered 
to Carter was not that they were from the same state but that they had personal 
experience of working with him. Eizenstat may well have had experience of working in 
Washington for Hubert Humphrey but as Carter said, ‘he didn’t really have those four 
years of experience and training within state government to know exactly how I did 
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things.’234 Some did recognise that there was a shortage of DC experience and tried to 
bring in ‘wise men’ on an ad hoc basis. Discussions were held with senior figures, notably 
Clark Clifford and Averell Harriman, but this was not sustained. 235 To the press, 
however, much was made of the Georgian influence and some of this criticism smacked 
of regional prejudice with the high-profile Jordan and Powell on one occasion described 
by speechwriter Patrick Anderson as ‘a couple of raw boned, narrow eyed South 
Georgian thugs.’236  
Carter saw himself as a leader who was taking on Washington and believed he 
had the skills to evaluate the options and make the best decision. The only real friend 
he had in the administration was Bert Lance and he made no new friends whilst he was 
president 237 He did bring with him into the White House two close associates, Hamilton 
Jordan and Jody Powell. As press secretary, Powell saw Carter daily, but he had no 
influence on policy. Jordan’s role, at least initially, was vague given Carter’s rejection of 
the chief of staff model. He focussed mainly on the appointments process but his access 
through memoranda was important and unlike other staff members he was sufficiently 
confident of his relationship with Carter to be critical of the operation of the White 
House and Carter personally.238 Carter’s major source of advice within the 
administration was Bert Lance. Over and above access to Carter’s office, Lance had a 
weekly lunch with the president as well as regular games of tennis. He was able to use 
his influence for example to tone down Carter’s performance at budget meetings, where 
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his detailed knowledge often intimidated staff 239 and to abandon plans to save energy 
by turning off the lights on the Lincoln Memorial.240  Lance said that he and long-term 
supporter Charles Kirbo were Carter’s only two sources of candid advice.241 This was not 
quite accurate given Jordan’s influence but with Kirbo visiting Washington infrequently, 
the resignation of Lance in September 1977 due to alleged financial irregularities in his 
bank dealings was a personal blow to Carter. He acknowledged at his press conference 
that he did not believe that Lance could be replaced.242  Lance had credibility both within 
and beyond the administration and was seen as a fixer.  Carter lost the option of saying 
‘talk to Bert about that.’ 243 His departure also curtailed the influence of the OMB 
because while his successor, Jim McIntyre, was trusted for his mastery of the detail but 
he lacked Lance’s political skills. When Lance resigned the only personal advice that 
Carter continued to receive was from his wife, Rosalynn. The role of fixer was mainly 
taken up by his Vice President Mondale. He had a regular weekly lunch with the 
president and was to play an influential role firefighting on Carter’s behalf. As Carter ran 
into trouble with Congress, he used Mondale as a bridge builder to facilitate deals for 
example on the Water Projects and the Farm Bill. 244 A measure of how Carter valued 
Mondale was his swift response to articles in the press suggesting that his vice president 
was losing influence. He called journalists from the New York Times and LA Times to deny 
this.245  Carter’s wife remained his political partner throughout his term in office. The 
indications of how he valued her role came in her trip to South America on his behalf, 
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her sitting in at cabinet meetings and her involvement with issues like mental health and 
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). There were also signs of her influence on wider 
issues. Rafshoon stated that she was influential in him returning to the White House. 246 
and Lance believed some aides, particularly Rafshoon and Caddell, took proposals to 
Rosalynn first to get her political judgement before talking to Carter.247 Some judged her 
to be the most influential president’s wife since Edith Wilson 248 but no archival evidence 
is currently available that confirms this other than the word of Carter and his aides. 
In terms of morale one of Carter’s more experienced staff, Anne Wexler, believed 
that the White House was the ‘least turf conscious place she had ever worked.’ 249 There 
were, however, tensions between the domestic policy and OMB leadership. Jim 
McIntyre thought Eizenstat’s team represented the views of the interest groups they 
used to work for. 250 Whilst accepting OMB’s technical competence, Eizenstat thought 
that they were politically naive. This was illustrated in an early draft of a note that 
Eizenstat wrote to Carter which contained a strong critique of the role of the OMB on 
policy matters. 251He subsequently deleted the criticism, perhaps conscious of Carter’s 
strong views on internal bickering. 252 More seriously some of this disagreement spread 
into fundamental areas of policy. The administration’s increasing emphasis on fighting 
inflation was undermined by leaks from White House staff.253  Carter’s attempts to 
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distinguish his personal views on abortion from his neutral public stance were 
undermined by an open rebellion led by Midge Constanza, his aide for public liaison, 
who organised a petition of White House staff.254 The main cause of tension in the White 
House arose out of the failure of Carter’s attempt at cabinet government to deliver a 
coherent policy development process. Initially cabinet secretaries and their staff could 
largely ignore White House staff but as they became aware that their policies required 
support across the administration, the role of Eizenstat in coordination became 
important. The Camp David Domestic Summit of May 1978 formalised that policy 
decisions would be reviewed by White House staff. This increase in their power resulted 
in most cabinet secretaries being relegated to a lower level of authority.255 After 
identifying major problems with the original cabinet government model, reforms did 
bring about improvements in White House efficiency. Yet, tensions and problems 
persisted until the cabinet government approach was abandoned in July 1979 and a 
chief of staff appointed. (See Chapter Seven). The new structure and the appointment 
of three experienced ‘outsiders’, Lloyd Cutler, Hedley Donovan and Alonzo McDonald, 
further improved the effectiveness of the White House. Whether an earlier 
implementation of this change would have significantly improved the administration’s 
record seems unlikely given the serious problems Carter faced when dealing with 
Congress.  
One of the main challenges for Carter was to ensure that his key legislation 
passed Congress. To succeed he needed to have clear legislative goals, the skills to build 
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support in Congress and the country as a whole, and an effective congressional liaison 
team. Carter started his term of office with perceived weaknesses in all these areas. He 
inherited a Congress with a Democratic majority but one that was fractious with a new 
leadership and a complex structure of 165 committees and sub committees256 that 
would make passing any but the simplest legislation difficult. His mandate from the 
electorate was perceived to be limited and his non-ideological style meant that he had 
no natural constituency within the legislature on which he could rely. Consequently, 
Carter had to build support for every major piece of legislation. This would make him 
dependent upon his skills and the quality of staff around him to succeed. Not even his 
greatest supporters would claim that Carter was a successful legislator in the Johnson 
mould. He made mistakes but, as Bergland argued, part of the reason why Carter could 
not control Congress was that Congress could not control itself.257  
A critical factor in legislative success was how well relationships with members 
of congress were managed. It is here that Carter’s role as a politician was crucial. Once 
the campaign was over Carter did not believe that politics had a role in government. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, his national security advisor, commented that ‘Carter made hardly 
any effort to disguise his disdain for domestic politics.’  258 He spent on average 30 hours 
a week in meetings with members of Congress, but this was regarded as not enough.259  
Eizenstat commented on dealing with Congress that, ‘You have got to like dealing with 
politicians ... and it just takes enormous energy,’260 but Carter neither liked nor 
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understood politicians. He emphasised that congressional constituencies were also his, 
as president, which challenged members of Congress on their own ground.261 He refused 
to accept that he owed Congress a debt from the election262 and he believed that they 
should back his proposals because he had studied the issue and, unlike Congress, was 
unaffected by special interests.263 Carter did accept that he lacked Washington 
experience but there seemed to be little effort to adjust to his new environment. He 
continued to assume that Congress would behave like the Georgia legislature and he 
remained confident that he could manage them as well as he had when he was 
governor. Attempts by senior legislators in Washington to argue for Carter to pay them 
more attention had the same outcome as in Georgia.264 Carter was always prepared to 
meet members of Congress, but it was usually in large numbers265 and he appeared to 
lack affinity with them or understand their viewpoint. Senator J Bennett Johnson of 
Louisiana said that Carter ‘didn’t have any friends who were in Congress who you’d think 
of as being warm and friendly. He just didn’t have any kind of relationship with 
anybody.’266 Some meetings with Senators Adlai Stevenson III of Illinois and Harrison 
‘Jack’ Schmidt of New Mexico, for example, resulted in some fairly scathing comments 
from Carter.267  Another attempt at relationship building became almost comical when 
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Rafshoon persuaded Carter to play Senators Lloyd Bentsen of Texas and Ernest ‘Fritz’ 
Hollings of South Carolina at tennis. Rafshoon’s expectation was that the game would 
be followed by drinks and political discussion. Carter finished the game and left them 
there, assuming this was all that was required.268 When he gave an important speech at 
Notre Dame University he failed to mention the local Democratic congressmen in the 
audience. 269  Although Carter was conscientious in making calls to congressmen at the 
request of his staff, he was reluctant to do so. Jody Powell was stated, ‘It’s the damndest 
thing about him. He went all over the country for two years asking everybody he saw to 
vote for him for president, but he doesn’t like to call a congressman and ask for his 
support on a bill.’ 270 Carter was not totally lacking in political guile. He could sometimes 
be pragmatic and when as governor his reform bill was going through, he ordered that 
no liberal measures be put forward so as not to antagonise conservative supporters of 
the bill.271 He was also prepared to compromise to get legislation through but he was 
extremely reluctant to do deals related to other policies.272 The exceptions being his 
successful intervention with the Senate to pass the Panama Canal Treaty and he ensured 
Congressman Mo Udall of Arizona’s support for Government Reform by appointing one 
of Udall’s friends to the Civil Aeronautics Board.273 However he vetoed funds for a 
nuclear carrier sponsored by Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson of Washington despite 
needing his support on the Energy bill.274 When Pennsylvanian Congressmen threatened 
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to vote against all his legislation unless he approved their choice for a US Attorney role 
in Philadelphia, he told them ‘to go to hell.’275  Carter was driven by his need to do the 
right thing over political expediency. This would make his relationships with members 
of Congress problematic.   
Carter needed the support of senior members of Congress if his legislative 
programme was to succeed. He said that he did not expect problems because his party 
had a majority.276 He was disabused of this by his first meeting with Democratic 
Chairman of the Government Operations Committee Jack Brooks of Texas over 
Government Reform in January 1977. 277  To succeed he needed to be guided through 
the complexity of Congress. Frank Moore, Carter’s assistant for congressional liaison, 
advised Carter weeks before the Inaugural that he ‘must decide early your first initiatives 
and work with the leadership prior to January in making them feel they are part of 
it.’278For Carter the leadership referred to was House Speaker Thomas P. ‘Tip’ O’Neill 
and Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd.  
Tip O’Neill was a liberal congressman from Massachusetts and new to the 
position of Speaker. Carter and O’Neill developed an effective working relationship. This 
was despite some ideological differences on the economy and a fractious relationship 
between O’Neill and Carter’s staff, particularly Jordan.  Carter in his diaries talked of 
O’Neill as a personal friend whose loyalty he valued despite O’Neill’s natural support for 
Teddy Kennedy.279 This relationship was reflected in a number of warm personal notes 
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from Carter.280 O’Neill ensured that key measures passed the House, including the 
Energy bill and he also influenced Carter’s compromise on the Water Projects.281 O’Neill 
had no illusions about Carter’s failures with Congress but he later said that, ‘I miss Jimmy 
Carter. With his intelligence and energy and his tremendous moral strength, he would 
have been a great leader.’ 282 No such sentiment was ever likely to be expressed by 
Senator Robert Byrd. 
Byrd made it clear from the start that his first loyalty was to his state, West 
Virginia, then to the Senate and finally to Carter.283 Carter was prepared to defer to Byrd 
on the tactics he employed to get his legislation passed but it did not always work as 
Byrd often gave way to the will of the committee chairmen. Frank Moore’s team were 
always conscious of the need to massage Byrd’s bruised ego when he felt that he was 
not getting the attention he deserved. 284 To Byrd, however, Carter did not treat the 
Senate with due respect. He believed, with some justification, that Carter and his 
advisors still thought they could treat the Senate as if it was the Georgia legislature. He 
was unhappy about Carter’s reversal of his decision in April 1977 on the $50 tax rebate 
which was taken without proper consultation or warning. Disturbingly for the 
administration, such decisions made Byrd question whether it would be wise for the 
Senate to support such policies if the president was going to undercut them by changing 
his mind. 285 There were arguments with Byrd over the administration failing to consult 
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him properly on local issues and appointments.286 These were similar to disputes with 
Tip O’Neill but Byrd’s anger and threats to withdraw support from key legislation were 
more direct.287 Byrd, unlike O’Neill, fundamentally disagreed with much of the 
legislation that Carter sent to the Senate, but he did play a key role in helping Carter on 
some issues such as the Clinch River Reactor, the Korean Amnesty and auto pollution.288 
However, Byrd did not prove an effective champion of the administration in the Senate 
as O’Neill was in the House.  
Carter’s failure to influence key members of Congress was a product of his 
inexperience and his attitude to making deals with politicians. Due to his national 
mandate he expected that a Congress led by his own party would follow his lead and 
accept his proposals. He believed that his experience as governor would be sufficient to 
deal with any issues. But Congress was both proud and jealous of its own prerogatives 
and had an agenda of its own. The success or failure of any legislative programme was 
dependent upon the ability of the White House to mobilise support. This was more 
difficult for the administration because of the complex committee and sub-committee 
structure and the fragmented nature of the political factions. In addition, the Carter 
administration’s predilection for comprehensive solutions placed increased strain on 
the legislative process. To be successful therefore Carter needed an effective 
congressional liaison team. 
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Frank Moore made recommendations to Carter during the transition about the 
role his team should play.289 Nearly all of them were ignored and in general the president 
expressed little interest in how Moore’s team operated.290  In the Carter White House 
congressional liaison officials were to have no influence on policy development as that 
was to be the remit of cabinet official departments and their own liaison staff. Moore 
initially only had seven people compared with HEW which had 40 and Commerce, 30 
staff. 291 Moore’s team were picked for their ability to serve the president not support 
Congress. Hence, they were organised under specific policy areas. This was against the 
advice of President Kennedy’s congressional liaison, Lawrence J O’Brien, who 
recommended that staff be aligned to build relationships with members of Congress.292 
Moore did benefit from daily access to the president and had Carter’s backing whether 
it was fending off criticism or conscientiously making calls to key congressmen.293 
Moore’s prime role was to keep Carter informed of congressional views whilst at the 
same time maximising the president’s independence.294 However, the structure soon 
ran into problems. Moore’s very appointment was perceived as a negative signal to 
Congress given his lack of experience of Washington. His staff were overwhelmed by the 
legislative programme and a backlog of politically sensitive appointments. Their focus 
on policies resulted in issues raised by individual congressmen being mishandled. 295 
Attempts to devolve work to cabinet departments failed because congressmen felt 
fobbed off. They wanted access to the president and, if not him, either Jordan or Moore. 
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The president was not inclined to talk to congressmen, and Jordan had agreed with 
Carter that he would step back from dealing with Congress. 296 To Moore this was simply 
a numbers issue; the president’s commitment to 20 percent cuts in White House staff 
made the situation worse.297 There was also criticism of the lack of legislative experience 
within the White House.298 But this was not reflected in the administration as a whole 
because liaison staff working in ten out of the eleven government departments were led 
by staff with congressional experience.299 The gradual move away from cabinet 
government resulted in increased resources and improved credibility for Moore’s team. 
The recruitment of the experienced Bill Cable as House Liaison in May 1977 and Dan 
Tate as lead for the Senate in the following year300 resulted in a better understanding of 
Congress. The team also became important members of the task force approach to 
legislative challenges. Used successfully for the Panama Canal Treaty bill, this became 
the norm as a means of managing important legislation in the second half of the 
administration. This approach under Anne Wexler’s outreach team brought together the 
relevant cabinet departments, the press office, members of Moore’s staff and 
departmental liaison to deliver key legislation. This was a recognition that with no 
natural coalition in Congress all major pieces of legislation required specific planning to 
enable passage. This coupled with regular Tuesday meetings between Carter and the 
Democratic leadership ensured that there was a more coordinated approach as his 
presidency unfolded. 301  
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This transition did not happen quickly and as a result there were avoidable errors 
at the start of his administration. Even before he began in the role, Moore had a 
reputation for ignoring queries from congressmen. This was due to an initial 
misunderstanding about his role in the campaign,302 but this was made worse by the 
continued failure of his staff to deal with congressional requests.303 There were several 
high-profile mistakes over appointments and the award of government grants. This was 
often caused by decisions made by cabinet departments but nevertheless Moore got 
the full force of congressional anger. During the first year there were a series of high 
profile complaints by Senators James O. Eastland of Mississippi, Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
of New York, William D. Hathaway of Maine and the Chair of Ways and Means 
committee Albert C. Ullman of Oregon.304  In addition Califano quoted Congressman 
Daniel D. Rostenkowski of Illinois, Chief Deputy Whip and one of the Democratic 
leadership team, about Moore stating that, ‘Every time he comes up here he costs us 
votes.’305 The most serious falling out was with Tip O’Neill who found out from the 
newspapers that one of his key supporters Bob Griffin, had been removed from the 
General Services Administration. Moore was banned from the Speaker’s offices and 
Carter had to placate O’Neill and force Moore to apologise.306 This incident was less 
Moore’s fault than the administration’s inability to coordinate its actions. For whatever 
reason, members of Congress felt neglected. As a senior congressman put it, ‘Two 
classes of people who don’t want to be ignored, beautiful women and politicians. If you 
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ignore them, you must be doing it on purpose because it is so obvious to everyone they 
are singular people. They don’t care for that kind of treatment.’307 The frustration was 
not always one way. The Democratic leadership often blocked attempts by Carter to 
replicate tactics that had worked for him in Georgia. O’Neill and Byrd vetoed attempts 
by Carter to engage with the GOP even when there was a natural constituency of 
support on specific legislation.308 To the Democratic leadership an invitation to key 
senators to discuss the energy bill, without consulting them, demonstrated ignorance of 
protocol but to the administration it was attempting to get the job done. 309  
Despite these problems Moore’s team did provide a flow of important 
information to Carter. This took the form of weekly reports on congressional activity, 
which Carter continued to read and comment on assiduously.310 They also provided 
briefings for when the president met members of congress which provided political and 
personal guidance to enable him to maximise his effectiveness.311 Moore worked hard 
to persuade a reluctant Carter to spend more time in different environments with 
legislators to put across the administration’s goals312 but also, Moore admitted, to 
educate Carter himself. 313  The introduction of more experienced staff and the 
realignment of the team won more plaudits. The move of Moore’s team to the West 
Wing in 1978 also brought a more important benefit by integrating them with senior 
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White House staff.314 In the run up to the Camp David Domestic Summit Moore and his 
team conducted a review with the Democratic whips following the failure to pass the 
Consumer bill. The criticism moved beyond that of Moore’s team to the whole 
administration approach to Congress.315 Many of the recommendations were endorsed 
by the president and implemented. Coordination improved, and the Democratic 
leadership were consulted more frequently. In October 1978 Senator Byrd was moved 
to say that he had never seen such achievement and harmony between President and 
Congress in 27 years.316 Yet, the question of Carter’s perceived attitude to Congress 
remained an issue, particularly after his decision early in his administration to take on 
Congress over the water projects.   
Carter’s attempt to cut back on government investment in water projects 
demonstrated the key themes of his domestic presidency. It highlighted his 
determination to do the right thing, fight special interests, reduce waste in government 
and to protect the environment. It was also seen as an early test of his administration’s 
competence and his ability to stand up to Congress.  For many members of Congress, it 
was a direct attack on their patronage because they used such projects to help their 
constituents.  There was however no universal support for such investment. Many of 
the projects were not financially viable and there were often major environmental 
concerns. Carter believed that he had the support for his actions of the American people 
(as he was fulfilling a campaign promise) and Democrats in Congress,317 key GOP leaders, 
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the OMB, the Water Resources Council and the Council of Environmental Quality.318 So 
Carter expected a Democratic Congress to fall into line, but he underestimated the 
political impact of his proposals. Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, Chair of the Finance 
Committee, was baffled by Carter’s actions because to Long the president ‘was asking 
for a fight when he didn’t have the votes to win to begin with.’ 319 The proposal affected 
congressmen across the political spectrum and many of them held key committee and 
sub-committee positions. Carter received little advice about the political consequences 
of his decision. Only Secretary of Interior Andrus raised it as a potential issue.320 The 
announcement was due on 21 February 1977 but it was leaked beforehand with affected 
congressmen being misinformed by the newspapers that their projects were cancelled 
(as opposed to postponed).321 No attempt had been made to warn these congressmen 
with Moore being quoted in the New York Times as saying that he did not know that it 
was tradition to tell congressmen in advance322  
The reaction on Capitol Hill was immediately hostile with congressional 
committees holding up key legislation and appointments. Carter and his team made 
various attempts both at compromise and ‘hanging tough,’323 but many of the proposed 
cuts were reinstated as Carter was forced to accept a compromise brokered by 
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 O’Neill.324 This may have been the right decision, but Carter’s staff were totally unaware 
of what in effect was a U-turn and therefore it damaged the president’s and their own 
credibility.325 This was not the end of the issue as there were annual budgets to come 
which proved to be an opportunity for more legislative battles. Despite a much-
improved performance from White House staff in dealing with the political realities,326 
Congress continued to reinstate the cancelled projects. Lance argued that the Water 
Projects policy was Carter’s worst mistake, as the negative effects lasted the rest of his 
term. He believed it ‘doomed any hopes we ever had of developing a good effective 
working relationship with Congress.’ 327 The administration grossly underestimated the 
ferocity of the local and regional forces that they were taking on.328 The initial ham-
fisted attempt in February 1977 made limited gains but at the cost of alienating key 
members of Congress and creating the impression that if pressure was applied, the 
president could be ‘rolled’ on legislative issues. 
As Carter’s popularity began to decline in late 1977 one of the major reasons 
given was his perceived inability to control Congress. He continued to insist that 
relations with Capitol Hill were good 329 but his lack of understanding was evident as he 
continued to express surprise at the ‘inertia of Congress.’330 Many of the problems 
centred on his attitude and his failure to treat Congress as a partner but most related to 
the sheer logistics of what his administration was trying to achieve legislatively. Many 
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of the main bills put forward were extremely complex, as Carter himself recognised, 
often involving up to 17 committees and sub-committees. Mondale’s review of Carter’s 
agenda for 1978 highlighted the limited amount of ‘floor days’ available for new 
initiatives.331 This workload imposed on Congress was a factor affecting the 
administration’s success rate. The other issue was the lack of a consistent base of 
support. Attempts to build support with the GOP were vetoed by the Democratic 
leadership which forced Carter to rely upon an increasingly volatile Democratic Party.332 
Analysis by Les Francis of congressional liaison indicated an overall level of support for 
Carter’s legislation of 68.5 percent amongst Democrats in the House but that varied 
amongst the regions with support in Texas as low as 29 percent.333 There were various 
attempts to quantify the administration’s ‘success rate’ with Congress. The consensus 
suggested that after a relatively poor first year Carter’s success rate was around 78 
percent. Although this compared favourably with previous presidents, it did not 
consider bills withdrawn to avoid certain defeat or the importance of the legislation that 
failed. 334 If Carter’s legislative record was regarded in general as a failure this view was 
largely a result of expectation and public perception. For the former Carter admitted 
that one of the biggest mistakes he made was to build up expectations that he did not 
fulfil.335  Shaping public perception proved to be another serious challenge for the 
president.                  
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The ability of the modern president to communicate effectively with the public 
has been critical to the perception of their performance in the job. By the mid-1970’s 
the communication channels used by the president had expanded to include national 
newspapers, press conferences, television (interviews and speeches), radio as well as 
various face-to-face meetings with the public. All of these were used by administrations 
to create an image of a successful president, to inform and on occasion persuade the 
public on critical issues. When Carter was elected he did not have a very clear image and 
the Washington press, who had mainly supported Ford, largely based their expectations 
on the style of previous Democratic presidents.  Hence the press believed that Carter 
would present a vision to the country supported by a coherent agenda. He would work 
effectively with Congress and above all be a visible leader. Carter fulfilled very few of 
those expectations. He was criticised for his ‘fuzziness’ on issues. HIs attempt to address 
this and concern about his religious beliefs in the Playboy interview had failed 
spectacularly during the campaign. In addition, the press, generally more cynical since 
Watergate, were at best sceptical over Carter’s statement ‘to never lie’ to the public and 
this, coupled with his obvious intelligence, became a challenge for them to catch him 
out.336The media, particularly the Washington press, were negative about Carter 
throughout his term in office. Carter believed his administration only had one month of 
positive coverage in the media out of 48 and that was the first month.337 James Reston 
of the New York Times said that, ‘The press was primarily responsible for destroying 
Carter’s political reputation.’ 338 Mistrust existed on both sides as Carter’s advisors were 
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equally suspicious of the Washington press. This was particularly the case with Frank 
Moore who bitterly resented criticism in the Washington Post of his team almost as soon 
as they arrived. 339 There was to be much criticism of the Carter administration’s lack of 
understanding of Washington but many in the White House felt that part of this was due 
to regional prejudice.340 To the Carter White House some of the coverage around Lance’s 
financial difficulties, seemed to reinforce this point.341  
Carter recognised that as president he was required to use his office to inform 
and influence the public and he believed that to carry out his mandate he needed to 
maintain contact with the people who had elected him. He was supremely confident in 
his intellectual ability, so he preferred this contact to be interactive where he could 
answer questions in an open and honest manner. He was at his most effective in 
campaigning, town hall meetings, radio phone ins, television interviews, and despite his 
reservations about the audience, press conferences. The editor of the Atlanta 
Constitution, Reg Murphy, by no means a Carter supporter, said of him that ‘one to one, 
he’s probably as convincing as anybody I’ve ever seen.’342 He was much less effective in 
front of large audiences, especially on television. Early in his campaign, his friend, 
Charles Kirbo, insisted that Carter took a television test. He was told by the experts that 
the maximum time where he would be effective on TV was 5 minutes. Carter ignored 
this advice.343  
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His most regular and most important channel to the public was through the press 
and, unfortunately, he simply did not trust them. He believed that the Washington Post 
conducted a vendetta against Lance and that the ‘so called Lance affair, was a DC only 
story’.344 In commenting on a Newsweek article, Carter wrote that the magazine was the 
‘worst violator of the self-initiated story.’345 By late 1977 Carter was commenting in his 
diary that, ‘Distortions in the Washington press are absolutely gross,’346 and by the 
following year in a television interview with Bill Moyers he was talking about being 
surprised by the ‘irresponsibility of the press.’ 347 Carter’s defensive attitude hampered 
his staff’s attempts to improve media coverage. Efforts to increase contact between the 
president and members of the media were met with resistance from Carter,348 
culminating in his much-criticised refusal to speak at the Annual White House 
Correspondents Dinner in 1978. This was a major media event which the president 
always attended; Carter refused despite the efforts of his staff and Mondale to persuade 
him.349 His stubbornness as far as the press was concerned was a barrier to any media 
strategy his staff tried to implement. But he did not think that all the press were 
irresponsible. In discussions with editors he praised the work of the New York Times and 
Time magazine, and even praised the editorials of the Washington Post.350 He also 
continued to read the main newspapers and take notice of what they said. Articles, both 
‘good and bad,’ regularly appeared in Carter’s In-Box and, negative or not, he still 
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demanded a response to the issues raised. For example, he demanded action be taken 
over an article in the Washington Post that reported that White House Staff numbers 
were going up at the time when 20 percent cuts were being implemented.351 Any media 
strategy that his staff developed needed to consider not only Carter’s prejudices but his 
strengths and weaknesses as a communicator.  
In the 1970’s the main communication channel with the public remained the 
press. The Washington-based press was crucial because it shaped the agenda of those 
other regional and state papers, which did not have DC-based journalists. His staff 
shared Carter’s suspicion of the Washington press but equally he enjoyed and was an 
effective performer at press conferences, so the administration followed a dual strategy. 
Carter made a public commitment to hold news conferences every fortnight, but these 
events were opened to the journalists, editors and owners of newspapers across the 
country.352 This attempt to reach a national audience was popular with those invited to 
the White House and Carter did receive a more sympathetic hearing. His standard press 
conferences were not confrontational, and he gave relaxed performances. It was what 
journalists reported afterwards that Carter thought was the problem. His administration 
did have a ‘honeymoon’ period with the press, backed by favourable polls and perhaps 
lasting as long as nine months until the Lance affair. 353 However, by the end of 1977 
Powell, Carter’s Press Secretary, was recommending an emphasis on television for 1978 
based on the assumption that fair treatment from the written press was unlikely.354  
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A second theme of the administration’s media strategy was linked to the 
president’s commitment to communicate with the public about his policies. This was 
called within the White House the ‘People Programme’. Coordinated by one of his aides, 
Greg Schneiders, it covered a series of events from Carter’s first fireside chat in February 
1977, to town hall meetings, radio phone-ins and visits to people’s homes. 355 In 
addition, ordinary people were invited to White House dinners 356 and the public were 
encouraged to write to him personally. He also asked his cabinet to go out and meet the 
people.357 This fitted in with Carter’s image of himself as an open and honest president 
who listened and was answerable to the people. During the early phase of the 
programme the president was perceived as a breath of fresh air.  David Broder of the 
Washington Post commented after the Clinton Town Hall event on March 1977 that, ‘In 
his first two months as President Jimmy Carter has achieved a triumph of 
communication in the arena of public opinion. He has transformed himself from a shaky 
winner of a campaign into a very popular President whose mastery of the mass media 
has given him real leverage with which to govern.’358 For this strategy to be successful, 
however, direct communication with the public  had to be not only sustained, which it 
was not, but also his staff needed to use  public support for his policies to influence 
legislators. Although this approach was eventually adopted to gain public backing for 
the Panama Canal Treaty, it was not fully implemented until Anne Wexler replaced 
Midge Constanza as Special Assistant for Public Outreach in September 1978. This 
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established an outreach strategy that linked together all aspects of the administration’s 
operations in a task force to support specific policies. 359    
A third element of the media strategy, which was perfectly in tune with Carter’s 
style, was the administration’s attempts to increase informality and reduce ceremony 
around the presidency. Best symbolised by his decision to get out of the car and walk to 
the White House with his wife at the inaugural, Carter calculated that this act would 
symbolise his closeness to the people who elected him.  This was also reflected in his 
rhetoric, a plain and simple style of a man talking to his neighbour.360 This image helped 
him be a successful presidential candidate but became less beneficial as his term 
progressed as Carter soon discovered that once in office the public expected him to act 
as the leader of their country. Attempts to reduce ceremony and his informality were 
used as examples of him lacking leadership hence the need to be seen as acting 
‘presidential’. 
A major problem for Carter was the message he was trying to communicate. The 
issues he wanted to address were by their nature complex and controversial. He had 
difficulty in explaining in simple terms the solutions he was offering to the public at a 
time when he faced increasing opposition. Another consequence was that Carter began 
to develop a reputation for indecisiveness. This was in sharp contrast to his image as 
governor as someone who was hard headed, stubborn, inflexible and opinionated. 361 
The situation was not helped by confusion arising from Carter’s policy of cabinet 
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government. There was no one in the White House who was able to coordinate an 
overall message on policy with each department having its own Publicity Information 
Officers (PIO’s) issuing their own statements. 362 Carter was also seen as the deliverer of 
bad news whilst he allowed cabinet members to give any good news to the public. Esther 
Petersen, his assistant for consumer affairs, contrasted this with Lyndon Johnson who 
insisted that any good news had to come through the White House. 363  It was for these 
reasons the Rafshoon was brought in to oversee communication strategy in June 1977. 
His appointment can be seen as part of an attempt by Carter’s advisors to improve 
coordination and control the message. Rafshoon was successful in ensuring that 
communication was more co-ordinated, and he worked hard to reduce the president’s 
exposure to the media, particularly on television. He told Carter that ‘you are running 
the risk of boring the people and you have 3 ½ years to go.’364 He also ensured that 
cabinet members became more involved in ‘selling’ the administration’s policies. 365 
Always conscious of the president’s image, Rafshoon was very concerned about jokes 
about Carter’s indecisiveness on the Johnny Carson Show as it could indicate that 
criticism in the Washington press was going nationwide.366 He continued therefore to 
encourage a somewhat reluctant Carter to court newspapers from outside Washington. 
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The staff who worked in the press and media offices of the White House were 
subjected to the least criticism from the press. This was surprising given Press Secretary 
Jody Powell’s lack of Washington experience, but he was well regarded by the media 
who recognised that his history with and regular access to the president made his 
comments authoritative. The press office, unlike congressional liaison, was well staffed 
from the beginning and the media liaison office, based on Ford’s operation,367 became 
highly successful in engaging with non-DC based media outlets. 368 They also played an 
important role in the task forces being established to support key policy initiatives. There 
was an improvement in the information provided to the press about Carter’s speeches, 
both formal and informal,369 as well as more effective planning of how the 
administration dealt with the media.370 However, partly because of Rafshoon’s 
approach, the press came to believe that everything the president did was politically 
motivated and that was damaging to Carter.371 The Wall Street Journal even suggested 
that Rafshoon had persuaded Carter to veto the Aircraft Carrier bill so the president 
could look tough to the public.372 In addition Carter’s television appearances became 
less appealing as the networks began declining to broadcast events like Town Hall 
Meetings.373 Carter and his aides remained convinced that the Washington media was 
biased against them. Powell stated, ‘He received credit for almost nothing.’ 374 Journalist 
Hugh Sidey’s comment after Carter lost the 1980 election that, ‘Now maybe we’ll have 
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a little class,’ 375 did suggest an anti-southerner prejudice. On the other hand, White 
House defensiveness did help create a negative reaction from the press. In addition, 
many of the negative stories in the Washington press came from members of Carter’s 
own party in Congress and his White House staff.376   
The ability to deliver an effective speech to a range of audiences both face-to-
face and on television is another important communitive skill for a president. Until 
relatively late in the campaign Carter had written his own speeches and was not used to 
working with speechwriters. To be successful, most speechwriters must build a direct 
relationship with their president, Theodore C. Sorensen’s relationship with President 
Kennedy being a good example.  This did not happen with Carter as most of the speeches 
were developed in correspondence.377 He was also vague in specifying what he wanted 
because he was ‘not used to transferring his thoughts to other people.’378 His insistence 
that other members of the administration should comment on a draft before he saw it 
was also unsatisfactory from the speechwriting viewpoint.379Carter would often 
comment in detail on grammar and punctuation380or he would reject the draft and end 
up writing the whole speech himself. Rafshoon said that, ‘There are no speeches given 
by Jimmy Carter that aren’t anywhere from 50 to 99 percent his.’ 381 Furthermore, the 
messages Carter tried to convey were complicated and often controversial. As he said 
in his Playboy interview, ’I’ve taken positions that to me are fair and rational and 
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sometimes my answers are complicated.’382 Complexity was only part of the problem as 
Carter was reluctant to simplify or use any rhetorical device that added emotion to his 
argument.383 He refused to sugar-coat his message. Speeches often started with phrases 
like, ’Tonight I want to have an unpleasant talk with you about a problem that is 
unprecedented in our history,’384 or, in a similar vein, ‘I want a frank talk with you about 
one of our most serious domestic problems.’ 385  There was also no underlying theme 
which would lift or inspire the public. One of his first speechwriters, James Fallows, 
argued that Carter ‘thinks he leads by choosing the correct policy, but he fails to project 
a vision larger than the problem he is tackling at the moment.’ 386 Criticism of Carter’s 
unwillingness to articulate a vision came to the fore during his presidency but he argued 
that the issues were too broad for slogans and that his speeches were aimed at building 
a relationship with the public not for the ‘entertainment of the press corps.’ 387  The 
closest his staff came to inserting a theme was the ‘New Foundation’ element of his 
1979 State of the Union Address. This had been well received388 but when questioned 
about this new theme at a news conference, Carter squashed the idea and it was not 
further developed. 389 This would prove a marked contrast with his Republican rival in 
1980. Ronald Reagan’s message was simple, optimistic, embedded in a coherent vision 
for America and delivered by a master speaker.  
                                                          
382  Carter Interview, Playboy, November 1976. 
383  Gordon Stewart, Carter Library Exit Interview Project, 10. 
384 Address to the Nation on Energy, 18 April 1977, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7369&st=&st1=   
385 Anti-Inflation Program Address to the Nation, 24 October 1978,  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30040&st=&st1=  
386 Fallows, ‘The Passionless President’. 
387 Carter, Government as Good, 8. 
388 Article, 20 January 1979, Speechwriters Subject Files, Box 29, JCPL. 
389 President’s News Conference, 26 January 1979, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32801&st=&st1=   
91 
 
The outcome was that his speeches came across as dry and uninspiring. James 
Fallows said that, ‘You can’t inspire people with a jigsaw puzzle.’390 Not all of Carter’s 
speeches were underwhelming. After his presidency he said of his oratorical difficulties 
‘I have never been at ease with set speeches or memorized text … I like to speak from a 
few notes, and the more I am embedded in an element of rigidity, the more 
uncomfortable I feel.’ 391 When speaking off the cuff to new congressmen or in his 
speech at the memorial for Hubert Humphrey, Carter could be warm and witty.392 He 
also could be passionate when attacking what he perceived as the unfair behaviour of 
interest groups, for example in his speech on justice on 4 May 1978. 393 Criticism of 
Carter’s speeches related not only to content but also to delivery. New York Times 
journalists Robert Novak and Rowland Evans described his style as, ‘Allergic to all efforts 
at eloquence.’394 More famously, former Senator Eugene McCarthy dubbed Carter the 
‘Oratorical Mortician who inters his words and ideas beneath a pile of syntactical 
mush.’395 Carter was not receptive to coaching to improve his oratorical technique and 
Mondale believed that, ‘Carter had contempt for orators.’396 James Fallows said that 
Carter refused not only to receive training but to practice - other than talk into a tape 
and listen back. Carter was concerned that any coaching would tarnish his unvarnished 
style, which may have been code for his southern accent.397  His reluctance to practise 
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was not finally overcome until Rafshoon persuaded him to do a video practice for his 
July 1979 energy speech.398  
Jimmy Carter’s inauguration was on 20 January 1977. It was remembered for 
Carter and his wife getting out of the car and walking hand in hand to the White House. 
This was a calculated act designed to symbolise the informality of his presidency. He was 
one of them and he would stay close to the people. His speech, which he wrote 
himself,399 was not so well remembered. He maintained the strong moral themes of the 
campaign with references to the Bible, faith and the moral strengths of both himself as 
president and the nation as a whole.400 Yet, he did not seek to inspire his audience. He 
said, ‘I have no dream to set forth today but rather urge a fresh faith in the old dream.’ 
There were no grand themes or programmes of action. 401 To Fallows it was a typical 
Carter speech with a list of thoughts that had no hierarchy or connecting themes.402 He 
talked about a government that was ‘competent and compassionate’. Whilst 
recognising that ‘we cannot afford to do everything’, he said he wanted his 
administration to be ‘a government to be proud of.’403 He also talked about the social 
themes of equality of opportunity, the dignity of work and strengthening the American 
family. There was little specific about domestic policy and on the key subject of the 
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American economy nothing was said. However, to the electorate immediate action was 
expected from the new president as the economy was dipping into recession. 
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Chapter Two 
                        The Economic Challenge  
 
Carter’s failed economic policy has been identified as one of the main reasons for his 
defeat to Ronald Reagan in 1980. Poor economic performance of presidents has been 
linked to their subsequent failure to be elected to a second term: Herbert Hoover in 
1932, Gerald Ford in 1976 and George H Bush in 1992. Equally improved economic 
performance helped re-elect Ronald Reagan in 1984, Bill Clinton in 1996, and Barak 
Obama in 2012. Bill Clinton was famously told by his campaign team in 1992, ‘It’s the 
economy stupid,’ but other than in time of war the economy has invariably been a key 
issue for presidential elections. Carter campaigned in 1976 for tax reform, controlled 
inflation without high unemployment, and free enterprise with minimal government 
intrusion,404 but above all he stood for competence. His government would be efficient 
and solve the problems left by the Ford administration. Unfortunately, the economic 
difficulties of the United States went far beyond the failures of one administration and 
would take all of Carter’s resources to resolve them.  
Carter inherited an economy that after a slow recovery in 1975 had stalled. 
Inflation was rising, and unemployment was at 7%. To most economists all the indicators 
suggested that there would be a recession in 1977.405 A fall in productivity masked 
underlying capacity issues in the economy resulting in much less room for stimulus 
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measures than the experts believed.406 The stagnation in the world economy, external 
pressure on oil prices from OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) 
and the financial crisis in New York City presented a picture of an economy in a parlous 
condition. Unfortunately for Carter he arrived in office at a time when the consensus 
amongst economists on how to address these problems had broken down. The 
prevailing economic theory of the 1960’s espoused by prominent economists like Walter 
W Heller argued that it was possible to maintain a balance between economic growth 
and unemployment. Known as neo-Keynesians, Heller and his disciples such as Arthur 
Okun held key positions in all administrations from 1960 until Reagan’s election in 1980. 
Okun and Charles Schultze, who became Carter’s Chief Economic Advisor (CEA), 
maintained that it was possible using fiscal measures to maintain economic growth 
whilst holding unemployment and inflation down to 4 and 2.5 percent respectively.407  
However by the 1970’s such theories were coming under attack from economists like 
Milton Friedman who argued that the economy could be controlled only by adjusting 
the monetary supply. The neo-Keynesian economic models failed to take into account 
the decline in productivity with the result that any fiscal stimulus overheated the 
economy and increased inflation. 408  By the mid-1980s there would be a new economic 
orthodoxy based around fiscal restraint, monetary policy to control inflation, 
deregulation and tax relief to stimulate growth. But in the 1970’s, as Frank Morris, 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, stated, ‘It is probably fair to say that 
economic policy is now being made in at least a partial vacuum of economic theory.’409 
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As a result the solutions that Carter’s experts recommended failed to deliver the 
forecast outcomes, particularly on inflation.  Not all of this was due to a failure in policy, 
as external factors such as the OPEC oil price increases and the inability of Congress to 
implement fiscal restraint also had a detrimental effect on the economy.  This 
uncertainty over policy was reflected in a factional conflict within the administration 
between the objectives of promoting growth and fighting inflation. This often resulted 
in Carter and his economic team seeking alternative advice from organisations such as 
the Brookings Institute. This included Joe Pechman on Tax Reform 410and Arthur Okun 
on alternative policies on inflation.411 This air of uncertainty around economic policy was 
to continue throughout Carter’s term in office. 
Carter was not interested in theoretical debate over the economy. His speeches 
focussed on moral issues such as protecting the poor and reducing unemployment. His 
approach was based upon his experience as a businessman and governor and 
concentrated on reducing the fiscal deficit and balancing the budget. His support for 
Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) should be seen in this context. This was a discipline that 
ensured that all budgets were built from the ground up and not based on what had been 
spent the previous year. This fitted in with Carter’s emphasis on good government, 
cutting waste and reducing regulation. He believed that by concentrating on small 
(micro) economic issues the big (macro) economic problems would be solved. His key 
advisor Charles Schultze thought Carter was a top rate micro economist but that his eyes 
just ‘glazed over on macroeconomics.’412 Hence he was dependent on his economic 
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advisors for solutions and he became frustrated by their failure to agree. He referred to 
one meeting with economists as a waste of time as each one expounded his or her own 
theories.413 As with all government policy Carter wanted his advisors to provide 
comprehensive solutions that he could study and implement. However, on the economy 
he found himself zigzagging between conflicting priorities of avoiding recession and 
fighting inflation. This made it difficult to build a political coalition as each faction had 
different solutions to the country’s economic ills. Carter often managed to find money 
to support social programmes but his rhetoric on economic policy remained 
conservative which alienated both wings of the Democratic Party.414 
If Carter cut a frustrated figure on economic policy in general, he did believe that 
he could contribute personally to fiscal policy by encouraging reduced government 
spending. White House files are littered with Carter demanding cuts on a range of 
expenses from periodicals, staff travel costs and the selling of the presidential yacht.415 
This extended to interest in the budget where his understanding of the minutiae was 
such that it often intimidated Lance’s team. 416 This degree of involvement did not last 
after his first year in office,417 as he began to devolve more of the decision-making to his 
economic team. Carter did not always recognise the economic implications of his 
decisions. The development of a new energy policy without any input from his economic 
advisors nearly proved disastrous.418  He did recognise his inexperience and continued 
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to ask basic questions about areas of personal concern on the economy.419  This 
involvement contradicted  Lance’s view that Carter was not interested in economics 420 
but it did confirm that he neither mastered nor developed a coherent view of the 
subject. It is often argued that Carter was a fiscal conservative. However, this was based 
more upon his moral stance against waste and his view that government should lead 
from the front in making sacrifices than any economic ideology. All of this made Carter 
dependent upon the economic team he selected to advise him. 
 Carter’s first appointment to his economic team was Charles Schultze as Chief 
Economic Advisor (CEA). Schultze followed a line of neo-Keynesian economists from the 
Brookings Institution who had gone into government. His practical background in 
economics appealed to Carter and they met at least once a week although this declined 
when inflation breakfasts were established in 1979.421 His early appointment resulted in 
Schultze being influential in shaping the administration’s initial policies. He provided 
Carter with regular written briefings on the state of the economy, and although Carter 
was frustrated with the failure of experts to improve the economic outlook, he rarely 
criticised his CEA. Schultze was frank with Carter about the financial situation, flagging 
his concerns early and often using his political judgement to persuade Carter to change 
course.422 Schultze was grateful both for Carter’s support against negative press 
coverage and his straightforwardness.423 Communication between Carter and his 
Secretary of the Treasury never reached the same level of trust. W. Michael Blumenthal 
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had worked in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and held senior positions in 
industry. As treasurer he was chair of the Economic Policy Group (EPG), but he was 
criticised because he often failed to find a consensus. Whilst his personal relationship 
with Carter was cordial, relations with White House staff were poor. Blumenthal quoted 
their lack of support in his resignation letter in July 1979.424   The level of mutual 
suspicion often resulted in both sides leaking to the press. Lance argued that 
Blumenthal’s jealousy of his access to Carter resulted in details of Lance’s fraud case 
being leaked to the press by Blumenthal’s staff.425 White House staff  in the run up to 
the Camp David Domestic Summit argued that Blumenthal deliberately undermined 
Carter’s position on tax reform by leaking to Congress in advance of the public 
announcement and circulated details of the New York financial rescue plan before Carter 
had approved it.426 Such infighting reduced Blumenthal’s influence with the president 
but this did not restrict his access, and as late as March 1979 he was writing thoughtful 
memoranda to Carter on economic strategy. Some of his ideas were implemented after 
he resigned.427 After his presidency Carter acknowledged Blumenthal‘s difficulty with his 
staff and defended his record.428 Yet it was Carter’s view that his successor, G. William 
Miller, was a more conciliatory and therefore effective figure. 429 
 The third element in Carter’s economic organisation was the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). This was important to Carter for two reasons. Firstly, 
his friend Bert Lance had been appointed as its head, and secondly, even after Lance’s 
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resignation in September 1977, the OMB was critical to delivering Carter’s key 
commitment to fight inflation by eliminating the fiscal deficit by 1981. Lance’s personal 
relationship with the president and his political skills did increase the OMB’s prestige 
within the White House. This influence was limited by Lance’s lack of technical expertise 
and an initial suspicion of many OMB staff because they were holdovers from the 
previous administration.430 Lance’s departure weakened its influence but as the 
administration struggled to control inflation, Carter became focussed on fiscal restraint 
which made him a natural ally of Lance’s successor, Jim McIntyre. McIntyre lacked 
Lance’s political skills but he was technically capable, and Schultze argued that the OMB 
and himself represented the ‘realistic hair shirts’ of the economic team.431  McIntyre felt 
that Carter’s long-term commitment to a balanced budget was not shared by his 
administration and that his economic strategy with Congress was undermined by leaks 
from White House staff.432  McIntyre’s complaints about lack of support from agencies 
often prompted counter claims from Eizenstat that the OMB lacked the political skills to 
deliver on its programmes. 433 This would become a recurring theme as the DPG gained 
more influence over economic policy. 
All three organisations came together in the EPG (Economic Policy Group). 
Inherited from the Ford administration, it quickly grew to over twenty members, 
including cabinet representatives from Labor, State, and Commerce as well as the vice 
president and members of the NSC and DPG. This proved to be unwieldy with Carter 
receiving papers from individual departments but with no summary of issues from the 
                                                          
430 McIntyre Interview, Miller Center, 56. 
431 Schultze Interview, Miller Center, 33. 
432 McIntyre Interview, Miller Center, 44 and 24. 
433 Draft memo to Carter, 20 September 1978, Eizenstat Box 155, JCPL. 
101 
 
short-staffed EPG.434 The president made the situation worse by insisting that Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Patricia Harris was added to represent inner 
cities, housing and minorities and as a concession to the black caucus.435  The EPG was 
initially jointly chaired by Schultze and Blumenthal at Carter’s suggestion, but  Schultze 
stepped down after six weeks, concerned about a conflict of interest with his role as 
CEA.436 Unfortunately Blumenthal proved to be an ineffective chair and within weeks 
alternative approaches were being discussed. The debate centred on the EPG’s lack of 
resources and the unwieldy nature of the group. Blumenthal made proposals to 
centralise and give the EPG its own staff, so it could develop policy. This proposal was 
challenged by Jordan and Eizenstat who did not trust Blumenthal to oversee a 
centralised body.437 The final decision by Carter gave the EPG more power and 
established a smaller steering group comprising just the three key economic advisors. In 
addition, Eizenstat was given a wider role of policy coordination which enabled the DPG 
to oversee economic proposals sent to the president. The steering group disagreed on 
major aspects of policy for the first 18 months of the administration until it finally agreed 
to prioritise the fight against inflation but even then, this policy was challenged by 
cabinet members who were part of the main committee. 438 The appointment of Miller 
as Secretary of the Treasury and EPG chair in August 1979 did improve coordination. 
Carter admitted that he did not feel well served by the EPG439 and late in his term in 
office felt the need to question its track record on forecasting.  
                                                          
434 Biven, Carter’s Economy, 40-45. 
435 EPG membership, SS Box 6, JCPL. 
436 Schultze to Carter, 5 March 1977, Rafshoon Box 18, JCPL. 
437 Jordan to Carter, 13 July 1977, C of S Box 37, JCPL. 
438 McIntyre Interview, Miller Center, 35. 
439 Carter Interview, Miller Center, 19-20. 
102 
 
Carter’s economic advice did not just come from the EPG. Following the 
recommendations of the Camp David Domestic Summit of April 1978, the Domestic 
Policy Group (DPG) became more influential in its advice on the political implications of 
economic policy. McIntyre resented the DPG’s influence and argued that it represented 
interest groups and used its influence on Capitol Hill to undermine OMB policies on fiscal 
restraint.440  As head of the DPG, Eizenstat did represent a more liberal view on 
economic policy, highlighting the political consequences of fiscal restraint as the 1980 
election drew nearer.441 But he was by no means the only liberal who argued for 
alternative policies. Ray Marshall, as Labor Secretary, was also criticised by McIntyre as 
having a negative influence on Carter’s policies.442 As the economic situation 
deteriorated the administration cast its net wider for advice. As early as October 1977 a 
paper from economist Arthur Okun which argued for new policies to fight inflation, had 
been copied to Carter and was circulated to his economic team.443 This practice 
continued throughout Carter’s term in office. Although Carter had a formal structure to 
advise him on economic policy, he continued to encourage direct communication from 
his individual senior advisors. 444 This often hampered the ability of his administration 
to reach consensus.  
The Federal Reserve (Fed) was established by Congress to control the banking 
system and specifically the money supply. Control of the money supply was one of the 
means available to government to reduce inflation, but it also had a consequence of 
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increasing interest rates which damaged confidence and potentially could push the 
economy towards recession. The difficulty for any president was that the Fed was 
independent, and its chair could follow what policy he deemed appropriate. In practice 
presidents formed a relationship with each chair and sought to influence their actions 
indirectly. Carter established regular dialogue with his first chair, Arthur F. Burns, and 
his successor William Miller, seeking and receiving advice on economic policy and 
reassuring them on his administration’s fiscal goals.445  Burns and later Miller followed 
a relaxed policy of monetary controls but there were times when the White House 
sought to influence the Fed to prevent interest rate rises. In August 1977 the EPG feared 
that the Fed would respond to an increase in money supply by raising interest rates and 
so Carter was advised to talk to Burns.446 Fed policy changed in the summer of 1979 
when Carter appointed Miller to replace Blumenthal at the Treasury and picked Paul 
Volcker as his replacement. Volcker believed that the only way to fight inflation 
effectively was to control the money supply.447 Such a strategy would prove to be very 
damaging for Carter with an election due, but he did not publicly attack Volcker for this 
policy. Despite what seemed conflicting strategies on fighting inflation, cooperation 
between the Fed and the White House increased with Volcker attending budget 
meetings which was unprecedented.448 The White House did try to use its influence on 
Volcker by appointing one of their own men to the Fed board449 and applied pressure to 
hold down interest rates. 450 However, in the final weeks of the 1980 election with 
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inflation still rising, Schultze, and by implication Carter, had accepted the inevitability of 
the monetarist strategy and had ceased to resist it.451  
If control of the Fed proved difficult, the relationship with key members of 
congress on the economy was even more challenging for Carter and his team. Under the 
Constitution all revenue-raising measures had to pass the House through the Ways and 
Means Committee, under its Chair Albert C. Ullman of Oregon.  Ullman had been 
instrumental in reforming the congressional budget process and tax reform. He was to 
prove a key player in supporting Carter’s stimulus package in February 1977. Senator 
Russell Long’s Finance Committee, along with Ways and Means, dealt with between 80 
and 90 percent of the administration’s legislation.452 Long, unlike other Chairmen, had 
not devolved any of his powers to sub-committees. He had a strong personal influence 
over each of its members and as a result the committee as a whole. 453 The White House 
eventually recognised the importance of Long, and under pressure from Mondale, 
Eizenstat and Moore, Carter agreed to a series of personal meetings and dinners with 
the influential senator. But there was no meeting of minds. Long had not campaigned 
for Carter and saw himself as a reluctant teacher of an inexperienced president. 454 He 
spoke of admiring Carter’s values,455  but he expected deals to be struck which was not 
Carter’s way of operating. This resulted in a frustrated Senator: ‘I never knew if I could 
count on him or not.’456 So he used the cover of Carter’s U-turn on the $50 tax rebate in 
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his Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) of 1977 to sneak into the bill an exemption on oil 
drilling costs that would help his home state of Louisiana; the sort of deal that would 
appal Carter.457 Long’s committee blocked the administration’s attempts at tax reform, 
and Carter’s perceived inability to stand up to Long was seen as a personal failure.458 In 
the end Carter’s frustrations boiled over. He told Califano that, ‘I never can understand 
him and then I never know what he is going to do except screw me most of the time.’ 
459 This attitude to Long was known to Carter’s staff, with David Rubenstein of the DPG 
commenting that the one way not to influence Carter on a proposal was to tell him that 
an interest group or Russell Long was in favour of it.460 The failure of this relationship 
was to have a critical impact not only on Carter’s economic policies but any policy that 
had an economic dimension.  
 Whilst the Carter election campaign may have lacked specific proposals on the 
economy, the new administration was committed to a package of measures that would 
reduce unemployment, increase growth and control inflation.461 Briefings Carter 
received in November 1976 claimed that the economy was moving into recession with 
a growth forecast at 4 percent that would be insufficient to reduce unemployment 
below the current level of 8 percent. The recommendation from his advisors was for a 
plan that would create jobs, incentivise the private economy, implement tax reform and 
establish prudent measures to balance the budget when recession was beaten.462 Work 
on the plan’s components started before Blumenthal had been appointed, so it was 
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developed, at least initially, by Schultze. The stimulus package had all the hallmarks of a 
Carter solution. It was a comprehensive proposal that was designed to address many of 
the economic problems that the country faced. The complexity of the package meant 
that components were integrated with each other so a change to one area would have 
a detrimental effect on the whole plan. It was a conservative proposal with the total 
value of the stimulus less than the Ford package of 1975.463 The mix of tax cuts and job 
creation was a compromise between liberals and conservatives within the 
administration, with Carter straddling the debate. He was supportive of job creation but 
wanted the emphasis placed on training rather than public works. On the issue of the 
tax cut Carter, whilst accepting it was necessary, was insistent that it would only be 
temporary because he wanted to protect his commitment to a balanced budget by the 
end of his term in office. The structure of the proposal suggested an ‘all or nothing’ 
negotiating strategy with Congress, which was not usual practice. 
 The package of measures was called the Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) and was 
submitted to Congress on 31 January 1977. Carter, in a fireside broadcast on 2 February 
1977 464  emphasised the balanced nature of the plan which included proposals that 
dealt with both inflation and unemployment. He recognised that his proposals were not 
perfect and that many groups would want a different emphasis but argued that it was 
the best chance of producing steady, balanced, sustainable growth. His broadcast 
proved prescient as ERP was attacked by all interest groups as not doing enough for their 
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sectors. The AFL-CIO and the conference of mayors who had campaigned for him 
wanted more done to create jobs.465 This opposition was reflected in Congress with 
Ullman presenting his own alternative proposals on tax credits with the aim of 
stimulating employment. Carter, already frustrated by the House leadership breaking up 
the package and sending it to different committees, 466 now faced a proposal that his 
staff believed would destabilise ERP.467 Despite an attempt by Blumenthal to dissuade 
him,468 Ullman continued to promote his plan and within three weeks of its submission 
$1.6bn worth of spending had been added to the ERP.469 The administration was also 
struggling to coordinate negotiations with Congress as each department was 
responsible for different aspects of the plan. This resulted in Eizenstat and Moore having 
to issue briefings to White House staff and cabinet secretaries to keep track of the plan’s 
status in Congress.470 The chances of the legislation passing deteriorated further when 
the White House announced cuts in Water Projects. The congressional reaction was 
hostile. Carter’s attempts to reassure were to no avail as the Senate retaliated by 
delaying passage of ERP with Long threatening to put legislation in ‘deep freeze’ until 
the results of a review of the projects that Carter had ordered were known. 471 
 The delay in the legislation not only gave its opponents more time to resist 
elements of ERP which they did not approve but also allowed uncertainty to develop in 
the White House over the tax cut. The $50 tax rebate was designed to boost consumer 
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spending and the economy as a whole. At $11.9bn it represented by far the largest cost 
element of the plan with a further $4bn to be spent on tax simplification and a business 
tax cut. The cut was unpopular with both Congress and business. Moore was reporting 
in early February that Democratic support on the Senate Finance committee was 
wavering whilst the GOP wanted a permanent tax cut.472 Further uncertainty was 
created by unexpectedly favourable unemployment and growth figures in March 1977, 
473 resulting in some questioning the economic necessity for the rebate.474 In April Carter 
received a brutally frank briefing from Dan Tate from Congressional Liaison on the 
Senate vote on the rebate and Carter’s congressional strategy. Tate stated that 
Democrats were voting against him across the spectrum, knowing that it would be 
personally embarrassing to Carter. They criticised him for not negotiating and being 
naive or selfish or stubborn. Although they respected a hard-headed president, what 
they feared most was one who was high handed. According to Tate, Byrd believed that 
only Carter’s personal intervention could save the rebate whilst Tate himself warned 
that this political battle would be key for his future relationship with Congress. 475  Carter 
continued to rally his administration and his supporters in Congress to support the 
rebate. He wrote to senators on 6 April laying out the arguments for the rebate. 476 The 
turning point was a briefing from Mondale who had talked to Senator Alan M. Cranston 
of California and was now convinced that the administration was going to lose the vote 
and that any compromise would not necessarily succeed or be worth the price paid. 
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Mondale also reflected the growing view that the economic conditions had changed and 
that many people whom Carter respected were opposed to this proposal.477  Following 
further discussion with his economic team, Carter decided to drop the rebate in mid-
April 1977. Given its unpopularity in Congress this should have been a win for the 
administration, but unfortunately poor communication resulted in many of his staff, 
cabinet and key congressmen being given no warning of Carter’s change of heart. 
Blumenthal was left to make a speech to the National Press Corps without being 
apprised of the change of policy. Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, a close ally, who 
had fought hard for the rebate, was also not told, prompting him to say, ‘You can’t trust 
these people.’ 478    
 The fate of ERP highlighted the issues that Carter was to face early in his 
presidency: the difficulty in proposing a comprehensive package that would be 
scrutinised piecemeal by different committees in Congress and a White House lacking 
the coordination and experience to manage the process. A consequence of the reversal 
of policy on the tax rebate was damage to key relationships in Congress, particularly 
with Byrd.479  The failure of his economic advisors to predict the early upturn in the 
economy and more seriously the inflationary aspects of ERP was to prove a continuing 
problem for Carter.  Although the size of the stimulus effect had been reduced by the 
withdrawal of the tax rebate, the early improvement in unemployment and growth 
figures did suggest that the ERP had been successful. However, even the more optimistic 
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advisors like Blumenthal were raising concern about inflation and this was increasingly 
to become the focus of Carter’s economic policy from the summer of 1977 onwards.480  
This was not the only attempt by the Carter administration to stimulate the 
economy. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (also known as the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act) was signed by Carter into law on 27 October 1978. This legislation was an 
attempt by liberals to tighten congressional control of economic policy by committing 
the government and the Fed to achieve targets on all key economic indicators. The aim 
was to force the government to achieve ‘full employment’ by developing job creation 
schemes. The bill was sponsored by former Vice President Senator Hubert H. Humphrey 
of Minnesota and a leading member of the black caucus, Representative Augustus F. 
Hawkins of California. Both men had been important supporters of Carter during the 
election and passing this legislation had been a campaign commitment. Unfortunately 
for Carter the bill represented economic theory that was under attack and tied the 
White House to actions that were inappropriate for the economic climate. The neo-
Keynesian faith in government action to control growth, employment and inflation was 
being proved ineffective and the administration was forced to prioritise its actions on 
fighting inflation at the expense of unemployment. Furthermore, whilst the bill had the 
support of liberals, the unions and minority groups, there were conservatives even 
within the Democratic Party that had strong reservations about its inflationary aspects. 
They saw Humphrey-Hawkins as a symbol of excessive government spending.481 The 
draft bill was submitted in the House in January 1977, but the EPG had fundamental 
objections. Blumenthal believed that the targets set on unemployment were not 
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achievable, that insufficient attention was paid to inflation, and the government had not 
been given enough flexibility to achieve its goals. He was also worried that proposed 
monetary controls would face objections from the Federal Reserve.482  In an early 
example of the DPG intervening on economic policy on political grounds, Eizenstat 
raised concerns with Carter that a draft letter from Schultze to Hawkins which proposed 
changes to the bill would alienate his supporters.483    There followed a series of attempts 
by the White House to reach a compromise, initially with Hawkins and later with a more 
flexible Humphrey. Carter sought Tip O’Neill’s advice who argued that the bill was 
unlikely to pass in its current form and urged compromise. 484 The bill’s sponsors, fearing 
declining support in the House, accepted a White House proposal that softened the 
unemployment target to 4 percent by 1983, removed many of the detailed restrictions 
and placed more emphasis on fighting inflation.485 The compromise bill passed the 
House in March 1978 and the Senate to become law in the following October. Many of 
Carter’s economic team did not believe that even the watered-down targets were 
achievable. 486 This proved to be the case as by June 1980 Schultze was recommending 
moving the unemployment target date be extended by more than five years. Carter 
could argue that he had fulfilled a campaign promise, but it had little practical effect.  
Another campaign commitment proved even more difficult to achieve, Carter’s 
promise to reform the tax system. He may have been vague with many of his campaign 
promises but on tax reform he was very clear. In his acceptance speech at the 
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Democratic Convention in New York, he said, ‘It is time for a complete overhaul of the 
taxation system. I still tell you it is a disgrace to the human race. All my life I have heard 
promises about tax reform, but it never quite happens. With your help, we are finally 
going to make it happen.  And you can depend on it.’487 In his fireside talk on 2 February 
1977 he confirmed that his advisors were working with Congress on a reform that would 
give a fairer, simpler tax system. He talked of a comprehensive package by the end of 
the year. 488 Carter did not give his advisors any specific guidance on reform, but this did 
not mean that he did not have views of his own. In his campaign speeches he talked 
about fairness where the taxation burden was to be shifted from lower and middle 
income families to the well off, and the closing of tax loopholes which gave allowances 
for lunches and entertainment that favoured the rich.489 He also expressed an interest 
in reducing the level of taxation as a proportion of GDP, something Reagan would be 
campaigning for in 1980.490 Carter looked to the Treasury to produce tax reform 
proposals. Blumenthal raised concerns that other administration initiatives, particularly 
on energy, would cut across his work but a deadline of the end of July 1977 was agreed; 
this proved to be optimistic.491   By mid-May Carter expressed disappointment at the 
Treasury’s early proposals, characterising them as ‘too timid.’492 As a consequence 
Carter sent Eizenstat to brief Larry Wordworth, who was leading the Treasury team, on 
Carter’s views. Eizenstat emphasised that Carter wanted a comprehensive solution built 
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based on first principles that would produce a fairer, simpler, progressive system that 
eliminated tax shelters. His mandate was for reform and not for a proposal that was 
watered down to suit Congress. For good measure Eizenstat went through statements 
Carter had made on the campaign. He stressed what Carter wanted from the Treasury 
was the best solution at zero cost and to leave how Congress might react to the 
president. Eizenstat expressed major concerns about the Treasury proposals which did 
not fulfil many of Carter’s criteria, and having talked to Long and Ullman, he concluded 
that September 1977 was a more realistic target date. 493  
 White House dissatisfaction with Treasury proposals continued through the 
summer of 1977. Carter’s speechwriter Jim Fallows raised concerns about whether the 
current proposals squared with the presidential campaign promises, quoting from 
Carter’s convention speech. 494 Carter was also receiving criticism from liberals like 
Califano and Senator Edward M. Kennedy who had his own ideas on a new progressive 
tax system where the rich contributed more.495 He wrote to Blumenthal and 
Woodworth, requesting changes with greater progressivity and the closing of more 
loopholes. Frustration with his Treasury team resulted in Carter looking for alternative 
sources of advice. This included Joe Pechman from the Brookings Institution whose ideas 
were to continue to receive a favourable response from the White House throughout 
Carter’s term in office.496 He was also concerned about quotes in the press attributed to 
Blumenthal that directly contradicted Carter’s views on progressivity. 497 Blumenthal 
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denied this, but there did appear to be a lack of trust between them. When he met 
Ullman on the proposed bill, Carter did not want anyone from the Treasury present, 
preferring Eizenstat.498 Early discussions with congressional chairmen in August had 
flagged concerns that the proposals were too complex, and many elements would be 
unpopular. The Democratic leadership suggested splitting the bill, putting back the 
unpopular measures to the next session.499 By September 1977 many of Carter’s 
advisors, inside and outside the White House, recommended a postponement. Their 
main argument was that Congress would use the tax reform bill as an excuse to delay 
the passage of the Energy, Hospital Cost Containment and Welfare bills.500 Blumenthal, 
supported by Eizenstat, still argued that the bill was deliverable, particularly if Ullman’s 
committee sat during the winter recess. The risk was if the window was missed the 
chances of Congress passing a reform bill would be reduced and Carter would only get 
a tax cut.501 This had become the most likely outcome as liberals in Congress became 
pessimistic that a reform bill would pass and were reluctant to take criticism for the 
unpopular elements of the bill. Mondale advised Carter that a modified bill, focussed on 
tax relief with limited popular reform options such as allowances for business lunches 
and entertainment, should be submitted in January 1978. Reluctantly Carter agreed.502  
 By April 1978 even this strategy was in disarray with a majority on the Ullman 
committee voting against every aspect of the bill. An evaluation of the administration’s 
performance in promoting the bill by one of Eizenstat’s staff was highly critical, 
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suggesting that the Treasury was even unaware of a major Senate amendment.503  The 
Steiger amendment on capital gains tax which only benefitted the top 1 percent and a 
more restricted version backed by Ullman, the Jones amendment, signified that 
Congress had taken control of the legislation. The White House was forced to find a 
compromise on capital gains tax whilst the reform agenda was gradually being 
weakened. The White House lobbying of the critical Ways and Means Committee  had 
improved by July 1978 but by then Carter had lost the support of its chair, Ullman.504 
The search for a compromise on capital gains tax also revealed tensions between 
Blumenthal and the White House, with articles in the press suggesting he was 
compromising against Carter’s wishes.505 This may have been exaggerated because 
Blumenthal remained proactive in advising Carter in the final months before the bill was 
approved.506 The final bill, whilst similar in terms of total cost, $21.4bn, bore little 
relation to Carter’s original concept. Despite attempts to secure improvements, 
Eizenstat still described it as the ‘worst tax bill since the 1940’s’.507  Schultze, in a rare 
intervention on this issue, argued that despite its faults it would be difficult to justify a 
veto economically as a tax cut, which was what this bill had become, was needed in 
1979.508 Carter accepted his advice and signed the bill on 6 November 1978. 
 The administration’s tax reform proposals had all the hallmarks of a Carter 
project. He wanted a comprehensive solution from his advisors, free from any political 
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considerations. His Treasury experts either would not or could not follow his wishes. 
They argued that their view of accommodating Congress stood a better chance of 
success, but Carter had a mandate for reform and there was a window of opportunity in 
1977 to pass such legislation. However, the administration was dealing with a Congress 
that was overloaded with government initiatives that were equally complex and whose 
members were very angry about Carter’s policy on water projects. If Carter was to be 
left to deal with the political consequences as he wished, then he did not achieve his 
stated goals. The final bill had little reform left in it. The tax cuts were skewed towards 
the rich, many of the loopholes were not closed, it contained nearly $3bn in capital gains 
tax cut which Carter did not want, and at best progressivity was merely maintained, not 
improved as promised.509 The administration had failed in its reform goals. After June 
1978, the passing of Proposition 13 in California prompted a mood in the country, led 
by the GOP, that was largely focussed on tax cuts. For Carter his economic priority had 
moved onto fighting inflation. His tax reform was a missed opportunity. He failed to give 
his proposal the priority that was necessary, alienated key members of congress with 
his water projects proposals and overloaded the legislative agenda which enabled 
opposition to coalesce. The final act contained no elements of reform and merely cut 
taxes. The opportunity for reform was delayed until the Reagan 1986 Tax Reform Act. 
Carter saw deregulation as a means of making government more efficient and 
facilitate increased competition in the economy. Although he had the strong support of 
his financial advisors, including the Federal Reserve, Carter faced opposition from 
interest groups, particularly the unions. However, building on groundwork laid by 
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President Ford, he was able to pass substantive legislation with the congressional 
support of conservatives and some liberals, notably Ted Kennedy. Legislation enacted 
included the deregulation of airline, banking, communications, railroad and trucking 
industries. This was followed by the eventual removal of restrictions on oil and gas 
pricing which is discussed in the following chapter. Carter claimed that this legislative 
programme was ’the greatest change in the relationship between business and the 
government since the New Deal’510 and certainly such reforms transformed the lives of 
many Americans. It was one of the few areas of economic policy where the 
administration was able to win support from both conservatives and liberals in Congress. 
Deregulation was to become a major plank of the GOP presidential campaign in 1980 
but Carter was able to point to his own substantive record in this area. This policy trend 
initiated during the Ford presidency and significantly expanded under Carter was to be 
continued by the Reagan, Bush and Clinton presidencies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Inflation was not a problem unique to the Carter administration. The Ford 
presidency had struggled with the after effects of the OPEC price rises and had run its 
own ill-fated anti-inflation programme – WIN (Whip Inflation Now). Inflation, unlike 
unemployment, was not traditionally a key issue for the Democratic Party, but it was 
having a major impact on the middle classes by increasing property taxes, college fees 
and non-unionised wages. However, it was the impact on tax thresholds that was to 
trigger tax revolts in Colorado and New Jersey as early as 1976, well before Proposition 
13 in California.511  Carter had been warned in a transition briefing of the dangers of 
                                                          
510 Leuchtenburg, ‘Jimmy Carter and the Post-New Deal Presidency’. 
511 Biven, Carter’s Economy, 67. 
118 
 
inflation to consumer confidence.512 Despite this, Carter’s focus at the beginning of his 
term was on the risk of recession. If anyone had concerns about the inflationary aspects 
of the early stimulus package, Carter’s economic advisors were quick to reassure 
them.513 Carter kept Ford’s Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS) and outlined 
no new initiatives on inflation until much later in 1977. Given that inflation had been 
prevalent throughout the 1970’s the new administration had a series of options to tackle 
the problem. These ranged from mandatory controls of wages and prices to varying 
degrees of voluntary agreements with or without presidential involvement. What was 
striking throughout Carter’s presidency was how little discussion there was of 
alternative approaches to reducing inflation, when changes such as  control of  fiscal and 
monetary policies was being advocated by economists such as Milton Friedman.514  
Mandatory controls were discussed during the transition and rejected, a decision that 
was maintained right until the end of the administration.515 All of this limited the options 
that were available for Carter and his economic team to deal with a problem that from 
the autumn of 1977 began to dominate their economic priorities. 
During the early phase of his administration inflation was between 5.8 and 6.5 
percent but there was much more concern about declining growth and unemployment 
at 7 percent.516 Elements of the stimulus package, increasing the minimum wage and 
proposed reforms of energy and social security policy, had an inflationary impact. Fred 
Kahn, who would later lead the administration’s fight against inflation, argued that 
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changes in agricultural policy in the stimulus package, which reduced acreage, also 
contributed to food inflation over the next 18 months.517  Carter remained concerned 
about inflation but as long as wage increases kept pace there was no pressure on him 
from either his advisors or his supporters to deal with inflation. Schultze did not believe 
that the stimulus package would add to inflation, and at this early stage of the 
administration Blumenthal, who lacked macroeconomic experience, did not intervene. 
Schultze’s first draft of an anti-inflation policy on 29 March 1977 accepted that Inflation 
would get worse before it got better but aimed to reduce it to 4% by 1979. He ruled out 
any wage or price controls and encouraged dialogue with labour and business. COWPS’s 
prime role would be to gather information.518 Carter, who accepted Schultze’s approach, 
was not without alternative views. Chair of the Federal Reserve, Burns recommended 
more direct action to curb Federal spending: tax incentives to modernise plant, 
deregulation and vigorous implementation of anti-trust legislation.519 There was also 
criticism of Schultze’s proposals from Eizenstat who wanted tougher action on food 
prices.520 He argued for clear inflation targets in order to win public support, and for 
speaking out against those in breach of them. A spike in inflation of 1.1% in March 1977, 
due mainly to food prices, 521 may have been the catalyst that prompted some tightening 
of Schultze’s proposals. This ‘tougher’ approach was reflected in Carter’s first anti-
inflation statement on 15 April 1977.522 Additional measures included wider 
responsibilities for COWPS on monitoring, more action from government (including 
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spending controls) and establishing a framework for co-operation with business and 
labour. 
Whilst Carter’s speech indicated more focus on inflation the approach by the 
White House remained low key and fundamentally ineffectual. Inflation grew to 9.8 
percent by the end of 1978 but food inflation was running much higher at 16.4 
percent.523 The internal debate over economic priorities continued until mid-1978 when 
inflation publicly became the administration’s number one priority. Carter was asking 
questions about the impact of higher interest rates on inflation, prompting a brief 
discussion on monetary policy with Blumenthal in June 1977.524  His advisors continued 
to search for alternative approaches, but mandatory controls remained off the agenda. 
Carter reassured Republican Senator John Tower of Texas whose fear of mandatory 
controls caused him to hold up the renewal of COWPS in the Senate.525 New proposals 
from the EPG were sent to Carter at the end of 1977. These included for the first-time 
numerical guidelines similar to those used by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and an 
incomes policy which relied upon government persuasion.526 Although he appeared to 
endorse these recommendations, Carter expressed disappointment that the proposals 
lacked specifics and appeared to be mostly wishful thinking.527  
Further attempts at tightening controls were outlined in Carter’s speech to the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors on 11 April 1978. It contained few specifics 
outside Federal government actions, but he emphasised that, ‘There were no easy 
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answers. We will not solve inflation by increasing unemployment. We will not impose 
wage and price controls. We will work with measures that avoid both these extremes.’ 
528 One change that Carter did announce was the appointment of his special trade 
representative Robert S. Strauss to take on the additional role of special assistant on 
inflation. Strauss quickly was dubbed the ‘Inflation Czar.’ Whilst he did not have a 
significant impact on policy, it did symbolise Carter’s advisors’ increasing concern over 
inflation. In May 1978 Schultze wrote to Carter with some ‘disturbing thoughts about 
the economic outlook.’ He was beginning to recognise that the underlying problem was 
that inflation was being fuelled by a drop-in productivity and started lobbying for further 
cuts in the Federal budget.529  By June 1978 inflation had reached double figures. Carter 
received a range of proposals. George Meany of the AFL-CIO, afraid of wage controls 
being implemented, lobbied for credit controls which Carter rejected.530 Strauss wanted 
budget cuts but also a new Federal committee on efficiency and cost reduction. This was 
again rejected as it increased bureaucracy and cut across the work of COWPS and the 
EPG.531 By September 1978 there was recognition as inflation continued to rise that a 
further change of policy was required. It was Blumenthal who argued for more robust 
measures and it was his proposals, despite reservations from Mondale and Eizenstat, 
that were mainly reflected in Carter’s new policy announcement.532  
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 Carter’s speech on 24 October 1978 was an important moment in his economic 
policy. He publicly decided that fighting inflation would be his number one priority but 
again he went out of his way to dampen expectations: ‘I cannot guarantee that our 
efforts will succeed. In fact, it is almost certain not to succeed if success means quick or 
dramatic changes.’533 This partly demonstrated the pessimistic aspect of his character, 
but it was also a realistic reflection of his advisors’ lack of confidence that a solution 
could be found. He did, however, outline a series of concrete proposals and specific 
targets. Measures included reducing the budget deficit to $30bn, cuts in Federal hiring 
and action on deregulation. He established guidelines both for wage settlements at 
seven percent and prices at 5.75 percent which were to be monitored by COWPS. 
Despite continuing to reject mandatory controls, sanctions in the form of withdrawal of 
government contracts were threatened against those companies in breach of these 
guidelines. He also appointed Fred Kahn as Special Assistant to the President and 
Chairman of COWPS. The move of the former Chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board was a 
high-profile appointment. Kahn would have direct access to the president and joined 
the EPG. Reaction to the speech, however, was lukewarm. Wall Street did not think it 
was tough enough and foreign markets reacted with a run on the dollar.534  Kahn did 
have difficulties coordinating with Carter’s economic team. He complained of a lack of 
resources and felt that he was not getting cooperation from cabinet secretaries.535  Kahn 
was also frustrated by his inability to get his ideas across, describing the EPG as ‘an 
agency for systematically eliminating and weeding out any possibility of imaginative 
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innovation.’536The success of the new policy was dependent upon the ability of Kahn 
and Carter to persuade non-governmental bodies to accept the guidelines without any 
statutory powers to support them.  Despite failure to follow up and communicate 
previous initiatives,537 a more organised effort was made under Anne Wexler to 
communicate the new government policy.538 The impact of oil price increases in 
February 1979 caused Kahn to warn Carter that the policy was not working.539 As 
inflation hit 14.5 percent in May 1979, Carter’s advisors were searching yet again for 
alternative approaches. Schultze believed that Carter’s options had narrowed to fiscal 
restraint, credit controls or use of the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates.540  Carter 
was even receiving advice from his political rival Edward Kennedy who recommended 
tougher sanctions such as legislation against companies that did not comply and even 
hinted at mandatory controls.541 Kahn had become increasingly frustrated and in 
September 1979 threatened to resign. This was smoothed over by Carter and Eizenstat, 
but it was a symptom of Kahn feeling that he was being ignored on policy.542 The 
inflation debates up until July 1979 continued to be limited by the administration’s 
refusal to countenance recession, mandatory wage/price controls and use of monetary 
policy. This changed when Carter appointed Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve. 
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Volcker’s appointment was probably the one action that Carter did take to 
address inflation effectively. Inflation had reached 13.7 percent in July 1979 and Volcker 
made no secret of his intention, if appointed, to tighten money supply.543 It was his 
determination as the new chair of the Federal Reserve (Fed) to prioritise the fighting of 
inflation, even at the risk of recession. He ensured that there was an early imposition of 
tighter monetary controls which resulted in higher interest rates. This imposed a new 
anti-inflation policy on the administration which would prove to be the long-term 
solution to the problem. Volcker ensured that the Fed’s controls remained in place for 
the remainder of Carter’s term of office, albeit with a brief respite in the summer of 
1980.544 This imposed a high political cost on Carter’s re-election ambitions but he and 
his advisors recognised that something needed to be done. His aides were already 
warning of the danger of a weak economy with the primaries only six months away.545 
Even Schultze viewed Volcker’s policies as the ‘only show in town’ on inflation and he 
soon began a regular dialogue with him.546 In the meantime the administration 
continued its efforts to find its own solutions to what seemed to be an intractable 
problem. 547 There was recognition that whilst wage settlements continued to fall within 
the guidelines set down by the government, tightening controls was still necessary. 
Further policy initiatives announced on 14 March 1980 contained no new controls on 
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wages and prices but called for further cuts in the budget, the passing of oil conservation 
legislation and the imposition of credit controls.548  However, within the White House 
there was scepticism as to whether this policy would succeed. Al From, who worked for 
Kahn, believed that the ‘new’ programme would not be effective because inflation was 
approaching a psychological tipping point at 20 percent. The only policy that did work 
was the Fed’s but that was driving up mortgage rates and keeping traditional working-
class families out of the housing market.549 Attempts by Kahn, with Carter’s support, to 
penalise companies who breached administration guidelines through government 
contracts failed because both unions and business threatened to withdraw co-
operation.550 This left only the option of using presidential influence in private meetings 
or negotiations with major business and union leaders. Wexler’s outreach programme 
did give Carter the opportunity to meet with these leaders but unlike his Democratic 
predecessor, Johnson, Carter was not adept at such negotiation. Known as ‘jawboning’ 
this involved the president in face-to-face dialogue with business and union leaders and 
applying pressure to achieve the government’s targets on wage and price settlements. 
Despite the urging of his staff Carter did not make the most of his opportunities to 
influence the behaviour of the country’s economic leaders.551  By April 1980 Kahn was 
reporting that with the renewed rise in oil prices and increase in mortgage rates, 
inflation had risen to 18 percent in the previous three months. He feared that wages 
which had been restrained up to that point would soon accelerate to keep track. He also 
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complained that commitments in Carter’s 14 March speech to increase monitoring had 
not been upheld as Congress had failed to authorise the recruitment of 100 additional 
staff.552 The administration’s anti-inflation strategy was not working. 
In November 1979 Kahn had what he described as a heart to heart with Carter 
about inflation. He argued that whilst the administration attempted all the right or 
orthodox actions, none of them were working. Carter’s economic advisors had 
consistently got their inflation forecasts wrong which had damaged the administration’s 
credibility. 553  Policies on minimum wage, farm price supports and protecting some 
organisations against competition had added to the inflationary spiral. Kahn argued for 
radical solutions and tough political choices on the budget. Carter appeared to 
sympathise but little of this was done. 554 Kahn could have added that it took eighteen 
months for the administration to recognise that inflation was the number one problem; 
up until then Carter’s economic advisors’ main concern had been avoiding recession. It 
could be argued that on inflation, Carter was an unlucky president and point to the OPEC 
price increases, but these were not a new phenomenon. His predecessor had suffered 
from substantial rises in 1974-5 and Schultze had told Carter that oil prices had had a 
negligible effect on inflation until late 1979.555 Carter’s team tried alternative strategies 
to tackle the problem, but they were largely boxed in by their own policy decisions and 
the actions of Congress. The eventual solution, controlling money supply, was not 
discussed until Volcker imposed the policy on the administration. Any form of sanctions 
or mandatory policy to control wages and prices was rejected but more significantly the 
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underlying decline in productivity was only vaguely understood and not addressed. This 
coupled with poor forecasting and the increasingly desperate actions of his advisors as 
they changed policies damaged Carter’s credibility with the public. The impact of 
inflation was not just economic but psychological. Unlike unemployment it affected 
everyone and added an aura of uncertainty to every personal economic decision. To the 
electorate Carter did not seem to be in control and his management of the budget only 
confirmed this view. 
The budget process was something Carter understood both from his time as 
Governor and from his experience as a businessman. He thrived on the minutiae of the 
budget which he often knew in greater detail than his OMB staff. 556  Control of 
government spending was not only a key element of fiscal policy but a demonstration 
of the competence that Carter had promised the public when he was elected. 
Unfortunately to pass a Federal budget he needed the support of members of congress 
who had their own views on how money should be raised and where it should be spent. 
As far as the budget process was concerned it was politics not economics which 
dominated congressional thinking.  
 The process of building the budget was controlled by the OMB but to pass 
Congress its success was dependent upon the support of government departments and 
congressional liaison. Carter initially immersed himself in budgeting. It was something 
he felt he understood, and he hoped to reform the process with the implementation of 
ZBB helping to bring about a more rational approach. He had implemented this as 
governor and made major claims for its effectiveness during his presidential campaign. 
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Carter argued that ZBB focussed on objectives and needs, helped combine budgeting 
and planning, promoted cost effectiveness and finally encouraged management 
participation in the process.557 Whilst it was implemented across government 
departments, extravagant claims of savings were soon toned down by the OMB.558  ZBB 
was symbolic of Carter’s approach to policy - if you build a budget by the best means 
possible then the legislature would accept it. Nothing could have been further from the 
truth. To succeed the administration needed to understand the detailed workings of 
Congress, in particular the committee structure. This was emphasised in a report from 
Douglas J Bennet, assistant secretary for legislative affairs. He highlighted the 
importance of building long-term relationships with key financial committee chairmen 
and to integrate them into the budget process. When the government failed to do this 
with its first budget, Bennet commented, ‘if the administration shows the same 
contempt for orderly fiscal policy that Congress used to show, why bother with Budget 
Committees? ‘ 559 This report was not followed up by Carter who was much more 
focussed on agreeing a budget internally than how it was going to be sold to Congress. 
 Carter was hampered by a natural conflict between a Democratic House which 
was determined to pass the social legislation that had been denied by his predecessors 
and an administration attempting to fight inflation by fiscal restraint. Carter believed 
that such fiscal irresponsibility was the ‘Achilles heel’ of the party. 560 Liberal Democrats 
demanded that Carter pass the reforms he ‘promised’ during the election, but such 
reforms increased expenditure when nearly 70 percent of the budget was fixed in areas 
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like social security and health entitlements, defence and debt repayments.561 This reality 
was to hamper many of Carter’s most cherished campaign pledges and put his 
administration in a war of attrition with Congress. This started in the first months of his 
presidency as Carter’s request for a modest increase in the draft Ford 1978 budget was 
overridden by Congress which added a further $5.1bn.562 There were also problems to 
do with the White House losing influence over key congressional appropriations 
committees.563 Recognition by Carter’s advisors by mid-1978 that constraining the 
budget was an important element of the administration’s anti-inflation policy564 had 
been caused in conflict with congressional Democrats who were facing re-election that 
autumn. Proposals to cut back on spending were heavily criticised by liberals led by Ted 
Kennedy at the mid-term Democratic Conference.565 Carter’s staff were concerned that 
members of the cabinet were expressing opposition to fiscal restraint, some being 
quoted as describing the draft 1980 budget as a ‘Nixon-Ford budget which no 
Democratic President should sign up to.‘566 White House staff feared that a decline in 
Carter’s approval ratings had been caused by a perceived lack of leadership in delivering 
a reduced budget.567  Carter publicly committed to reduce the burgeoning deficit in the 
1980 budget to under $30bn. This was despite pressure from his own party, a three 
percent increase in defence spending above inflation, his own plans to deregulate oil 
and entitlement indexation (against inflation).568 This proved not to be achievable. 
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 The 1978 mid-term elections were a setback for his party, but the Democrats 
maintained their majority in the House despite an increase in the number of fiscally 
conservative congressmen elected. This should have helped Carter in achieving a 
balanced budget by 1981 but a review carried out by Moore’s team found that whilst 
the majority of congressmen supported budget cuts in principle no one wanted to be 
associated with unpopular measures in an election year unless they were certain such 
changes would pass Congress.569 By the end of 1979 Carter’s advisors had accepted that 
a balanced budget was not a feasible goal.570 Eizenstat argued that not only was this not 
achievable in a recession but such proposals would not pass Congress.571 Congressional 
proposals for the 1981 budget costlier than the White House’s, which had included an 
additional $7bn for defence. This was despite efforts by Carter to make further savings 
by reducing the costs of social programmes including welfare reform.572 On the advice 
of his team he vetoed the proposed congressional budget as inflationary, alienating Byrd 
in the Senate who withdrew all support from Carter.573 With the 1980 presidential 
election only five months away, Carter had failed in his budgetary goals and did not have 
an agreed budget for 1981. 
  McIntyre argued that Carter was successful in managing government spending 
but this was based largely on technical issues such as establishing a three-year budget 
process and the use of budget reconciliation.574 The public, however, saw constant 
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haggling with Congress and a president who had failed to get to grips with a burgeoning 
Federal budget.575 This was a harsh judgement given that much of government 
expenditure was fixed. Also, the administration had been affected by crises outside 
Carter’s control and by a Congress which continued to promote its own agenda. But this 
was a president who had campaigned on his competence. He looked anything but as his 
public commitment to a balanced budget became less credible with the passing of each 
financial year.    
Many historians in writing about Carter’s economic policy have stated that he 
tried to balance the liberal policies of his party with the fiscal realities of a weak US 
economy. His objective to move his party to the centre away from expensive social 
programmes to greater fiscal responsibility, ultimately, they argued, failed because  his 
administration could not control inflation   576 Others like Ann Mari May used a 
comparison of the key performance indicators of the Ford, Carter and Reagan 
administrations to argue that Carter’s economic record was largely successful, 
particularly in relation to growth.577  Iwan Morgan has stated that Carter’s economic 
policies of giving priority to fighting inflation, fiscal conservatism, deregulation and 
supply-side economics were a precursor of his New Democratic successor Bill Clinton.578  
Others have argued that his use of monetary policy and deregulation laid the 
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groundwork for what became known as ‘Reaganomics’.579  His fundamental differences 
with Reagan were not over  economic policy but in their views on government. Reagan 
famously saw government as ’the problem’ and wanted a free market economy whilst 
Carter believed in the power of government to do good and correct faults in the 
economy. The underlying assumption in the historiography suggests that Carter had a 
coherent view on economic policy but there is little evidence to support this. Decisions 
were made by his experts who failed to develop a consistent economic policy 
throughout his term of office, zigzagging between fighting recession and inflation. The 
administration’s economic forecasting was at best problematic, underestimating the 
economic recovery in 1977 and inflation rates throughout his presidency. His advisors 
did not grasp the significance of the decline in productivity or the importance of 
monetary policy until late in the administration. Carter’s interest in the budget and 
government spending may have indicated that he was a fiscal conservative, but he never 
articulated his views in any coherent economic philosophy, unlike his Democratic 
successor Bill Clinton. His fiscal policies were more influenced by his business 
background and a moral sense of the importance of a country living within its means. 
Carter’s failure to convince his party and ultimately the country of the benefits of a 
balanced budget left his administration with little to offer other than austerity.580 To the 
liberals in the Democratic Party, Carter’s economic policies were little different from the 
Republicans and this contributed to their support for Kennedy for the 1980 Democratic 
nomination. By the 1980 election the economic outlook indicated the continuation of 
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high inflation and an imminent recession. This was not the message of competence that 
Carter had presented to the public in 1976. None of his economic policies appeared to 
work and his most specific economic commitment, reform of a tax system he described 
as ‘a disgrace’, had been gutted by a Congress controlled by his own party. 
It is worth considering how did Carter’s character influenced the way economic 
policy was developed in his administration. He did actively involve himself in micro-
economic matters around the budget, ZBB and saving money in the White House, but 
contributed little to the macro-economic debate. Whilst he did get frustrated with his 
economic team, sometimes seeking alternative advice, he generally followed their 
guidance. His main role as president was to ‘sell’ his policy both in Congress and to the 
public, unfortunately this did not play to his strengths. Clinton, who was Arkansas’s 
governor when Carter was president, described Carter’s economic speeches as him 
sounding more like ‘17th Century New England Puritan than a 20th Century Southern 
Baptist’581 Clinton was to learn from this experience. Carter ‘preached’ self-sacrifice but 
did not articulate a positive view of his policies that would justify in the minds of the 
public the sacrifices that he was asking them to make. His dealings with Congress were 
hampered by his marked reluctance to build relationships and do deals, something 
experienced Congressmen had been used to under his Democratic predecessor, Lyndon 
Johnson. His distaste for the hard bargaining involved in passing legislation damaged his 
relationship with Congress. His decision to appoint Volcker to be chair of the Federal 
Reserve highlighted one of the positive elements of his character, the determination to 
do the right thing whatever the political cost. The tightening of money supply was the 
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eventual, if painful, solution to inflation. Carter recognised this would cost him politically 
in the run up to the November 1980 election but as was often the case he did it anyway 
because he saw it as the right thing to do. It was Carter’s one positive economic legacy. 
His economic policy was in many ways a failure of presidential influence. He could not 
through his speeches, his conversations with members of congress and other leaders 
persuade decision makers and the American public that his economic policies would 
work and were worth the price he was asking them to pay. He was to face a similar 
response when he asked for yet more sacrifice from the public when trying to solve the 
country’s energy crisis.  
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Chapter Three 
                 The Energy Crisis  
 
America’s oil production had been declining since it reached its peak in 1950 and its 
share of world imports had fallen from 52 percent in 1950 to 16 percent in 1974. US Oil 
imports had risen ten times in five years and represented an increase of $10bn on the 
US trade deficit.582 The concept of a US energy ‘crisis’, however, was by no means 
unchallenged. The US public throughout the 1970’s continued to believe that any crisis 
was caused by the greed of the oil companies or the incompetence of government. A 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report stated that whilst dependence on OPEC imports 
represented 40 percent of US domestic consumption, the opening of new fields in 
Alaska, Mexico and the Arab peninsula would remove the threat of shortage by 1980.583 
The options for America in dealing with an energy shortage were either to increase 
production and/or reduce consumption by conservation. To increase production 
required initial investment to find and develop new oil and gas fields. In the US, major 
suppliers had control of all stages of the production cycle from exploration, production, 
refining and distribution. Profits from increased prices in both oil and gas were restricted 
by regulation which kept prices artificially low for the US consumer but did nothing to 
stimulate new production. Deregulation as a solution, strongly favoured by 
conservatives, would raise prices, increase both inflation and supplier profits but would 
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not necessarily guarantee increased local production as the producers often received a 
better return by investing in overseas oil fields.  
The alternative approach to address the country’s profligacy in energy 
consumption was conservation. In the 1970’s America was consuming 2.3 times more 
than the European Economic Community (EEC) and 2.65 times more than Japan.584 A 
conservation strategy would include bringing US prices up to the real cost of production, 
fuel efficiency measures and incentivising alternative sources of energy like coal, nuclear 
power and solar energy. There were two opposing views about resolving the energy 
problem. The first was the belief that the free market would be the most effective means 
of stimulating production and stabilising prices. Alternatively, there was the acceptance 
of some form of regulatory control to protect poorer families against profiteering and 
reduce pollution.585 Both options needed to be considered against a background of an 
American public who were used to cheap, easily available energy and had been unused 
to any restrictions on their consumption since World War II. In addition, there were 
powerful interest groups representing energy suppliers, environmentalists, business 
and consumer groups, all expressing divergent views on the best energy strategy for the 
country. 
Although America’s energy security had been deteriorating steadily since the 
1950’s, it was not until the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973 that energy problems began 
directly to impact the public. The OPEC price increases in 1973-4 presented a challenge 
to the US government of Presidents Nixon and Ford. In his first State of the Union 
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address, Ford unveiled policies to deal with the problem. This included deregulation, 
incentives for coal and nuclear power plants as well as an oil import fee. His policies 
were largely anathema to a Democratic Congress and Ford found himself in a year-long 
battle before his legislation passed in the form of the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act on 22 December 1975. 586 This bill reinstated price controls originally brought in by 
Nixon but allowed the president to increase prices by 10 percent a year over 40 months. 
There were also some conservation measures including establishing a Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (SPC) and average fuel economy standards for cars. 587 This bill was 
regarded as having fallen short of Ford’s stated objectives. The Carter campaign team 
therefore entered the presidential race in 1975 expecting that energy policy would be a 
major issue.  
The decision to prioritise his new administration’s efforts on resolving America’s 
energy crisis was Carter’s. It was not forced upon him, but he chose it over other 
substantive issues. Energy had many of the characteristics of a problem that he liked to 
address. It was an issue that was highly technical, complex and fundamentally impacted 
on American society. Energy policy cut across ideology with possible solutions dividing 
Democrat from Democrat, liberal from liberal and region from region.  It was a challenge 
that Carter saw as an opportunity to demonstrate that government could be a force for 
good, despite the failure of his predecessors. To political scientist Charles O Jones, 
energy was the perfect issue for a ‘Trustee President.’ 588 To James Schlesinger, who 
would become the President’s Assistant for Energy, the choice highlighted two of 
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Carter’s character traits: the engineer who wanted to solve complex technical problems 
and the moral leader who wished to curb the country’s wasteful use of energy.589 Carter 
was influenced by writers like Robert Bellah, Christopher Lasch and Daniel Bell who 
wrote about the dangers of consumerism and were invited to the White House by Carter 
soon after his election.590 Hence there was an element in his policy of Carter seeking to 
promote energy conservation with consumers.  
Energy, however, was not a major issue in the 1976 presidential campaign. 
Carter did not mention it in his speech accepting his nomination on 15 July 1976. The 
Carter-Ford Presidential debates in September and October 1976 did offer him the 
opportunity to promote his energy proposals. During the 23 September debate Carter 
argued strongly for an energy policy that would include moving production from oil to 
coal and support for solar energy. He emphasised the importance of conservation and 
criticised Ford for ‘yielding every time to the special interest groups [who] put pressure 
on the President.’591 This early indication of Carter’s mistrust of interest groups was to 
have a major impact on how his administration’s policy was developed. Another sign 
that Carter was considering an initiative on energy was the active involvement of 
Democratic Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson and his staff in the transition. Jackson had 
been a rival of Carter in the primaries but was a strong advocate of a proactive energy 
policy and chaired the important Senate Energy and Resources committee. Jackson‘s 
staff provided advice on energy either through Jackson or directly to Carter and his 
transition team. This advice was for Carter to be cautious on energy policy. Grenville 
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Garside, who was Jackson’s staff director and counsel for the Senate Energy Committee, 
recommended that Carter should just focus on recruiting top quality people to the 
Federal Energy Administration (FEA) and the Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA), and appointing an energy Czar. He made no recommendations 
for specific polices but wanted the new administration to concentrate on education, 
consultation and policy formulation.592 The reasons for Jackson’s caution were 
expressed in a memorandum to him from Arlon Tussing, chief economist on the Senate 
Energy Committee, who argued  
Energy Policy was not a promising area for early policy innovation by the new 
Administration. No crisis is imminent and there are no bold dramatic steps that 
can quickly assure long-term security of our energy supply or bring down fuel 
and electricity prices. Most bold moves would at least in the short run increase 
uncertainty and result in higher costs and prices. We can afford to spend a year 
or more reconsidering the whole spectrum of energy issues without the aura of 
crisis and confrontation that have surrounded them since 1973. 593  
Carter did act on some of this advice from Jackson’s staff, particularly on the eventual 
scope of the new Energy Department, 594 but ultimately, he wanted his administration 
to produce a comprehensive solution to the energy problem and he was not prepared 
to wait. 
Carter may not have followed all of Jackson’s advice on policy, but he did try to 
ensure that his key advisor on energy would be of the right calibre and someone he 
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trusted: he chose James Schlesinger. This was a critical appointment not just because 
Carter expected Schlesinger to become the Secretary of the newly formed Department 
of Energy but because he would delegate most of the policy development to him. He 
took an instant liking to Schlesinger. As well as giving him regular access during the week 
he met regularly with him on early Saturday mornings.595 Schlesinger proved to be one 
of Carter’s most controversial appointments. He had been Ford’s secretary of defense 
but had been fired because of his covert opposition to SALT II and his condescending 
attitude to Ford over the president’s relations with Congress.596 Carter was also aware 
of concern from his staff about Schlesinger’s suitability for the role.597 The perception of 
Schlesinger being a difficult character was subsequently borne out by his actions over 
appointments, where he tended to ignore recommendations from the White House.598 
Tensions with White House staff persisted until his resignation in July 1979. The 
relationship with Carter, however, remained cordial but Schlesinger was not above 
criticising the president for spending too much time on the detail and not enough on 
leadership.599 If Schlesinger was important to his administration’s policy development it 
was Congress and the American public whom Carter needed to persuade to support his 
policy proposals. It was essential that Carter and his team were able to influence key 
congressional leaders and committee chairmen if their legislation was to pass. But this 
was to be hampered by the inexperience and naivety of both Carter and his staff. Energy 
policy divided Congress not on party or even ideological lines but more in terms of a 
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state’s natural resources and geography. In addition, the very complexity of the 
legislation resulted in the involvement of a wide variety of powerful interest groups. For 
example, there were 117 groups alone involved in decisions on the pricing of natural gas 
in 1978.600 Carter’s deep mistrust of interest groups and their influence would be a major 
factor in how his administration decided to develop the new policy and how he dealt 
with individual members of congress and the public. 
Carter’s inauguration address on 20 January 1977 gave no indication that he was 
going to give energy such a high priority. Indeed, there were many alternative policies 
that were regarded as equally urgent, not the least of which was dealing with the parlous 
state of the US economy. The decision may have been prompted by a winter fuel crisis 
in eleven states east of the Rockies caused by the coldest winter in 100 years. This crisis 
prompted lobbying of Carter from such diverse individuals as Senator Jackson, the 
consumer lobbyist Ralph Nader and Carter’s mentor Admiral Rickover. Carter began to 
see energy not just as a complex technical problem to be solved but also, in seeking to 
reduce waste, a moral one.601 To Carter, the policy’s degree of complexity justified 
careful study and analysis. He wanted a comprehensive solution that would be for the 
public good and not for the benefit of interest groups. It was not to be a panicky 
response to a one-off crisis. The winter gas shortages were resolved by effective 
cooperation between the Federal government, Congress and private industry. It 
resulted in the passage of the Emergency Natural Gas Act on 2 February 1977. 
Recommendations from his staff for further action were met with a ‘let’s not panic’ 
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comment from Carter.602 But, in his statement on the energy shortage on 21 January 
1977, Carter had said that, ‘Today’s crisis is a painful reminder that our energy problems 
are real and cannot be ignored. This Nation needs a coherent energy policy and such a 
programme of energy action will be formulated promptly.’603 Carter’s promise of action 
was confirmed in his ‘Fireside Talk ‘on 2 February 1977.604 Energy was not the only issue 
covered by this address, but it was the first one he raised. Carter set a deadline of 90 
days for his administration to report back to Congress on a new energy policy. This would 
include recommendations for a new Department of Energy as well as a focus on 
conservation, reduced dependency on oil and use of alternative energy sources, 
particularly coal and solar power. He acknowledged that the public might not believe 
that there was an energy crisis but hoped that the winter gas crisis would have changed 
their minds. 
Two decisions proved critical in how Carter’s proposals were received: firstly, the 
creation of a 90-day deadline; and, secondly, the decision to keep the development of 
the plans restricted to a small group of ‘experts’ under Schlesinger. An artificial deadline 
had been used by Carter before as governor to drive through proposals with the 
legislature and lobbyists who, given the short timescales, found it more difficult to 
disrupt his legislation. He also hoped to replicate the cooperation that enabled the 
passage of the Emergency Natural Gas Act earlier in the year. He was concerned that 
any consultation prior to announcement would just be an opportunity for special 
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interests to delay and sabotage his proposals. So, he insisted that the plans be developed 
by experts in secret even from other government departments which Carter believed 
had relationships with interest groups. Unfortunately, this had the effect of restricting 
the expertise available to Schlesinger’s team and consequently limiting the scope of 
their analysis of the problem.605 This decision also caused concern in the White House 
and resentment in Congress. Eizenstat became involved in March 1977, acting on behalf 
of advisors from the CEA and DPG who were growing concerned about the potential 
economic and political implications of any energy proposals.606 Economic advisors 
eventually saw the proposals two weeks before publication and immediately raised 
objections about the impact on growth and inflation. Fortunately, there was time to 
resolve this before Carter’s speech in April, but this opportunity was not available to 
Congress. Major supporters like Jackson felt excluded and as early as 3 February 1977 
Dan Tate from Congressional Liaison described Jackson’s  behaviour as ‘bitter’ and that 
he had ‘made life in the Senate Liaison pretty miserable lately.’607 The use of an artificial 
deadline and secrecy did hamper the progress of the new policy and Carter’s approach 
would draw striking parallels with the doomed attempt by the Clinton administration to 
pass healthcare legislation 16 years later. 
Although there were tensions caused by the secrecy within the White House 
during the 90-day deadline, many issues were resolved. Schlesinger was able to agree 
with Cecil Andrus, secretary of the interior, on the structure of the new Department of 
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Energy.608 The concerns expressed by the EPG over the plan’s impact on inflation proved 
to be manageable. 609  There was pressure from liberals within the administration such 
as  Secretary Califano to do more to protect the poor from the aftereffects of the fuel 
crisis and use energy taxes to reform social security but these ideas were resisted.610  
Carter also rejected attempts by Schlesinger to include more individual ‘sacrifice’ in his 
plans with taxes on commuter parking and luxury cars.611 As the deadline approached 
Carter, prompted by Eizenstat, became concerned that the new energy plan should be 
integrated with other programmes so as not to hamper the administration goal of a 
balanced budget by 1981. 612 Overall whilst the imposed deadline and secrecy did bring 
disadvantages, especially with Congress, Carter had no reason to believe that a broad 
package of well thought out measures would not succeed. He now wanted to use his 
current high approval ratings to convince the American people of the benefit of his 
Energy Plan, thus enabling him to defeat the formidable interest groups that would be 
aligned against him.613 
Carter understood that on energy his main task was to convince the American 
people of the seriousness of the energy crisis and the fairness of his solution. The launch 
of his Energy Plan was carefully choreographed. He continued the use of symbolism that 
he had followed in the winter fuel crisis with a Saturday cabinet meeting and the staged 
                                                          
608 Schlesinger to Carter, 16 February 1977, SS Box 8 and Briefing to Carter, 28 February 1977, 
SS Box 9. JCPL. 
609 Schultze to Carter, Impact described as 0.2-0.4 percent,15 April 1977, SS Box 15, JCPL. 
610 Eizenstat to Carter, 10 February 1977, SS Box 7 and Califano to Carter,18 April 1977 SS Box 
18, JCPL. 
611 Schlesinger to Carter, 31 March 1977, SS Box 13, JCPL. 
612 Carter to Schlesinger, 29 March 1977, SS Box 13, JCPL. 
613 Barrow, ‘Carter and the Quest for a National Energy Policy’, 162. 
145 
 
helicopter visit to Pittsburgh prior to his speech.614 He spoke to the nation on 18 April 
1977, followed by his address to Congress two days later and a televised press 
conference on 22 April. 615 The administration had attempted to engage the public as 
part of the 90-day period by sending out over 450,000 postcards asking for suggestions 
on energy.616 Carter had also used the Town Hall meetings to raise awareness of energy 
issues. Early ABC polling indicated that whilst there was initially an increased level of 
public concern about energy this was not sustained.617 Carter’s speech was remembered 
for the acronym MEOW which was derived from the phrase the ‘moral equivalent of 
war’, something he had taken from Admiral Rickover.618 Carter sought to convince the 
American public that the country faced a situation that was worse than the gas crisis of 
four weeks earlier and even the OPEC crisis of 1973. He sought to promote moral and 
social responsibility for the common good. He argued that ‘we must not be selfish’ and 
wanted to ‘test the character of the American people,’ all of which was aimed at 
encouraging individual self-sacrifice in the use of energy.619 In presenting Schlesinger’s 
comprehensive package to Congress, he was much less ‘preachy’ but was certainly 
downbeat: ‘This cannot be an inspirational speech tonight. I don’t expect much 
applause. It’s a sober and a difficult presentation.’620 In his televised press conference, 
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Carter was forced to defend the use of the phrase MEOW which had been criticised as 
an overreaction. He later claimed that his bill had raised energy awareness by 20  
percent 621  but it did not get the response from the American people that he had hoped. 
Three months later he was saying that ‘the public is not paying attention, voluntarism is 
not working.’622 Carter’s desire for an honest assessment of the energy problem without 
any ‘spin’ came across as so pessimistic that it failed to motivate the American people.  
If the US public was not responding, how would Congress react to the complex set of 
proposals submitted by Carter? 
The National Energy Plan, submitted on 20 April 1977, covered 113 separate but 
interlocking initiatives, the clear majority of which were not controversial. The objective 
of the proposed legislation was to reduce energy demand, increase supply and distribute 
costs equitably between the consumer and industry. Measures included a Crude Oil 
Equalisation Tax (COET) which would allow the domestic price of oil to rise to world 
levels by the ending of price controls by 1981 with the first-year tax revenue being 
redistributed to poorer families. Oil consumption targets were to be established and if 
missed by over one percent, a five cents gasoline tax was to be imposed. There were 
incentives for mass transportation and alternative sources of energy such as coal and 
solar power. Conservation was to be encouraged through incentives for major buildings 
and house insulation, and a national 55 mph speed limit was proposed.623 Carter’s 
Energy Plan was comprehensive and complex and he recognised the difficulty he would 
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face in passing such legislation given the number of congressional committees that could 
be involved.624 He also had no natural constituency either in Congress or the country 
that would support his proposals in full. This resulted, for example, in environmentalists 
being natural supporters of his conservation measures but in opposition to the move to 
‘dirty’ coal-fired power stations. This meant that the administration would have to build 
different alliances for each aspect of the plan. To be successful would require the White 
House to run a sophisticated operation to manage the legislative process and muster 
public support.  
 The initial public response according to a Gallup poll on 26 April 1977 was 
overwhelmingly in favour of the Carter plan (87 to 13 percent) 625, but there were few if 
any groups that supported the whole package. Democrats were split not only in terms 
of ideology but to a large extent geography. Natural supporters like the 
environmentalists favoured restricting growth but Carter’s labour constituency wanted 
a plan that would increase jobs. Supporters such as the Urban League believed that 
aspects of Carter’s proposals would hit the poor whilst unions like the Teamsters 
regarded the standby tax as an imposition on working people.626 These were just some 
examples of the response from within the Democratic Party and did not include the 
views of the GOP or the energy industry who would be lobbying to support or change 
parts of the plan that they did not favour.  Carter hoped that by developing the plan in 
secret he would avoid such pressures until it was announced but he knew that he could 
not avoid opposition indefinitely. He did hope that he could counter the interest groups 
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by mobilising popular opinion but whilst the overall plan had high public approval 
ratings, these were never translated into active support. This encouraged congressional 
intransigence. The struggle with Congress over energy also had a negative impact on 
Carter’s personal popularity with a 10 percent drop in his approval ratings reported as 
early as 5 May 1977.627  
Carter’s performance in supporting the Energy Plan was also subject to criticism 
in the press and even from Schlesinger. The conservative press continued to argue that 
there was no crisis, just government incompetence. Jordan summed up the problem for 
Carter by saying, ‘We cannot create an atmosphere of sacrifice that is politically 
meaningful if the American people persist in thinking the crisis is not real.’ 628It was 
suggested that he ‘dropped the ball between April and September’ by not being 
sufficiently proactive. 629  This was unfair as up until August 1977 the bill was being 
managed successfully by Speaker Tip O’Neill in the House and it was only when it 
transferred to the Senate that problems occurred. It was at this point that Carter became 
heavily engaged in lobbying by going on the road, making three televised speeches and 
encouraging cabinet members to speak out in favour of the plan. 630 In a rare occurrence 
the workaholic Carter recognised that he had to prioritise his time: ‘It’s become obvious 
to me that we’ve had too much of my own involvement in different matters 
simultaneously. I need to concentrate on energy and fight for a passage of an acceptable 
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plan.’631 There was some recognition that he was more effective after that point632 but 
criticism remained about his ability to influence key members of Congress. Schlesinger 
regarded him as a failure at lobbying, quoting an unsuccessful meeting with Senator 
Lloyd Bentsen of Texas as an example.633   
 The passage of Carter’s Energy Plan took eighteen months despite his personal 
efforts. Although this legislation contained many significant measures, it was not the 
solution that Carter had promised. The parts of the plan that involved price increases 
like the oil standby tax and the COET (also called the Wellhead Tax) had little support in 
Congress and the country. Carter’s appeal for self-sacrifice came up against the hard 
realities of electoral politics. An unnamed Democratic Representative from New York 
bleakly summed up the problem in supporting Carter: ‘You are asking me to vote for 
something that will cost my constituents money and make life less convenient and they 
won’t see any benefit from it for the next 5 years. And I’ll tell you something else if I do 
what you want … I will be out.’ 634 The White House and the party leaders in Congress 
faced different coalitions of members for every aspect of the legislation. Carter’s most 
effective champion in Congress was Tip O’Neill. He did not break the bill down and send 
it to different committees as was customary but by using one super committee created 
an ‘Omnibus Bill’ and successfully managed its passage through the House.635 This 
radical approach ensured that following the bill’s introduction in the House on 2 May 
1977, it passed three months later. 636 Only the standby gasoline tax proposal failed due 
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to opposition from a coalition of liberal and conservative representatives neither of 
whom were convinced by the administration’s case.637  
The Senate would prove to be much more difficult. The momentum created by 
the passage of the House Omnibus bill was lost during the summer recess and the impact 
of the Lance Affair. Senate Majority Leader Byrd was a traditionalist and so, unlike 
Speaker O’Neill, he broke the bill up and sent it to the various Senate Committees. The 
two key committees were Finance under Russell Long and Energy and Resources under 
Henry Jackson. The administration’s difficult relationship with Long has already been 
discussed but it should be added that Long’s home state, Louisiana, was oil producing 
and so he was naturally opposed to many of the bill’s provisions. Jackson, on the other 
hand, had long campaigned for a national energy policy and had contributed to the 
Carter transition discussions on energy. However, relations between Jackson and the 
White House were never cordial. Jackson had mounted a late challenge to Carter in 
1976, and Jordan had made derogatory comments about him in an interview during the 
campaign. The president had also rejected Jackson’s advice on the inclusion of natural 
resources in the new Department of Energy.638 Schlesinger argued that it was the White 
House’s failure to build an alliance with Long and Jackson that damaged the Energy bill 
in the Senate.639 Long, whilst supporting Carter on some issues like the new Energy 
Department, proved too resourceful for Carter and his team whose lobbying Long 
labelled ‘sloppy and naive.’640 The White House tried to use Byrd as a conduit to Long 
but was unsuccessful, as were attempts to influence both Long and Jackson (whose wife 
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was Georgian) by inviting them and their spouses to dinner at the White House.641 The 
Energy bill that passed the Senate was significantly different from the House version. 
Most of the revenue raising aspects of the original bill like COET and the standby gasoline 
tax had been removed by the Senate and replaced by a series of energy tax concessions. 
These tax changes, if passed, would increase the fiscal deficit during 1978-81 by $34bn 
more than the House bill.642  The administration used all its resources to influence the 
outcome of the joint conference when the House and Senate came together to resolve 
the differences. In establishing strategy for the conference, Carter’s staff had two major 
concerns: firstly, the continued belief in Congress that the public still did not believe that 
there was an energy crisis and therefore did not support any ‘sacrificial’ elements of the 
legislation; and secondly, that when the pressure of negotiations was applied, the 
administration (meaning Carter) would compromise too early. For the six-week period 
between late September and early November 1977, the White House established a task 
force to manage the lobbying on the bill, employing many members of the 
administration including the cabinet and the president.643 Carter was told not to get 
involved personally too soon in discussions because ‘If we compromise early, the Senate 
will think we are suckers and the House will think us unreliable.’ 644 In the briefings that 
Carter had with members of Congress and Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO, he emphasised 
how important the Energy bill was to the prestige not just of the president but of 
Congress and the Democratic Party.645 The attempt to move the final bill towards the 
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House version failed because the overwhelming majority of Senate Democrats, including 
liberals, were against revenue-generating measures like COET. 646 
Despite considerable efforts by the White House and Carter personally, the final 
passage of the Energy bill did not take place until October 1978. Many elements of the 
original proposals were defeated by the sheer complexity of the alliances deployed 
against the administration, often involving Carter’s nominal supporters. Congressional 
liberals watered down gas deregulation proposals and attempts by Carter to reach out 
to petroleum leaders, arranged by Charles Kirbo, were vetoed by staff concerned about 
possible reaction from environmental supporters.647 Some of the administration’s 
failure was down to decisions made as early as February 1977. The self-imposed 
deadline to produce the Energy Plan resulted in a limited investigation of alternatives. 
There were technical flaws in the proposals with errors in some numbers submitted to 
support the legislation. The initial pre-briefing on the bill was bungled with important 
material not being ready in time and Carter’s brusque style resulted in a failure to explain 
his policy to members of congress with sufficient clarity.648 There was also a lack of 
understanding of the fundamental differences between how the House and the Senate 
operated which hampered White House effectiveness. 649 O’Neill ‘one bill’ tactics could 
not be replicated in the Senate and time was wasted in delayed lobbying of the Senate 
during the summer recess. Finally, there was the impact of the administration’s other 
legislative initiatives both on the congressional timetable and on relationships with 
important legislators, who often tried to use their support for the Energy Bill as a 
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bargaining chip for other legislation. Carter remained an active participant in the 
lobbying, meeting with Long and Jackson as well as intervening, for example, in the 
Natural Gas conference, to ensure a deal.650 Not all of his interventions were successful, 
for instance his talk of oil producers as war profiteers alienated Senate and business 
leaders.651 Although there was criticism of the effectiveness of lobbying by 
inexperienced staffers, Carter was exempted from this because of his in-depth 
knowledge of the subject.652 However, despite this Carter admitted that, ‘The issues 
before us are so complicated, it has gotten past me.’ 653He was far less successful in 
persuading the American people of the necessity of his plan. Carter went on TV three 
times in nine months to try to galvanise support but whilst polls reflected public criticism 
of oil companies and Congress, only 43 percent believed that there was an energy 
crisis.654 Attempts by Rafshoon to develop a 90-120-day communication strategy to raise 
awareness failed to increase pressure on Congress to act.655  
The National Energy Act of 1978 was by any definition a substantial piece of 
legislation. It increased overall energy supply with subsidies for alternative programmes 
and incentives to utilities to share power. Gas deregulation was deferred until 1984 but 
controlled prices were increased with future rises established as inflation plus 4 percent. 
The legislation set up the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) with storage capacity of 120 
days or one billion barrels, which would take seven years to complete and cost $70bn. 
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Significantly, price incentives for both industry and the consumer were rejected by 
Congress as too costly. 656 Carter’s staff quickly recognised that he was not receiving 
credit for the bill as the press and the public were not so much focussed upon what was 
included in the legislation but what was not and how long it took to pass.657 
By the end of Carter’s second year in office the energy debate had moved onto 
the issue of oil deregulation. The oil producers and their supporters argued that allowing 
the price to rise to its natural level would provide an incentive for new fields to be 
explored. As a politician who believed in deregulation, his policy on the air industry being 
a case in point, Carter was sympathetic to this view but many of his supporters were 
opposed. Liberal congressmen argued that oil producers would reap huge profits from 
deregulation which they would not necessarily invest in American oil fields but would 
rather exploit cheaper options abroad. There was also concern over protecting poorer 
families who would be hardest hit by the price increase. Environmentalists favoured 
switching production away from oil to cleaner energies and wanted much more 
emphasis on conservation. The solution appeared to be linking deregulation with a tax 
on oil company profits (a Windfall Profits Tax) which could be used to subsidise poorer 
families and fund cleaner energy. The argument for such a tax was by no means clear 
cut and this argument dominated energy policy for the remainder of Carter’s term in 
office. The administration was ‘helped’ in this debate by the revolution in Iran as it 
resulted in OPEC price increases which added $22bn to the US annual import bill. 
Although US prices continued to be held below world rates, poor internal oil allocation 
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resulted in local shortages in May 1979. 658 Further attempts to deregulate oil were 
delayed by the opposition of his own supporters in Congress. Liberals continued to fear 
the impact on the poor and environmentalists wanted much more emphasis on 
conservation.659 Carter tried to make contingency plans in the event of shortages as part 
of emergency measures, but these were delayed by conflicting messages within his own 
administration. Schlesinger stated that the energy crisis justified contingency plans for 
rationing, but his own department argued that US energy stocks were healthy and that 
even with oil consumption rising, there was no need for contingency plans in the 
medium term.660 
 The White House worked hard to build a coalition that would support oil 
deregulation linked to a windfall profits tax. Carter met with senior senators, including 
Long, and by the end of March 1979 he believed he had enough support to recommend 
action.661 However, there remained differences amongst his staff, especially on strategy. 
His advisors argued that making deregulation contingent on a windfall profits tax would 
not work because conservatives and liberals would separately oppose each piece of 
legislation, thus causing deadlock. They recommended using the 1975 Ford Energy Act 
to phase in deregulation by 1981 and challenge Congress to bring in a tax on excess 
profits.662 In the end Carter chose to launch both proposals in his speech on 5 April 1979. 
In it he continued to remind the public that, ‘The energy crisis is real. I said so in 1977, 
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and say so again tonight, almost exactly 2 years later. Time is running out.’663 He equated 
the dependence on imported oil as a risk to national security and sought public support 
to ensure that Congress responded to the crisis. Initial response from the public was 
favourable664 but the bill proposed, whilst not as complex as two years earlier, still 
involved seventeen separate pieces of legislation.665 The warning from his staff about 
the difficulty in passing the Windfall Profits Tax proved prophetic and there was 
evidence that Carter was becoming frustrated. Speeches he made against oil companies 
were very hard hitting even inflammatory. Eizenstat became concerned that Carter’s 
remarks were not being seen as presidential and had fixed the administration’s position 
when negotiation and flexibility were required in the future.666 This was not Eizenstat’s 
only concern about Carter’s speeches on the administration’s new energy proposals. In 
a speech in Iowa in May 1979, Carter appeared to undermine his carefully worked-out 
position on deregulation by seeming indifferent to the issue. Eizenstat told Carter how 
damaging this was to his reputation with Congress and its implications for the future 
passage of the legislation. He was so concerned that he arranged an editorial in the New 
York Times to ‘correct’ Carter’s statement.667 The continued battle with Congress 
prompted his team to recommend another nationwide address on energy to mobilise 
the public support for his policies in July 1979 when Carter returned from the Tokyo 
Summit. It was during the summit that a further large OPEC price increase prompted a 
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fresh crisis with petrol queues and a ‘riot’ of truckers in Levittown, Pennsylvania, on 24-
5 June 1979.668 
 Carter’s address to the nation on 15 July 1979 became known as the ‘Malaise’ 
speech but it was supposed to be a speech on ‘Energy and National Goals.’ The evolution 
of the speech will be covered in Chapter Seven but much of the mood of pessimism 
which pervaded the White House in the run up to the speech was related to frustration 
with energy policy. As Eizenstat told Carter, ‘nothing else has so frustrated, confused, 
angered the American people or so targeted their distress at you personally.’669 His 
approval rating at this time had sunk to 27 percent.670 His speechwriters were equally 
direct: ‘Gas lines promote anger, not conservation.’ ‘Hatred for the oil companies is only 
matched by lack of confidence in the Administration,’671 but they were struggling to 
create a draft that would galvanise public opinion. Proposals were to deregulate oil 
prices over 28 months, and for a Windfall Profits Tax that would be used to build an 
Energy Security Fund to help the poor and build mass transit systems. In addition, there 
were to be government initiatives to reduce consumption by 5 percent including a 55-
mph speed limit. However, all of this remained deadlocked in Congress. Proposals on 
creating a Low Energy Assistance Programme for poor families immediately ran into 
trouble as further OPEC price increases had tripled the cost of decontrol. Pressure from 
Senate liberals forced Carter to expand this programme of support from $800m to 
$2.4bn.672 The agonising over the energy speech, its postponement and the resulting 
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series of meetings at Camp David moved the debate away from energy. This caused 
tension between Carter and his advisors. Carter refused to have his energy staff present 
at Camp David when he met external experts. Eizenstat implied that it was because 
Carter believed his staff had leaked a confidential memorandum to various 
journalists.673  This tension was highly unusual in the Carter White House but 
symptomatic of the atmosphere at the time. Following lobbying from Mondale and 
Eizenstat the final version of the speech did contain new targets on energy with the aim 
of inspiring a positive public response. These included the goal of never importing more 
fuel than the US had done in 1977, backed by import quotas to ensure that this was 
achieved. In addition, Carter proposed massive funding from the Energy Security 
Corporation (ESC) for alternative fuels and mass transit as well as targeting utilities to 
cut consumption by 50 percent. Finally, in alluding to the spirit of World War II, Carter 
proposed the creation of an Energy Mobilisation Board (EMB) to speed up energy 
production. 674 
 Although initial polling after the speech was positive, Carter failed to inspire the 
public. New York Daily News commented next day that Carter only had one problem: 
how ‘to wake up the 80 million Americans he put to sleep last night.’675 Carter’s attempt 
to gain support for a new energy policy was to be made with a new secretary of energy 
as James Schlesinger had resigned. He had discussed leaving with the president before 
he  left for Tokyo to enable Carter to have someone in post who was ‘less scarred by 
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earlier battles.’676 Schlesinger always claimed have enjoyed a close relationship with 
Carter but the presidential papers are littered with Carter and his staff expressing 
concerns to Schlesinger over many issues, particularly over his choice of staff.677 Carter’s 
advisors had been so concerned that they argued that the resignation was an 
opportunity for a top to bottom overhaul of the new department.678 Schlesinger, in later 
interviews, was highly critical of a number of Carter’s decisions. He criticised the limited 
time he had to develop energy proposals and build a new department.679 He was equally 
critical of Carter’s leadership style, arguing that tactics on oil deregulation showed ‘the 
administration and the President of the United States did not understand governing.’680 
Nevertheless Schlesinger did influence Carter in the more interventionist elements of 
his energy policy, especially in his 15 July speech.681 His successor, Charles W. Duncan, 
came from the Department of Defense and  lacked energy expertise, but he did have 
considerable managerial experience and was widely regarded as a more effective 
operator by White House staff. 
The moral elements of Carter’s 15 July speech continued to be debated for the 
rest of his time in office, but he was determined to implement the specific measures he 
had proposed. The White House of 1979 was much better organised and it deployed all 
of  its resources to support the new energy goals with an elaborate communication 
plan.682 Members of the cabinet and senior members of staff were co-opted under  
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Wexler’s speaker programme to give speeches in support of legislation.683 Unions like 
United Automobile Workers (UAW) were engaged in sending postcards to Congress 
demanding action.684 Carter himself was heavily involved in meeting with members of 
congress and lobby groups both face to face and on the phone.685 Despite these efforts 
the speech did not change the fundamental politics of Congress. Senator Byrd, due to 
his support for increased coal production in his home state, tried to take a proactive role 
but the legislation remained largely in the hands of senators from oil producing states 
like Russell Long.686 There was very little change in the attitude and practice of Congress 
and so progress remained painfully slow. Caddell complained to Carter that opinion 
leaders were not engaging with his programme and that public frustration was being 
directed at Carter personally.687 Frank Moore provided Carter with an update in August 
1979 which summed up the complexity of the debate in the Senate committees with 
concerns being expressed on regional, environmental and ideological grounds about the 
proposed legislation on the Energy Security Corporation (ESC) and the Energy 
Mobilisation Board (EMB).688 Carter’s renewed commitment to synthetic fuels and what 
was felt as a weakening in Carter’s support for environmental safeguards led to the loss 
of support from environmental groups.689 These were not the only Carter supporters 
who were dissatisfied with his July proposals. Liberals in the mid-west and north eastern 
states continued to press for more assistance for low-income families hit by the 
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proposed oil price increases. This resulted in the original proposal for a Low-Income 
Energy Assistance Programme being increased to $4bn, much more than Carter had 
envisaged.690  
It took nearly a year for Congress to pass the major elements of the president’s 
1979 proposals. This was mainly due to arguments over the Windfall Profits Tax and the 
Energy Mobilisation Board. The Windfall Profits Tax was vital to fund not only support 
for poorer families but key elements of Carter’s energy conservation strategy, including 
the development of synthetic fuels and mass transportation systems. Carter’s attempt 
to raise revenue with an oil import levy had been defeated when for the first time in 29 
years Congress overturned the veto of a president from the same party.691 This 
increased the pressure on the administration to reach a compromise. There was intense 
lobbying from the White House but it faced opposition in the Senate where over 100 
amendments were submitted from liberals and conservatives who had different views 
as to how revenue from the tax should be dispersed.692 Most of Carter’s core supporters 
in the unions, minorities and the poor had concerns about the impact of deregulation of 
oil prices and as a consequence lobbied hard for a bigger slice of the proposed revenues. 
On the other hand, conservatives representing the oil lobby wanted a greater share of 
the revenue being allocated to incentives designed to increase local oil production. 
These debates persisted until the bill’s passage on 2 April 1980. As a result, the 
legislation was the product of a series of compromises with all the major interest groups. 
This enabled Carter to claim that the fundamental balance between incentives for 
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production and revenue raised was the same as in his original plan.693 However, there 
were major differences. For instance, the revenue generated was far less with $227bn 
now agreed compared with $292bn in the original plan.694 Given the obstacles in his 
path Carter had every reason to be satisfied with the final bill. The concept of the Energy 
Mobilisation Board (EMB), that it would cut through red tape and ensure that energy 
projects were quickly implemented, had a wide appeal in Congress. But it also raised 
fundamental concerns over the increased powers of Federal Government in relation to 
state’s rights, and fears, especially from environmental groups, about how and in what 
circumstances the EMB could overturn (‘waive’) environmental and regulatory 
protection. This issue of the ‘waiver’ was described by House Energy and Commerce 
Chair, John Dingell of Michigan, as the ’single most important environmental issue this 
administration has faced.’695 The usually supportive House split three ways over this and 
with over 200 environmental leaders signing an open letter against the waiver, the 
White House had failed to win congressional support by July 1980 when the election 
was in full swing.696  
By the first anniversary of the ‘malaise’ speech Carter could argue that most of 
the major reforms he had recommended had been passed. He could also point to a 
substantive list of completed legislation that fulfilled his 1976 campaign promises and 
addressed the ‘energy crisis.’ As part of the preparation for running Carter’s presidential 
campaign in 1980, the speechwriter’s office was asked to pull together the 
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administration’s key achievements, on energy, the list was impressive. It included the 
phased deregulation of oil and gas production, a new Department of Energy, the first 
integrated Energy Plan, massive investment in alternative energy sources, and a new 
focus on conservation in government, industry and homes. In addition, there was 
support for the poor to cushion the effect of price increases, investment in mass transit 
schemes and an overall 11 percent reduction in dependence on imported oil.697 Despite 
all of this, energy was not regarded as a Carter success story. In all his television 
addresses, town hall meetings and news conferences Carter failed to persuade the 
public that a personal sacrifice was required in response to an energy crisis that they 
believed was not real. In June 1979 31 percent of Americans believed energy was the 
most important problem facing the country but one week before the 1980 election, in a 
similar poll, only three percent cited energy as the number one concern.698 Carter 
himself accepted that his initial use of apocalyptic language, ‘moral equivalent of war 
(MEOW),’ was a mistake.699 The failure to persuade the public resulted in there being 
insufficient support for those controversial measures that required active personal 
sacrifice such as tax or price increases. At the same time, by inflating the size of the 
‘crisis’, Carter created expectations that appeared to be lost in a long drawn out battle 
with Congress. By highlighting the security risk caused by US dependence on imported 
oil, he also increased the perception of American impotence which reflected badly on 
Carter. Another problem for the administration was that there were often differences 
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in emphasis in messages from the president and his experts, Carter saying that there 
was a crisis and the Department of Energy often disagreeing.  Even in his final year in 
office there was a major disagreement between members of the DPG and Secretary 
Duncan on whether to announce an energy emergency in Carter’s final State of the 
Union speech.700    
So why did Carter decide to make energy the priority for his administration? 
Energy was an archetypal ‘Carter issue.’ It was a highly technical, complex and long-term 
problem that affected everyone and therefore required expertise and serious study if a 
comprehensive solution was to be developed. He believed that solving this problem 
would be a clear demonstration of both presidential and governmental competence. 
Political scientists like Charles Jones, Erwin Hargrove, and Kenneth Morris,701 in 
analysing Carter’s failure on energy policy, have acknowledged the moral dimension but 
have concentrated on his organisational and communication failures. This approach has 
neglected evidence that Carter saw energy policy in moral terms and was determined 
to push legislation forward despite the political costs. This is not to suggest that Carter 
was naive on this issue; he realised that he had to mobilise public opinion to overcome 
resistance from major interest groups. The 1977 Energy Plan’s 90-day deadline and 
secrecy may have hampered implementation but fundamentally did not affect the 
outcome.  
Carter underestimated the practical difficulties involved in passing complicated 
legislation. Congressional splits were not on party or even ideological lines but more 
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based on region or geology. As a congressman if oil was in your state your position was 
fixed whether you were Democrat or GOP or conservative or liberal. Each element of 
the Carter energy plan created a different type of opposition which often involved 
strange bedfellows. For example, environmentalist congressmen working with the 
conservative oil lobby to oppose the proposed switch to coal. Groups that Carter 
assumed would be his supporters like the environmental and consumer lobbies were 
frequently in opposition. The first critic of his 1977 energy plan was consumer lobbyist 
and supporter Ralph Nader, who complained that Carter’s rhetoric was too dark, and 
the plan needed more emphasis on conservation.702 The White House became more 
effective at lobbying and achieved some well worked compromises on energy policy, for 
example on the Windfall Profit Tax but this was not enough to deliver Carter’s ambitious 
goals. Burton and Scott Kaufman in the Presidency of James Earl Carter argued that 
Carter’s inability to articulate a more positive vision for the country hampered his 
attempts to implement energy policy.703 Seeing energy as a moral issue heavily 
influenced his speeches. In the ’malaise’ speech of 15 July 1979, he argued that ‘we are 
confronted with a moral and spiritual crisis.’ 704  It was Carter, the preacher, asking for 
personal sacrifice for the greater good but such a ‘preachy’ tone did not motivate the 
public. Asked in an interview why the American public did not believe that there was an 
energy crisis, a frustrated Carter commented rather sourly that ‘they don’t want to face 
an unpleasant fact.’705 Carter’s decision to frame energy policy as a moral issue was to 
reduce the chances of establishing a political consensus. Ultimately it was the failure to 
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energise public support and the consequential inability to outmanoeuvre the powerful 
interest groups inside and outside Congress that proved decisive.  
Carter made energy a major priority throughout his administration. He was more 
personally involved in this than any other domestic policy issue, including the economy 
and more liberal issues like health insurance. He gave television addresses, went to town 
hall meetings, held briefings for the press and lobbied key congressmen, face-to-face 
and by phone.706 So what did energy policy signify about Carter’s ideology? It confirmed 
Carter’s belief in the necessity for the government to intervene in the energy market for 
the benefit of all. The ESC and particularly the EMB were seen as evidence of his liberal 
beliefs. The Wall Street Journal, commenting on his 15 July speech, said, ‘The real Jimmy 
Carter has finally stood up and on the far left of the Democratic party.’707 However, the 
same president deregulated, albeit gradually, oil and gas prices, a key issue for free 
marketers. These were important changes but were implemented only when Carter felt 
he had no choice. Unlike his successor, Ronald Reagan, Carter did not believe that the 
free market could solve all energy problems708 but other more conservative beliefs were 
prominent in the battle to pass energy legislation. Carter’s fiscal conservatism was often 
in evidence as he continued to express concern about the cost of energy initiatives, be 
it coal/gas conversion or the nuclear ‘fast breeder’ programme.709 This mix of 
conservative and liberal actions may suggest a president trying to establish a new ‘third 
way’ but there is little evidence to support this. Carter saw energy as a moral and 
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technical challenge for his government to address. Unlike Bill Clinton, who couched his 
policies within a ‘New Democrat’ philosophy, Carter attached no ideological framework 
to the proposals that Schlesinger brought forward. He soon found his programme 
attacked on all sides ideologically; there was no middle ground. His staff therefore had 
to build a new coalition of support for each component of his policy. 
 Carter’s energy legacy was substantial, but it all seemed much less than he had 
promised.710 Much of his energy programme was dismantled by his successor, including 
the Windfall Profits Tax, which was repealed in 1988.711 Ronald Reagan was opposed to 
Carter’s interventionist approach but was helped by more favourable conditions in the 
global energy market. Reagan benefitted from the fall in OPEC prices in 1983 and the 
consequential oil glut, so did not have to deal with the immediate challenges that Carter 
faced. By 1986 oil prices had fallen back to their 1973 levels. However, given the same 
circumstances Reagan would have spoken to the public in a very different way. Whereas 
Carter emphasised the complexity of the energy problem, Reagan would have simplified 
the message. He would not have immersed himself in the detail or announce that he 
was going ‘to have an unpleasant talk’712 with the American people about personal 
sacrifice. He would have talked about taking the government out of the energy business. 
An oversimplified even misleading message possibly, but Reagan would always promote 
a positive vision of America that would leave the audience feeling somehow better, not 
something Carter was ever able to achieve. The fundamental difference between the 
two men lay not in their politics but in their character. The optimistic Reagan saw 
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positive outcomes in any scenario whilst Carter, the Baptist engineer, saw the 
complexity of every problem, the hard road ahead and the need for sacrifice.  
Energy was yet another policy area where Carter did not benefit from good 
fortune. This proved to be a continuing story when his administration sought to solve 
the long-term problems of welfare, health insurance and social security. Only this time 
Carter had to meet the expectations of the liberal wing of his party.  
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Chapter Four  
                   Health-Welfare Policy: Betrayal of the Liberals? 
 
Hamilton Jordan did not usually attend in-depth policy discussions at the White House 
but, in the run up to a decision on welfare reform in April 1977, he attended a 
Department of Health and Welfare (HEW) briefing for Carter. His honest and insightful 
note of the meeting to the president demonstrated the closeness of their relationship, 
the impact of the administration’s substantial legislative workload and the nature of 
Carter’s involvement with HEW’s Secretary, Joseph A Califano. Jordan advised Carter 
against making any immediate decision on welfare reform because he believed that the 
president did not, yet, fully grasp the complexities of the subject. He contrasted Carter’s 
understanding of welfare with his involvement in energy policy where he had 
participated in a lengthy discussion with Schlesinger and his team, as well as completed 
hundreds of hours of reading. Jordan estimated that the time Carter spent on welfare 
was as low as five percent compared to time spent on energy policy. For Jordan the 
questions Carter was asking at that meeting just confirmed his lack of detailed 
knowledge. He argued that this was not surprising given Carter’s level of involvement in 
the ERP, the debate over the tax rebate, the Energy bill and SALT (Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks). Jordan believed that the HEW proposals were uncoordinated and 
flawed but concluded, ‘I do not believe that it is humanly possible to have a good welfare 
reform program ready by 1 May that you believe in and are comfortable with.’ He also 
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told Carter that he looked exhausted and with his first major international summit in 
London due in two weeks, he must find time to rest. 713 
Jordan’s observations were revealing for several reasons. Firstly, they 
highlighted that as early as April 1977 both Carter and his staff were becoming 
overloaded but that the view that Carter involved himself in too much of the detail of 
policy did not apply in this instance, or indeed other policy issues. He had decided to 
delegate policies like welfare reform to Califano. Jordan’s memorandum underlined the 
difficulty for Carter in making decisions on complex issues when he did not fully grasp 
the detail. This was something that Carter was not used to because as governor he was 
able to be involved in the minutiae of all-important policy issues. Now as president he 
was already finding the job beyond his considerable capacity to absorb detailed 
information. Carter was trying to delegate but as a result it became much more 
important for his staff to coordinate all viewpoints, both inside and outside the White 
House, to help him come to a decision. These organisational issues were critical in the 
development of all the HEW reforms that his administration sought to implement. 
Welfare reform and National Health Insurance (NHI) were key issues for the liberal wing 
of the Democratic Party and this placed major expectations on Carter at a time when 
the president was facing opposition not just from the GOP and powerful interest groups 
but from a more conservative electorate who were becoming resistant to what they saw 
as ‘big’ government solutions. 
 As the first successful Democratic presidential candidate in twelve years, Carter 
faced high expectations, particularly from the party’s liberal wing. The delivery of 
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welfare and health reforms was seen as an important measure of his ‘liberal credentials’. 
His election campaign and inaugural address gave few indications of his commitment to 
reform. Reference in speeches to compassionate government and getting people back 
to work gave little indication that such reforms would be a major priority.714 The one 
exception to this was his speech on health ideas to the Student National Medical 
Association (SNMA) in Washington DC on 16 April 1976. In this speech, Carter’s liberal 
credentials were there for all to see, as he made specific commitments to universal 
health coverage.715 His ideas on these reforms, however, had some conservative 
themes. He acknowledged that the Federal government was inefficient and wasted 
money and that schemes like welfare were subject to fraud. Carter’s focus therefore 
when dealing with health and welfare reform was as much about establishing an 
efficient service and clamping down on waste and fraud as on increasing benefits to the 
poor and sick. In this he was responding to the conservative mood in the country and 
this was one of the reasons why Rafshoon wanted Carter in 1978 to make a major 
national speech on waste and fraud.716  Another influence on his administration’s reform 
plans was Carter’s increasing concern over inflation and a public commitment to 
eliminate the budget deficit. This resulted in pressure from his economic advisors to 
oppose, or at least water down, any substantial reforms even when campaign promises 
were involved. Eizenstat in his role as coordinator of policy found it difficult to bridge 
the gap between HEW and Carter’s economic advisors. These internal policy differences 
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as well as disagreement over legislative priorities amongst White House staff hindered 
the legislative process. As a result, HEW proposals suffered because its draft legislation 
became entangled in a series of congressional committees. The prioritisation process, 
managed by Vice President Mondale, pushed both welfare and health reform down the 
administration’s agenda for 1978 and 1979 as difficulties with Congress became more 
apparent.717  
Carter’s commitment to welfare and health reform would place a heavy 
workload on HEW and its Secretary Joseph Califano who had been recommended to 
Carter for the role by Mondale. Two attributes made Califano stand out from most, if 
not all, of Carter’s cabinet appointments. Firstly, his liberal credentials were outstanding 
as his role in the Johnson administration had helped shape the Great Society reform 
legislation. 718 Moreover, he had liberal friends in Congress and the media. He was a 
close friend of Ben Bradlee, editor of the Washington Post, and of the Kennedy family. 
Secondly, his experience of government, particularly of major reorganisations, was 
invaluable to the new administration.719 However, he was also regarded as a classic 
Washington insider, especially by Carter’s Georgian staff and this made him an object of 
their suspicion. This was exacerbated by the size and nature of the department he ran. 
HEW was criticised by conservatives for being too large and a source of government 
waste, especially in relation to welfare benefits. Carter’s interest in reducing waste and 
fiscal restraint often resulted in disputes over its budget.720 HEW had substantial 
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resources, for example it had over 40 of its own congressional liaison staff, 721 and 
jealously guarded its lead status on issues. This often resulted in conflicts with the White 
House  on issues such as HEW’s anti-smoking policy and its lack of support for Carter’s 
Education bill. 722  
Whilst HEW’s anti-smoking stance was in line with Carter’s campaign pledges, its 
active promotion damaged him with southern constituencies, especially in North 
Carolina. Carter was embarrassed by the announcement of an anti-smoking initiative as 
Califano gave him no advanced warning and the press had picked up on the 
contradiction between HEW’s policy and the administration’s backing of price supports 
for tobacco.723 Carter understood Califano’s position on this issue, as it was a campaign 
pledge, but he was much less tolerant of Califano’s actions on the Education bill. The 
establishment of a separate Department of Education was also a major campaign 
commitment and it was supported by some, if not all, of the unions.724 It was not 
surprising that HEW would have reservations about losing a major component of its 
organisation. Nonetheless once the legislation was agreed within the White House, 
Califano was accused by Carter’s staff of continuing to lobby secretly in Congress against 
the bill.725 It was cited as one of the major reasons why Califano was eventually fired by 
Carter in July 1979. Califano’s covert actions against the Education bill were not the only 
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source of tension with White House staff. Jordan had made no secret of his deep-rooted 
suspicion of Califano’s liberal background, in particular his closeness with the Kennedy 
family.726 Califano was criticised for his poor record on recruiting minorities and women 
and a lack of consultation on hires.727 There was also condemned for his performance at 
a Senate sub-committee on Mental Health, Rosalynn Carter’s area of personal interest. 
It was described by a staff member in a memorandum to the First Lady as ‘such a 
discredit to you and to everyone who has worked so hard on the commission and this 
legislation.’ This criticism could not have done anything but damage his standing with 
both the President and his influential wife.728 Califano in turn had an unfavourable view 
of White House staff, describing them as naïve and accusing them of leaking negative 
stories about him to the press.729 
Carter’s attitude to Califano and the role he played in the cabinet was often 
contradictory. In many ways Califano was only cabinet member carrying out the role in 
the manner that Carter himself had defined. He wanted his cabinet to be independent, 
manage their departments efficiently; and Califano had the experience and confidence 
to do both. Carter, as he was focussed on other issues, devolved major responsibilities 
to HEW to develop important policies on health and welfare. This demonstrated a 
personal confidence in his secretary. Califano also felt able to comment on a wide range 
of issues outside his immediate responsibility. For example, he expressed strong views 
against the position of the Justice Department on the Bakke discrimination case.730 This 
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flexibility given to cabinet members became an issue when White House staff became 
more influential in policy making. It was not just a problem with Califano but given his 
background and the complexity of the policies he was responsible for, conflict between 
HEW and White House staff was probably inevitable.731  
Califano’s personal relationship with Carter was not straightforward. On the one 
hand, White House papers contain numerous hand-written notes of praise from the 
president732 who often gave support to Califano in policy disputes with White House 
staff.733 They agreed on a number of moral issues, notably abortion where Califano, as 
a Catholic, supported Carter who was criticised on this by his own staff.734  Califano was 
allowed to be candid with the president about his leadership.735 But much of the 
criticism of Califano about not supporting the Education bill and not cooperating with 
White House staff was passed on to Carter. The Georgians on Carter’s staff simply did 
not trust him.736 Rafshoon could not understand why Carter and Mondale continued to 
trust Califano even though, Rafshoon believed, he directly lied to them both on a 
number of occasions.737 The HEW Secretary always felt under suspicion because he was 
part of the ‘Washington Cocktail circuit’ but to the president it was about being a team 
player. In the end Carter believed that he had become incompatible with White House 
staff and cabinet members and so he was eventually dismissed in July 1979.738  However 
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much of a problem Califano was perceived to be, the fact was that he remained Carter’s 
main spokesman for major legislation for nearly three quarters of his administration 
suggests that the differences were exaggerated. 
If there was an early example of Carter facing up to a moral challenge and ‘doing 
the right thing,’ it was on resolving America’s social security funding deficit. The issue 
for the new administration was that the social security schemes, delivered principally 
through Old Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI), were due to 
run out of funding in 1983 and 1979 respectively.739 In the eventual solution, brokered 
by the White House with Congress, both parties agreed to tax increases before the 1978 
mid-term elections, a risky proposition for many congressmen. Despite this, Congress 
continued to seek ways to backtrack from that commitment, forcing the White House 
to develop a more palatable solution to this problem. This, unfortunately for Carter, 
caused divisions in the White House, leaving him with three competing proposals from 
the Economic Policy Group (EPG), Domestic Policy Group (DPG) and HEW. This problem 
was caused by a lack of coordination across the administration and limited presidential 
engagement.740 Carter has often been criticised for his inordinate attention to detail, 
but on this, as with other such policies, he did not have the time to study proposals in 
depth.741  When he was asked by his staff to talk to Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia 
about social security, Carter commented that whilst he had done so he did not know if 
he had helped as ‘he knows more about it than I do’. 742 The recognition of the need to 
plug the gap in funding did not mean a solution could be easily found. The additional 
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money required, Schultze estimated, was $60-80bn over five years.743 The 
administration’s proposal submitted envisaged increases in payroll tax but also 
substantial increases in employer contributions.744 As with other financial legislation, 
Senator Long was an unenthusiastic supporter of any tax increase and Carter’s staff 
worked extremely hard either to secure his acquiescence or at least to mitigate his 
opposition.745 The bill was submitted in May 1977 and was passed that December. The 
law provided long-term funding from 1980 until 2030. It focussed on increased 
payments from the wealthier, lifted restrictions on what retirees could personally earn 
and still retain benefit and ended discrimination on the grounds of sex. 
The passing of Social Security legislation on 20 December 1977 was a success for 
Carter but this proved difficult to sustain as pressure from Congress to reduce or remove 
proposed tax increases soon followed. The domestic policy team argued that part of the 
problem was how the tax increases were inaccurately portrayed in the press. There was 
debate within the administration over how Carter should respond.746 Carter publicly 
urged Congress to hold its nerve and not amend the law.747  The pressure remained so 
the administration was forced to explore alternatives to the scheduled tax increases.748 
Options included alternative forms of funding and a programme of cost savings.749 
Suggestions to reduce the level of benefits as an option were rejected as this was 
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unlikely to pass Congress.750 The funding issue continued to be debated right up to the 
1980 election with Califano’s successor, Patricia Harris, asserting that the administration 
had to hold the line on the  proposals as increases in unemployment and inflation would 
further deplete scheme funds.751 Continued disagreement and the forthcoming 1980 
election resulted in no further changes to the legislation. The passage of the Social 
Security bill reflected Carter’s idealism but was more a demonstration of his 
pragmatism, delivering effective legislation across party lines. Social security had been 
in the past an ideological issue but in this instance all sides, whatever their ideology, 
recognised that the funding problem was an issue that had to be resolved. This would 
prove to be a very unusual occurrence and not something the administration would 
benefit from with their other policy initiatives. For Carter it was a question of good 
government but one with which he had limited personal involvement, given the 
pressures on his time. 
 Welfare services in the 1970’s were delivered through a number of programmes 
by Federal and State organisations. These helped the poor, the unemployed, the 
disabled and their families. Attempts at reform in previous years, like the Nixon 
administration’s proposals on the Family Assistance Plan (FAP), had failed because of 
the complexity of the legislation and an inability to gain cross party support. However, 
the pressure for reform had increased, driven by two major factors. Firstly, there was 
the spiralling cost of these programmes due mainly to increasing numbers of claimants. 
This was not just a Federal problem. Some of the programmes like Aid to Families with 
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Dependent Children (AFDC) were supported by the states and those with large 
concentrations of urban poor, such as New York, were struggling financially. In 
California, Governor Ronald Reagan negotiated a deal with his Democratic legislature 
which made reforms and controlled expenditure.752 The second incentive for change 
was increasing public criticism of the welfare system. Reagan and other conservative 
politicians were arguing that these programmes discouraged employment, were poorly 
run and subject to fraud. Carter was very sensitive to this. Papers in the Carter White 
House at the time included a US News and World report headlined ‘The Great National 
Rip Off – How People Cheat and Steal $25,000,000,000 a year from the Government.’753 
Not all welfare programmes were criticised in this way, but the national mood was 
stronger than any counter pressure from liberals to improve benefits. 
 Carter’s attitude to welfare had always been sympathetic; his background in 
rural Georgia meant that he understood what it was like to be poor.754 But his approach 
to reform was as much conservative as liberal. In introducing his plans for welfare to the 
nation on 2 February 1977, he balanced the benefits of reform between savings for the 
tax payer and help for those who ‘genuinely’ needed it.755 Carter’s insistence on a zero 
cost solution was in line with his conservative fiscal outlook but advisors like Schultze 
and Califano never believed reform could be implemented without at least some initial 
additional funding.756 Carter was also conscious of conservative criticism of waste and 
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fraud and constantly sought answers on this from Califano.757 All of this caused concern 
among his liberal supporters with Congressman Charles Rangel quoted as saying that 
‘the poor are not a priority in this administration.’758 
  Welfare reform was a more administratively complex problem to solve than 
energy policy. Yet there were similarities in how Carter approached each problem. In 
both cases he opted for a comprehensive solution and he committed publicly to a fixed 
deadline; in welfare’s case - 90 days. He encouraged his staff to focus on technical rather 
than political issues and he communicated no overarching theme to guide them. Equally, 
in both cases, there were powerful groups inside and outside Congress who opposed his 
plans. However, there were some differences between each policy area. The first was 
that the wide range of welfare programmes and the requirement to create job 
programmes meant several government departments became engaged in policy 
development. The two major departments affected were HEW and Labor but also 
involved were the departments of Agriculture and Commerce as well as White House 
staff groups like EPG, DPG and OMB. As a result, the consulting group established to help 
coordinate this policy had 30 members.759 Given the nature of the task and the number 
of interests involved, disputes were inevitable, especially between the two major 
players HEW and Labor. Unfortunately, during the first five months of the 
administration, there was no organisational mechanism to manage such disputes. The 
energy policy was developed within a tight group and detailed proposals were not seen 
outside until much later. Also, any policy issues could be resolved by Carter as he was 
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heavily involved in the detailed discussions. This was not possible to achieve with 
welfare reform due to its complexity and, unlike energy, issues arising from earlier 
outside consultation which was encouraged by Carter.760 He tried to resolve the 
bureaucratic infighting by using Schultze to adjudicate, albeit without success.761  Finally, 
a major difference with energy was Carter’s own involvement. As discussed earlier, from 
the start he immersed himself in the detail of energy policy, but with welfare he stepped 
back and left responsibility to Califano and his team. 762 This was partly an indication of 
the importance attached to energy but also a response to his heavy workload early in 
his administration. Hence, he was only able to give broad direction to Califano which 
was to cause, at least initially, some confusion in critical areas of policy.763                                 
 Carter imposed two specific restrictions on welfare reform that severely 
hampered policy development. He established an arbitrary deadline of 1 May 1977 to 
bring forward proposals and specified that any plan would be at zero additional cost. 
Califano, whilst not challenging the deadline, wanted a further 60 days for ‘consideration 
of programme and budgetary alternatives and political feasibility.’764 Carter agreed to 
wide consultation but would not move the date. Califano also could not envisage any 
comprehensive reform without incurring cost, at least initially.765 The issue of zero cost 
continued to be a source of friction between Carter and not just Califano but other 
members of his administration.766 For example, Califano was shocked when he 
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presented options that required additional funds to ensure that more claimants gained 
from the reform than lost, that Carter rejected those proposals.767 The principles of 
welfare reform were agreed by Carter on 12 April 1977. This included simplifying 
administration, redirection of CETA (Community and Employment Training Act) training 
to the poorest, a freeze on the state supplement for AFDC and the provision of universal 
minimum benefit. The principle was also established that non-working families would 
not have higher benefit than working families, and incentives would be provided for 
recipients to work and keep families together.768 There were major disagreements 
between Labor and HEW over how the job creation programme would integrate with 
the structure of HEW benefits. These issues were not finally resolved until 20 May 1977, 
after Carter’s self-imposed deadline.769 There was also scepticism over whether Labor 
could deliver the promised number of up to 1.4m new jobs and so it was decided that 
no jobs target would be discussed at Carter’s initial press briefing.770  
This was not the only issue that required resolution in May. The HEW proposal 
to fund claimants through negative income tax was administratively simple but ran the 
risk of being seen by Congress and the public as providing cash handouts and therefore 
being a disincentive to work.771 There was also recognition that not all welfare 
programmes could be covered initially so the plan focussed on AFDC, Supplementary 
Security Income (SSI) and Food Stamp programmes. However, as late as 29 April 1977, 
Califano was expressing concern over the negative reaction from Congress to the White 
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House’s Food Stamp proposals and suggesting delaying their implementation.772 As the 
issues were debated in the run up to Carter’s announcement, domestic policy staff were 
still recommending an alternative phased approach 773 and the OMB expressed concerns 
about the accuracy of HEW’s costing for the programme.774 The White House therefore 
started discussions with Congress with many issues unresolved and increasing concern 
that important legislators would be in active opposition.775 
 Carter’s announcement of his proposals emphasised his commitment to reform 
but confirmed to Congress that his first priorities were the Energy bill, Tax Reform and 
Social Security.776 Califano was concerned about the timing because he feared that the 
cost of Carter’s Tax Reform bill would eat into funding for welfare and, later, health 
reform.777  Whilst there was little controversy over HEW’s welfare principles, the LA 
Times called them about as controversial as the Boy Scout oath,778 there were major 
objections from across the political spectrum of  the detailed proposals. Liberals argued 
that the benefits were too low and 38 states, mainly in the north, would have to 
supplement payments. They also argued that not enough jobs or training were being 
offered and the payment of minimum wages would undercut the employment market. 
Conservatives, on the other hand, opposed the reform because they believed that the 
guaranteed income plan discouraged work, the jobs programme was too expensive, and 
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the proposals would increase welfare rolls.779  In addition individual congressmen and 
lobby groups had specific concerns.  AFL-CIO favoured a permanent government job 
creation programme.780 Several legislators like Al Ullman, Chair of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, recommended a phased implementation which Carter rejected. The 
zero-cost option had resulted in more welfare recipients being worse off than better. 
Califano, as late as 25 July 1977, was requesting additional funds from Carter to address 
this.781 At the same time the president received a memorandum from Lance suggesting 
that even without additional funds, HEW’s ‘zero cost’ budget was $3.3bn in deficit.782 
The political analysis from his domestic policy team was, if anything, more pessimistic. 
They told Carter that the programme would be attacked by both wings of the 
Democratic Party and that Long and Ullman, as committee chairmen in the Senate and 
House respectively, wanted more conservative options presented. They further 
suggested that there were three constituencies for welfare reform: one that sought 
savings for the tax payer; one, increased benefits, and the states that sought fiscal relief 
for their own benefits bill. The DPG analysis of these groups was that the latest proposals 
did not bring any reduction in the size of the welfare bill and the modest fiscal relief was 
only provided by making 6.5 million AFDC recipients worse off by an average of $400 
annually. Suggested changes to the proposals were rejected by Carter as unlikely to 
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receive Long’s support.783 Despite these major reservations, some amendments were 
agreed, and the legislation was formally submitted to Congress on 6 August 1977.784 
 In the ensuing legislative battle, the White House failed to get its proposals out 
of committee onto the floor of the House. Ullman, whose concerns were well known, in 
the end proposed his own version of the bill which also failed to pass his committee. In 
addition general concerns over the cost of the legislation caused Congress to seek an 
independent review of HEW’s budget which found flaws in its cost assumptions.785 
Administration efforts continued to push for legislation with Speaker O’Neill’s 
support,786 but by the end of 1977 welfare had ceased to be a priority and was not 
mentioned in the following January’s State of the Union Address.787Whilst Carter had by 
no means given up on welfare reform, his personal involvement declined after 1977. 
The initiative for reform passed to Califano and Congress. Ullman, Long, Moynihan, 
James Corman and other legislators introduced bills at various stages during 1978 and 
1979, each representing a different approach to reform. Califano initiated a further 
attempt at legislation in March 1978. 788 This did not receive enthusiastic support from 
the White House with Eizenstat expressing scepticism over its chances of passage but 
he nevertheless recommended Carter’s support, claiming it would prevent him from 
being accused of giving up on a campaign commitment. 789 This still did not get full 
backing from White House staff with McIntyre at the OMB not only continuing to oppose 
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such legislation but unusually submitting OMB’s own counter proposals.790 Carter 
supported the Califano initiative and a later incremental and more limited proposal in 
early 1979,791 but both failed at the committee stage after facing criticism from 
conservatives and liberals.  White House staff continued discussions with Congress up 
until March 1980 before Carter cancelled the last attempt at reform due to budgetary 
pressures.792 
 Laurence E Lynn and David de F Whitman, in their book The President as Policy 
Maker: Jimmy Carter and Welfare Reform, argued that the failure of Carter’s welfare 
reform was a result of poor management and ineffective communication.793 The policy 
development process without Carter’s direct and detailed involvement had no 
mechanism to bring together the different views in his administration or evaluate the 
political consequences. This role would be taken in future by Eizenstat and his team, but 
this function was not in place during the first part of 1977. Consequently, no consensus 
was reached on legislation submitted in August 1977. The focus placed on policy 
development resulted in no thought being given as to how reform was to be supported 
to enable legislation to pass Congress. As a result, the legislation produced was so 
complicated that it would prove impossible to pass even in the House. There were issues 
outside the administration’s control which would hamper any efforts at reform, not the 
least the hostile attitude of the public to taxation and to the payment of benefits to the 
‘undeserving poor’. Sensing this trend, Carter continued to seek a wide-ranging solution 
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but at zero cost. But his commitment to deliver jobs, a campaign promise to extend 
coverage and his promise not to consolidate programmes, all at zero cost, could be 
delivered only by making many of the current beneficiaries worse off.794 To liberals in 
his administration, including those in HEW, his apparent willingness to accept this was 
incomprehensible. It was a continuing source of tension between Carter and Califano, 
who still went back to him with additional options to improve the terms. To those 
intimately involved in the crafting of the reforms, what Carter was asking of them was 
impossible and to those in HEW it just confirmed Carter’s natural conservatism. 
However, Carter may well have not seen this as an ideological issue but a question of 
delivering what he viewed as a practical solution given the circumstances. He was 
already facing defeat at the hands of conservative Democrats on tax reform and his 
energy policy. He feared the same with any measure that was not fiscally conservative, 
whatever his personal views. Equally he was not likely to be convinced by technical 
arguments in favour of more generous benefits because he lacked the detailed 
knowledge that he had in other policy areas like energy.  
Although Carter was not as engaged in welfare reform as he was, for example, in 
energy policy, that did not necessarily mean his personal involvement would have 
changed the outcome for his legislative proposals. Nixon’s welfare policy initiative, 
Family Assistance Programme (FAP), failed in 1970 and again in 1972 despite active 
support from a president about to win a landslide election victory. Carter took on a 
highly complicated policy issue. He was unable to manage his administration in a way 
that delivered legislation that could pass Congress. It would be misleading, however, to 
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imagine that a fully engaged president supported by a united, well organised 
administration could have been more successful. Carter was sufficiently attuned to the 
public mood to understand that any increase in spending and government bureaucracy 
would meet strong resistance in Congress. It would be difficult to envisage that any 
government could have created legislation that would satisfy both liberal and 
conservative viewpoints. The outcome for the president was conclusive: a major plank 
of Carter’s campaign in 1976, welfare reform, had failed to gain congressional approval.   
 Whilst Carter can be criticised for his inability to prioritise and plan his legislative 
programme, the administration’s approach on health policy was more measured. The 
decision to concentrate on controlling hospital costs, made in January 1977, was 
supporting economic policy and as a necessary first step in achieving in 1978 the liberal 
‘holy grail’ of comprehensive National Health Insurance (NHI).795 The White House 
recognised that controlling spiralling health costs, projected to rise to $200 billion by 
1979, 796 would align with Carter’s anti-inflation policy. This message would be used by 
the administration as the main argument in selling the legislation after 1977. Carter 
believed that the case for mandatory cost controls was overwhelming and would receive 
support inside and outside Congress. Yet there were major obstacles to overcome if his 
proposals were to become law. His bill needed to pass four health sub committees and 
five full committees, as well as the floor of both Houses.797 This process would take time 
which helped medical interest groups like the American Medical Association (AMA) and 
American Hospital Association (AHA) to develop their opposition. These groups proved 
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to be highly effective at influencing members of congress. The White House’s improved 
capability to mount outreach campaigns in support of legislation, in place by 1978, was 
unable to work effectively on Hospital Cost Containment (HCC). Anne Wexler, 
responsible for outreach, argued that this was because opposition to the bill was well 
entrenched and that the public were not directly affected by its benefits as personal 
medical costs were incurred by insurers not the individual.798 
The legislative strategy followed by the White House was to work with Herman 
Talmadge who chaired the Senate Health Sub-committee.799 By April 1977 Califano was 
already reporting on the depth of the opposition from the AHA. He informed Carter that 
hospitals employed one in thirty of all US workers and that pressure against the bill 
would be applied to congressmen even before proposals were published. He concluded 
that, ‘In short the hospital cost containment legislation will not be enacted unless the 
Administration is willing to expend significant political energy.’800 Carter launched the 
Hospital Cost Containment bill on 25 April 1977 801 and continued to work with Congress 
for the next 18 months. The bill that eventually passed the Senate, based on the Nelson 
amendment, was a compromise in which voluntary cost controls were to be initially 
trialled and, if unsuccessful, would be replaced by mandatory rules. This success was 
due to effective congressional lobbying and the willingness of Carter to compromise, not 
something that was regularly achieved elsewhere in his legislative programme. The bill 
still had to pass the House. Carter’s continued commitment to HCC was confirmed in his 
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1979 State of the Union address: ‘There will be no clearer test of the commitment of 
this Congress to the anti-inflation fight than the legislation that I will submit again this 
year to hold down inflation in hospital care.’802 He followed this up by establishing a 
legislative task force to support passage of the bill.803 In his announcement of legislation 
in March 1979 he argued that, ‘The American people want me, and they want other 
elected representatives, to take action, action that is strong, prompt and effective.’ 804 
For the remainder of the year, the White House worked hard for the bill to pass the 
House and Carter was involved in personal lobbying and made speeches.805  Despite this 
intense effort, the bill was rejected by House members. Carter’s staff continued to argue 
that HCC was still worth pursuing and that projected savings alone were worth $1.1bn 
in the 1981 budget.806  However, no further attempts were made with Congress even 
though there remained a bill in the Senate. A proposal was made to use Carter’s 
executive powers to control hospital spending, but this was abandoned on legal  
advice. 807 For the remainder of the administration hospital costs were managed as part 
of Carter’s overall anti-inflation policy which focussed on monitoring and voluntary cost 
restraint.  
Carter saw the battle over HCC as one between his administration and the 
medical lobby. He believed that his loss was down to the AMA’s huge financial 
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contributions to three or four Illinois congressmen.808 This is perhaps an 
oversimplification but unlike some other policies submitted by Carter, HCC did have 
more proponents in Congress and the White House made fewer mistakes in managing 
that support for the bill. Effective compromises and alliances were built in the Senate, 
particularly with liberals. Ted Kennedy’s support was achieved by the promise of future 
cooperation on NHI. However, the AMA and AHA proved more effective in the House in 
equating mandatory controls with increased government involvement, a keystone issue 
for the public. The power of these medical interest groups would be critical when Carter 
sought to bring in broader healthcare reform. 
 Carter did not personally focus on healthcare policy until November 1977; 809 but 
his commitment to reform had been established nineteen months earlier. His speech on 
national health policy to the SNMA in Washington DC was passionate and specific. He 
talked about Medicaid being ‘a national scandal’ and criticised the bureaucracy of 
programmes that were spread over fifteen departments and were ripe for 
reorganisation. He pledged reform, stating, ‘Coverage must be universal and mandatory. 
Every citizen must be entitled to the same level of comprehensive benefits.’810 What 
gave this speech added importance was that its content had been negotiated with the 
unions by Eizenstat, at the time a key advisor in Carter’s campaign team. The outlined 
policy was very close to union proposals on health and fell just short of the Kennedy-
Corman Health Security bill drafted in 1975. This bill, with its ‘cradle to grave’ 
entitlements, was at the time stalled in Congress.811 This speech would frame the 
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expectations of the unions, congressional liberals and their standard bearer on health 
policy, Senator Kennedy.  
 Although politically damaged by his involvement in the death of one of Bobby 
Kennedy’s female staff at Chappaquiddick in 1969, Kennedy remained a powerful figure 
in the Senate and the Democratic Party. He was regarded as the champion for universal 
health care and used his chairmanship of the Human Resources sub-committee as a 
platform for health reform. There would be questions from the Carter White House 
about the motivation for his actions on this legislation but Kennedy’s commitment to 
health reform was both genuine and longstanding. He first submitted proposals in 1973 
and saw health reform as a moral issue, like civil rights, not something that could wait 
until the economy could afford it.812 He was to remain influential on this issue right up 
until his death in 2009, being one of the sponsors of the Affordable Care Act of 2010. To 
the Carter White House, he was major player in Congress with a good voting record in 
support of the administration, but he was not the most important Senator on this issue; 
those were the Chairs of Finance and the Health sub-committees, Senators Long and 
Talmadge. Outside Congress Kennedy had developed a close relationship with the 
unions, particularly Doug Fraser of the United Automobile Workers (UAW), who were 
strong supporters of Carter and universal healthcare. Consequently, the White House 
worked very hard to keep Kennedy involved in the policy development process, often 
using Peter Bourne, Special Assistant to the President on health issues, as an additional 
channel of communication. 
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 Health policy was developed in a similar way to welfare reform and HCC. Carter 
devolved responsibility to Califano and did not involve himself in the detail. However, 
he did not impose a rigid deadline as was done with welfare nor did he exclude other 
policy makers from the process as he had done with his energy plan. This was in contrast 
with his Democratic successor, Bill Clinton, who in 1993 imposed secrecy and time 
restraints on the development of his ultimately unsuccessful Health Reform bill.  The 
White House had to manage conflicting views in Congress and an overcrowded 
legislative schedule to make progress on any proposals.  Finally, like welfare and HCC, 
the administration faced strong and effective opposition from interest groups. Carter 
found himself caught between, on the one hand, his natural compassion and a campaign 
commitment and, on the other, his concern for fiscal restraint.  His economic advisors, 
especially the OMB, applied consistent pressure to restrict the scope of any HEW 
proposals on the grounds of cost. 
The planning of health reform was discussed by his staff throughout 1977. Carter 
was under pressure from his economic advisors to postpone proposals indefinitely but 
he was anxious to maintain union support and so wanted to proceed.813 Peter Bourne, 
his assistant on health policy,  continued to feedback Kennedy’s concerns, stating that 
Kennedy had hinted that lack of action from Califano could prompt him to go public with 
his criticism.814 Jordan, in response, defended Califano and the White House strategy 
but also expressed concern about promoting Kennedy over other congressmen like 
Rostenkowski, Long and Talmadge who were in his view equally, if not more, important 
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to the success of any health legislation.815 It was agreed that a White House decision on 
the draft proposals would be made by 15 December 1977 with legislation to be sent to 
Congress in April 1978.816  
It quickly became evident that whilst HEW were developing a comprehensive 
scheme broadly in line with the Kennedy-Corman bill and Carter’s health policy speech 
of April 1976, there were major obstacles to passing such legislation. Califano believed 
that consultation on reform would take several congressional sessions and not enough 
time was being allowed for this.817  In a briefing from his domestic policy team for a 
meeting with Kennedy, Carter was told that there was wide disagreement amongst his 
advisors and in Congress. His economic team continued to express concern about the 
cost of reform. Many in Congress were opposed to significant Federal involvement in 
the scheme as part of general antipathy to big government initiatives. This coupled with 
a restricted congressional timetable indicated that the chances of passage of a reform 
bill were limited and it would be better to wait until after the mid-term elections in 1978. 
Bourne, a liberal on health policy, presented a more positive picture on progress. He 
argued that HEW’s policy was mainly settled and that any delay had been due to the 
need to ‘educate’ Califano. He believed the impact of the 1978 mid-term elections would 
be marginal and that so far Kennedy had been very restrained in not criticising the 
administration.818 But Bourne’s view within the administration was a minority one. At 
the same time, Fraser, as leader of the UAW, was querying why Carter would not just 
support the Kennedy-Corman bill as its content broadly aligned with Carter’s SNMA 
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speech.819 Despite his staff’s reservations, Carter decided that he would present 
legislation in 1978, accepting only the necessity to delay its introduction until July of that 
year.820 There was, however, no specific commitment on the sort of policy that would 
be presented. Although Carter vehemently denied this, the unions continued to believe 
that he was committed to draft legislation on the lines of the Kennedy-Corman bill.821 
 Throughout 1978, Carter was under pressure from many of his advisors to 
postpone the National Health Insurance (NHI) proposals until after the mid-term 
election. Califano believed much more time was required to gain support whilst Carter’s 
economic advisors objected to the cost of a comprehensive scheme.822 In a series of 
meetings with the unions, UAW and AFL-CIO, Carter and his staff attempted to persuade 
them to change key elements of their proposals. Carter was worried about their scheme 
being federally funded with no patient contribution, as this would drive up the cost and 
reinforce congressional opposition to government involvement.823 In March 1978 
Kennedy and the unions came up with what they believed was a compromise. This 
accepted in principle that healthcare could be administered by the private sector, but 
their proposals were still largely based on the Kennedy-Corman bill with comprehensive 
benefits and universal coverage. The revised proposal was viewed by Carter’s advisors 
as too costly both politically and economically. Joseph Onek from Carter’s domestic 
policy team warned that most unions provided good health cover, so could take a tough 
line without risk to their membership. In addition, although NHI was a popular measure 
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with the public, many people already had the cover it provided, so there was no direct 
benefit to them in the legislation. Without this personal stake many would oppose NHI 
if it was seen as too expensive.824 Discussions with Kennedy and the unions throughout 
April failed to reduce the cost of their proposal because the White House could not get 
agreement on reduced coverage, limited patient contribution and more effective cost 
control.825 By mid-May consultations had been extended to include key members of 
congress, only to find more conflicting opinions. Califano found in his round robin 
congressional discussions that Ullman opposed the Kennedy-Corman proposals in 
principle and did not want any NHI bill as it contradicted anti–inflation policy. Senators 
Long, Talmadge and Ribicofff only favoured their own limited health bill which 
federalised Medicaid and provided cover for catastrophic injury. All congressional 
leaders opposed sending forward a bill in 1978, whilst Long went so far as to say that his 
bill would be the only one to pass his Finance Committee. Only Kennedy and Corman 
favoured putting a comprehensive NHI bill forward but even Corman had raised 
objections about the proposal by the unions to use private insurers. 826 
 Despite these difficulties Carter wanted to honour his campaign commitment 
and in this he was supported by Califano. The HEW secretary opposed Carter’s economic 
advisors who were arguing on cost grounds for a phased scheme as the only realistic 
option that had support in Congress. Califano maintained that the phased option would 
fail, Carter could not continue to ‘string Kennedy along’, and that it would be better to 
fulfil his campaign promise by submitting a comprehensive scheme even if it eventually 
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failed. 827 Eizenstat in principle supported Califano but wanted to delay submitting a bill 
until after the mid-term elections. He did acknowledge the validity of the concerns over 
cost articulated by the CEA, Treasury, Commerce and OMB.828 These disagreements 
hindered Carter’s commitment to Kennedy and labour to publish his proposals by July 
1978. Carter’s economic advisors delayed attempts to finalise the administration’s NHI 
principles by refusing to sign them off. They submitted their own version of NHI based 
on affordability that would be implemented in phases over future years. 829 Carter met 
Kennedy in June 1978 and warned him that while he still supported a comprehensive 
scheme, all of his economic advisors opposed this and wanted a phased solution.830 The 
agreed compromise on the principles between liberal and conservatives in the 
administration left undecided the issue of how the scheme was to be implemented. 
Whilst it set out a path to comprehensive insurance, the financial triggers required in 
the proposal made the long-term goals problematic for Kennedy.831 In the final meeting 
Carter was unable to convince Kennedy or the unions that a phased approach would 
guarantee comprehensive legislation and Kennedy therefore withdrew his active 
support.832 
 The initial response from the National Insurance Association of America to 
Carter’s plan was positive: they characterised it as a ‘good start’.833 But there were 
divisions both inside and outside the White House. There were three proposals before 
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Congress. A Senate bill sponsored by Long, Talmadge and Ribicoff, which provided cover 
against catastrophic illness and federalised Medicaid, would cost $13bn. The Kennedy–
union comprehensive plan would cost $59bn. Finally, the cost of the Carter plan, which 
was phase one of a comprehensive solution, was initially estimated at $25bn.834 In 
addition there were continued disagreements within the White House over legislative 
tactics. Mondale favoured, in August 1978, going for a quick deal on the Long bill as he 
viewed this as the most realistic option. This was rejected at the time because of 
reservations about the limited scope of Long’s proposals as well as an underlying 
concern about whether Long could be trusted. 835 There were also disagreements with 
Califano who believed that a phase one bill would not pass, and the Long plan was 
fundamentally wrong. He therefore wanted HEW to demonstrate the administration’s 
long-term commitment by presenting a comprehensive plan.836 Eizenstat led the 
opposition to this, arguing that in the increasingly conservative climate, the mere 
highlighting of the expensive comprehensive plan would damage any chances that 
Carter’s bill had of passing Congress. This dispute between DPG and HEW was eventually 
resolved in February 1979 with limited involvement by the president in the 
discussions.837  To have any chance of success in 1979, the administration had to move 
quickly and gain the support of the liberals in Congress. Meetings were organised with 
Kennedy and the unions in February 1979. The proposal was to gain support for phase 
one in return for an agreement on the content of the final comprehensive scheme. 
Eizenstat recognised that this would be difficult to achieve but believed that Kennedy 
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would make concessions.838 Carter, however, was unable to persuade either Kennedy 
or the unions to accept a phase one approach and/or that his proposal was more 
generous than the Long bill. The liberals remained wedded to a comprehensive policy. 
 The administration continued to try and pass a bill that met the requirements of 
both wings of the party - a tough task made even more difficult by objections from 
Carter’s economic advisors about the cost of even the phase one element of his plan. 
McIntyre of the OMB wrote to Carter wanting a meeting to discuss a cheaper OMB 
alternative whilst Schultze also raised concerns. 839 There was intense debate during 
May 1979 that focussed on a plan to provide increased help for the poor whilst 
controlling costs. The objective was to occupy the centre ground and force conservatives 
like Long to support Carter or form an alliance with the medical lobby to vote down the 
bill.840 As for the liberal supporters, by June 1979 differences between Carter and 
Kennedy and the unions had become unbridgeable. Financially the gap between the 
White House and the Kennedy plans was nearly $40bn, which Carter deemed as simply 
unaffordable.841 A new proposal had been shaped by compromises reached within the 
White House and with Congress.842 White House staff managed to form a coalition of 
potential supporters across the party to be present at Carter’s public announcement of 
the proposed legislation on 12 June 1979. The inclusion of James Corman, co-sponsor of 
the Kennedy-Corman Health Security bill, was a major coup due to compromises Carter 
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felt able to make.843 Whilst Carter was prepared to see congressmen Long, Rangel and 
Ullman prior to the announcement, he left the unions to Mondale. He also rejected the 
opportunity to make a full speech endorsing his proposals, opting instead for a short 
statement.844 The press conference merely highlighted the differences with Congress, 
with a less than enthusiastic endorsement from Long.845 This was followed by a 
statement released by Kennedy which, whilst emphasising that he would continue to 
work with Carter, criticised his plan as fundamentally unfair and ineffective in reducing 
costs.846 When Kennedy launched his presidential bid in November 1979, NHI became a 
political issue but even before then his public criticism ensured that Carter’s bill would 
be attacked by liberals as well as conservatives in Congress. In addition, attempts by the 
White House to get any health bill passed by the Senate Finance Committee were 
delayed by other administrative priorities on the Windfall Profits Tax and Hospital Cost 
Containment.847 The conservative political climate and approaching 1980 election, as 
well as the existence of three different congressional proposals on health, made a 
successful outcome very unlikely. The most positive conclusion that the White House 
could present going into the 1980 election was that they had submitted a bill and the 
intention remained to pass NHI legislation should Carter be re-elected.   
 The creation of a comprehensive national health scheme was an article of faith 
for the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and the union movement. Following his 
speech to the SNMA, they believed that they had a president who was committed to 
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pass such legislation. Whilst Carter accepted the need for a comprehensive health 
scheme, unlike his Democratic successors, Presidents Clinton and Barack H Obama, he 
did not make this his number one reform priority. In contrast to Clinton, he chose to 
prioritise welfare policy over health and was prepared to compromise over the final 
legislation. But both presidents found that critics characterised their legislative 
proposals as imposing ‘big government’, a damaging message when both he and Clinton 
had been elected to change the way the government operated. 848 Carter did not 
immerse himself in health policy and he was, therefore, more dependent on his advisors. 
Unfortunately, health insurance became an issue that split the Democratic Party and 
caused fundamental disagreements amongst White House staff. The coordinating role 
of Eizenstat’s domestic policy team was on more than one occasion bypassed by 
McIntyre’s OMB, who not only disagreed with the fragile consensus of the policy teams 
but presented their own counter proposals. This hindered the ability of HEW and White 
House staff to formulate a consistent policy during 1978-9. Califano, who cut a 
frustrated figure during this period, believed that Carter recognised that he was caught 
between his campaign commitment and a lack of money.849  Ultimately Kennedy and 
the unions believed it was right to submit a comprehensive health bill even if, given the 
conservative make up of Congress, there was no possibility of its passage. It was Carter 
who took the pragmatic view and supported a phased proposal because he believed that 
had the best chance of success. This involved lobbying Ullman and Long because they 
had powerful positions in Congress and not Kennedy who simply did not have such 
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legislative influence. In the end it was ideological disagreements as well as highly 
effective lobbying from the medical industry that ensured that no health legislation was 
passed before the 1980 election. Carter believed that Kennedy’s constant criticism of his 
health policy was a product of an early decision to run against him in 1980.850 This view 
was held by several his staff and may explain Jordan’s unusual level of involvement in 
health policy. Yet whilst health did become an issue in the primaries and at the 
Democratic Convention, there is little evidence to support this view prior to the summer 
of 1979. For Kennedy, health policy was, and would continue to be for the rest of his 
political life, a question of principle. Carter did make every effort to pass health 
legislation, but he lacked the passion, commitment and even the evangelical fervour of 
Kennedy who saw health as a moral issue.  
In his speech on health policy to the SNMA, Carter quoted his favourite 
philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr, by saying that it was ‘the sad duty of politics is to 
establish justice in a sinful world.’851 The reforms he sought in health and welfare 
brought together his religious faith and his belief in government to achieve social change 
for the greater good. This might indicate that Carter was acting as a social liberal in 
carrying out these policies. If this was the case it raises the question of why Carter was 
not more proactive. Why for example did he not use his office more to persuade the 
American public of the need for reform? The concept of the ‘bully pulpit’ came naturally 
to Carter as a lay preacher and he had used it regularly during his administration on 
subjects like energy and inflation.  It was before his trip to Japan in April 1979 that he 
began to express doubts about the effectiveness of his many speeches in support of 
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energy reform.852 This period of reflection could well explain Carter’s reluctance to 
speak out on health reform after April 1979. 
Carter’s handling of health and welfare policies during this time contrasted with 
the way that many historians have characterised his working style. He did not immerse 
himself in the detail but delegated the work to policy experts. Whilst he did impose 
arbitrary deadlines, he did not exclude key members of his administration from the 
policy-making process. He displayed a much more pragmatic approach, trying to 
negotiate an agreed plan with members of Congress opposed to his legislation. This 
contrasts with the image of Carter in the media as a leader as someone who was 
involved in every minute aspect of the workings of his administration and who would 
not make deals.  These changes were partly driven by the pressure on his time. He was 
much less personally engaged in these policy debates than he was in energy or even the 
economy. The legislation left over from Carter’s first year in office adversely affected the 
HEW sponsored bills being put forward in 1978. His congressional liaison team made it 
clear that bills in Energy and Tax Reform would take priority during 1978 and even 
beyond. So, if a log jam hampered Carter’s Health and Welfare bills, it was one of his 
own making. The deteriorating economic conditions strengthened the position of 
conservatives inside and outside the White House as Carter sought to achieve change at 
minimal or even zero cost; a near impossible task. The role of the OMB after 1977 
became more influential in challenging the cost of HEW programmes and reminding 
Carter of the potential impact on his anti-inflation strategy. He did not have the more 
favourable climate in the legislature enjoyed initially by both of his Democratic 
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successors, Clinton and Obama. He was also not helped by the unrealistic expectations 
of liberal supporters whose position on reform became more entrenched at a time when 
such views were in decline in the country.  
Carter’s commitment to social reform was genuine. He grew up with poverty and 
cared about solving the problems of health and welfare, but he lacked the passion of 
the liberals in his party. There were few major speeches calling for sacrifice for the poor 
and the sick. Unlike Kennedy he ultimately regarded health reform not as a moral issue 
but as a practical problem to be solved. Liberals in Congress had been his most 
consistent supporters, but he never regarded himself as one of them. They were an 
important constituency whose programmes needed to be accommodated if possible. 
His approach to solving such problems lacked Kennedy’s moral certainty and at no point 
did his proposals veer away from the practicalities of fiscal restraint. His response was 
pragmatic in trying to establish a middle ground between conservative and liberal 
positions. His speeches on health and welfare issues placed much more emphasis on 
cost savings and reducing waste and fraud than the social benefits of the reforms being 
proposed. There was, however, no natural constituency on Capitol Hill and beyond for 
this approach and hence it was doomed to failure. He did not give up easily on these 
policies, sustaining the fight through most of his remaining time in office, but he 
continued to refuse to give them legislative priority. Carter’s track record on delivering 
HEW’s social legislation was poor. Only his attempt to save the social security system 
from bankruptcy was a notable success but even that suffered from attempts by 
conservatives to claw back the agreed tax increases. These social policies were 
fundamental to the Democratic Party and many liberals felt that Carter had failed to 
deliver on his campaign promises. This may not have been a fair assessment given the 
205 
 
political environment, but it would lead to an increasingly frosty relationship with some 
of his core constituencies in the Democratic Party, particularly the unions.   
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Chapter Five 
Labour Policy: A Fragile Alliance  
 
In December 1980 White House staff were writing memoranda on the administration’s 
achievements for a State of the Union address the following January. Deputy Chief of 
Staff Landon Butler wrote the brief on relations with labour. Butler had been Carter’s 
liaison with the unions, principally the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), during the 1976 election campaign and then 
throughout Carter’s term of office. His report, at least initially, presented a balanced 
picture of White House–union relations but Butler ended by saying that ‘it is no 
exaggeration to conclude that no political leader in the country enjoys more loyalty and 
support from labour leaders than yourself.’ He justified his argument with a description 
of union resources, believed to be in the region of $12-15 million, deployed to support 
the president in the 1980 campaign.853 Butler argued that Carter secured greater 
backing from the union leadership than he had done in the 1976 election but in the 1980 
election both Carter and those leaders were unable to convert this into votes from either 
union or non-union workers. The success of Ronald Reagan in persuading millions of the 
American working class to vote for him signified a major failure not just for Carter but 
for the union leaders who supported him.  Since the 1960’s there had been a decline in 
union influence, in the economy and the political process, which hampered any attempt 
by Carter to deliver an effective labour strategy.    
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Since the inception of the New Deal the unions had been a key component in the 
electoral alliance that had helped keep the Democratic Party in power. The economic 
boom after 1945 had brought full employment, high wages and substantial increases in 
real income but it also saw the end of the unions’ active involvement in the Federal 
government. The economic growth of the 1950’s ensured a continuation of labour’s 
economic influence but the rise of the new defence and technology industries in the 
Sunbelt states. signified a direct challenge to union power. To incentivise the transfer of 
industries and their skilled workforce from their traditional base in the north and north-
east, southern states created attractive tax incentives and passed ‘Right to Work’ 
legislation which banned not only closed shops but unions altogether. By 1955 17 states 
had passed ‘Right to Work’ laws. 854 This trend contributed to a decline in union 
membership and was one of the major factors in the AFL-CIO seeking to reform the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1946. The transfer of jobs to the Sunbelt also signalled the decline in 
traditional industry in the north where the blue-collar workforce was unionised.  This 
threat to the union’s economic power was mirrored by the decline in its powerbase in 
the Democratic Party.  
Reforms initiated in 1975 to increase grassroots membership weakened the 
influence of union bosses in the nomination of delegates to the party convention. The 
unions faced competition for influence from emerging social movements representing 
women, ethnic and environmental groups who had different political and economic 
goals and were often critical of older national institutions like the unions. 855 This 
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resulted in the union leadership having less influence over the nomination and election 
of members of congress, and by 1976 the number of traditional labour constituencies 
had declined.856 In addition they faced major demographic changes in the workforce 
with a decline in unionised blue-collar jobs, counterbalanced by a rise in the white collar 
employment which tended not to be unionised.857 This trend, often stimulated by 
reforms like the introduction of the minimum wage, would continue until there were 
more white-collar jobs than blue collar by 1982.858 Butler suggested that the AFL-CIO 
had struggled to meet these challenges because of what he characterised as 
‘institutional disarray.’ He argued that AFL-CIO split with liberal unions like the United 
Automobile Workers (UAW) and uncertainty over a successor to the aging AFL-CIO 
president George Meany made collective decision-making difficult. In addition the 
decrease in union influence nationally resulted in the leadership being, in Butler’s view, 
‘intimidated by minority views.’ He quoted, as an example, the UAW’s success in 
persuading the AFL-CIO to oppose Carter’s proposals to remove controls on energy 
prices. Butler argued that the easiest way for the AFL-CIO to mollify minority union 
opponents was to criticise the president directly.859  
Given all this uncertainty it was not surprising that the AFL-CIO in 1976 did not 
commit to any Democratic Party candidate until after the convention. Its electoral 
steering committee concentrated its resources on the encouragement of voter 
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registration.860 However, several major unions chose to ignore this and formed their 
own ‘Labour Coalition’ which endorsed individual candidates during the primary 
campaign. It was with these groups, rather than the AFL-CIO itself, that the Carter 
campaign team liaised. Rather than commit himself at the Democratic Convention to 
deals with the ‘old institutions’ like the AFL-CIO, Carter found his natural support with 
those more liberal unions such as the UAW and National Education Association (NEA). 
 Carter had little if any experience of unions in Georgia and he said very little 
about them in public. Whilst they viewed themselves as legitimate representatives of 
the working class and part of the New Deal coalition, Carter saw them as just another 
interest group albeit one that generally supported him. In office he had to be reminded 
by Butler that referring to labour as special interests in speeches was counter-productive 
and using the term ‘great institutions’ was suggested as an alternative. 861 The unions 
had a historically privileged position in the New Deal coalition, but Carter rarely referred 
to this in his campaign rhetoric. He did not frame himself as a successor to FDR and nor 
did he choose him as a role model. Instead he suggested, somewhat unconvincingly, 
that Truman was the president he most admired. 862 The absence of AFL-CIO support 
during the primaries encouraged Carter to make common cause with individual unions 
over specific policy issues like health insurance (UAW) and education (NEA). He also 
discussed issues such as deregulation and government reform that would affect some 
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unions. However, Carter was not necessarily ‘anti-union’ and would, as the 1976 race 
became closer, tailor his rhetoric to ensure their support.  
 In developing labour policy and in handling day-to-day relations with the unions, 
Carter relied upon experienced members of his team. He often used Mondale and his 
contacts within the Democratic Party to maintain dialogue with labour, but his key 
appointment was Ray Marshall as Secretary of Labor. Meany had made it clear to Carter 
that he wanted Ford’s Secretary of Labor, John Dunlop, to get the job. Meany feared 
that Marshall would focus too much on non-union labour and discrimination issues. At 
their respective interviews Carter got on with Marshall, a fellow southerner with whom 
he had worked before, but not with the Republican, Dunlop. Marshall may not have 
been Meany’s first choice, but he had advised Carter to appoint him as his chief 
economic advisor and wanted him for an AFL-CIO post as director of research. 863 In the 
end on the key labour appointment where Carter had a free hand, he chose to ignore 
the advice of the President of the AFL-CIO. Perhaps this was a sign of Carter’s attitude 
to what was regarded as labour’s biggest interest group. He did, however, listen to one 
union boss, Jerry Wurf of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME), who supported Carter in the primaries. Wurf said that, ‘I didn’t 
get much out of Carter but one thing I did get was that Dunlop did not become Secretary 
of Labor.’ 864 Marshall, as with other cabinet members, was given the freedom to make 
his own appointments and he regarded himself as enjoying an advantage of being the 
only one in the White House who knew about the unions.865  He was not without allies 
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in the administration on labour issues, often enjoying the support of Mondale and 
Eizenstat. 866 At staff level Butler’s responsibilities as deputy chief of staff included 
labour liaison whilst Bert Carp of the DPG established regular information sessions for 
keeping business and unions informed of government policy, with the occasional if 
somewhat reluctant presence of the president. 867 
 From Carter’s viewpoint, union support through most of the 1976 campaign was 
sporadic at best. He had only been able to get backing from the unions on a state by 
state basis in the primaries. At the convention he was endorsed with Mondale’s help by 
the AFL-CIO, but he was widely regarded as the least bad option. Carter continued to 
campaign in 1976 as an outsider, separate from the big organizations, like the unions, 
which he viewed as part of the system. The AFL-CIO was the institution that George 
Meany had grown up with from his time as a young plumber in New York and had gone 
on to oversee the merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955. Meany was a reformer within the 
union, a strong campaigner against discrimination on the grounds of race or religion.868  
He was also a conservative on foreign policy issues, backing Nixon in the 1972 election 
over Vietnam. He was 82 when Carter took office and had been president since 1955. 
His organisation was facing serious economic and political challenges, and he was 
looking to a Democratic president to help meet them.  
Carter’s major legislative priorities were not driven by concern over labour, but 
some policies had a close association with specific unions. The UAW influenced 
administration proposals for National Health Insurance. The NEA were strong 
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supporters of the formation of the new Department of Education. But Carter could not 
afford to ignore the AFL-CIO. In a memorandum to Carter, Jordan warned that they were 
the ‘single most formidable force on the Hill and due to their support, many Democratic 
congressmen in the north and north-east had ran ahead of the national ticket in 1976.869 
They submitted their own ‘shopping list’ following their Miami conference in February 
1977. They were determined to reinstate the four labour bills that had been passed by 
Congress but vetoed by Ford. They wanted an increase in the minimum wage to $3 per 
hour as well as amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act which, they argued, would restore 
the intended balance between employers and workers. 870 Carter did not accept or reject 
these proposals but discussions facilitated by Eizenstat with Marshall, Mondale and 
Butler established the administration’s position which was confirmed at a meeting with 
Meany and his deputy, Lane Kirkland, on 4 March 1977.871  Although the unions wanted 
White House support for their agenda, they did not believe that they would need it to 
pass the legislation that Ford had vetoed.872 They had developed a formidable lobby 
organisation over the years and expected the loyalty of members of congress they had 
supported during the election campaign. However, changes in the congressional 
committee structure and the increasing influence of both left and right-wing pressure 
groups on Democratic members had reduced union influence. Meany complained that 
it was not just the AFL-CIO which was suffering; Democratic Party leaders found that 
’quite a few new House members are not paying attention to their instructions.’873 In 
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response to these difficulties labour formed a progressive alliance to fight the 
conservative trend in Congress and the Democratic Party.874 However, the unions were 
to become more reliant on the administration for practical support to pass legislation. 
 The first test of Carter’s labour strategy was be the passage of the Common Situs 
Picketing bill. The bill, one of those vetoed by Ford, applied mainly to the construction 
industry and allowed picketing of all workers on a site even if they were not directly 
involved in the dispute. Although this legislation’s impact was negligible nationally, the 
business lobby argued that the bill was a denial of rights and an abuse of power. The bill 
was part of the Democratic Party platform in 1976 and so Carter agreed that he would 
sign it. He did express concern about the impact on small businesses and the union’s 
decision to remove a clause from the original bill which imposed a 30-day cooling off 
period in disputes. Eizenstat urged Carter to demand that this clause be replaced but 
also reminded him of his need for AFL-CIO support on other issues.875 Carter chose not 
to insist on its reinstatement, partly because he had made no commitment to support 
the bill actively, just to sign it if it passed. The union’s refusal to compromise with the 
opposition in Congress demonstrated their supreme confidence that their legislation 
would pass the House, but this was misplaced. Their discussions with new Democratic 
members failed to detect reservations about the bill and as a result 37 out of the 68 
freshmen voted against it, ensuring the vote in the House was lost.876 This defeat was a 
major surprise and it encouraged the business lobby and conservatives in Congress to 
oppose the AFL-CIO’s next objective, the Labor Law Reform bill (LLRB).   
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 Following the defeat of Common Situs, the proposed Labour Law Reform bill was 
seen by the AFL-CIO as a major test of its political strength and, by implication, a 
measure of Carter’s labour credentials. The administration accepted that the original 
Taft-Hartley Act had not been working as intended. The new bill was promoted by its 
supporters as a series of sensible measures to strengthen the powers of the National 
Labour Relations Board (NRLB), increase penalties for breaches of the law, speed up the 
process of union recognition and close loopholes used by employers to disregard the 
act. The most controversial element of the bill was the proposal that employers who 
were found guilty were to be denied Federal contracts. 877 From April to early July 1977 
administration officials worked with the unions to shape the draft bill. White House 
reservations over certain aspects of the bill, in particular union insistence on repealing 
the ‘Right to Work’ law, were resolved in the administration’s favour. In briefing Carter, 
his staff acknowledged that the unions had been realistic in their demands. 878 His senior 
advisors, Marshall, Mondale and Eizenstat recommended that Carter support the 
revised bill. There was also an intervention from Jordan who emphasised that the 
legislation was backed by those liberal unions such as UAW and the Machinists and 
Communication Workers of America (CWA) who were strong Carter supporters. Whilst 
indicating some minor reservations, Carter accepted his staff recommendations and put 
the full resources of his administration behind the legislation. 879  
The LLRB was launched on 17 July 1977 and passed the House in October of that 
year. Its final passage was dependent upon the government getting the sixty votes in 
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the Senate to overturn any filibuster by the opposition. Carter’s congressional liaison 
team were confident of getting the necessary votes. There was an option that an early 
move to a vote in the Senate after October 1977 might have garnered enough votes to 
succeed but the legislation was delayed by the way Carter prioritised passage of the 
Panama Canal Treaty. The subsequent delay of four months enabled the business lobby, 
marshalled by a National Action Committee, to send out 8 million leaflets which painted 
the bill as a radical measure designed to increase union power. In addition, several 
senators who had backed Carter on Panama did not want to be seen voting for two 
’liberal’ measures consecutively. 880 Carter’s staff were confident of the support of 59 
Senators and initiated heavy lobbying of a further seven to get the extra vote. The 
administration used every resource, including Carter personally, to persuade these 
legislators to vote for the bill but this was to no avail; they could not overturn the 
filibuster.881 Proposals to pass a weaker bill were rejected by the unions.882 Plans to 
reintroduce the bill in 1979 were also rejected on the grounds that the 1978 mid-term 
elections had resulted in the loss of eight senators who had previously supported 
legislation, thus making it impossible to pass anything other than a watered down 
version.883  
Carter was subsequently blamed for LLRB’s failure but at the time Meany gave 
him high marks for his support.884 The AFL-CIO president put the bill’s failure down to ‘a 
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heavily financed, well-orchestrated coalition between big business and right-wing 
extremists.’ 885 Despite a well-financed lobbying effort by the unions, the conservative 
mood in the country and the new committee structures in Congress proved too difficult 
to manage, even with Carter’s full backing. As an indicator of the issues the 
administration faced, 16 Democrats voted against the bill, most of them from the south, 
despite heavy lobbying by a Secretary of Labor and a President from the same region.886 
From Carter’s perspective he was comfortable with this labour reform as it had no real 
budgetary implications.887 The same could not be said of labour expectations of his 
economic policy. 
 Carter’s Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) was designed to address the recession he 
inherited from the Ford administration and was broadly endorsed by the unions. The 
plan contained two policies that aligned with union conference resolutions: measures 
to address unemployment and an increase in the minimum wage. Carter was able to 
reach agreement with the unions on these issues as part of the 1977 budget, but this 
stimulus package was the last traditional Democratic budget he was able to submit. 
Carter was the first Democratic president since the war to face an economy that was not 
growing substantially, so many policies recommended by the unions would have to 
involve a redistribution of the economic cake or an increase in taxation.888 In such a 
debate the unions wanted to support a stimulus package that addressed unemployment 
rather than promote tax cuts which were supported by conservatives. They hoped that 
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the passage of the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act, signed into law by Carter 
on 27 October 1978, would compel future governments to focus on growth and 
unemployment. This proved a false hope as many of the act’s more proscriptive 
provisions had to be removed to enable its passage. Carter continued to back 
programmes to help the unemployed, principally through the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA),889 but he did not accept that the government 
should prioritise full employment over problems like inflation.890 In terms of fiscal policy 
during 1977-78, the AFL-CIO had reason to be fairly satisfied with Carter. However, they 
expressed concerned over the conservative nature of his tax reform proposals which 
had kept many of the loopholes that favoured the rich without significantly reducing the 
tax burden on poorer families. 891 Despite this disappointment the unions continued to 
try to influence the spending priorities in the budget round.892  
 As the economy deteriorated, the administration gave priority to controlling 
inflation. This created various issues for the unions. Firstly, whilst labour leaders would 
always support liberal interventionist policies to help employment and growth, they 
were fundamentally opposed to any government intervention in wage bargaining. There 
was also concern that as Carter’s inflation policy took centre stage less attention would 
be given to achieving full employment. The president was opposed to statutory wage 
controls and reassured the CWA at their convention that, ‘My own belief is that the 
system of free enterprise, the great union organizations can best handle their affairs 
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through equal authority at the bargaining table.’893 But the support of the unions along 
with business was critical to the success of any voluntary anti-inflation policy.   
Another consequence of the shift in economic policy was the increase in 
influence of policy-makers like Schultze, Kahn and McIntyre, all of whom had less 
sympathy with the union view on the economy.894 The administration went through a 
series of phases in its anti-inflation programme but managed to keep union support 
through most of 1978. In direct discussions with Meany, Marshall managed to persuade 
the labour leader that inflation was a direct threat to AFL-CIO members’ standard of 
living. He also played on Meany’s fear that if the unions did not co-operate, the public 
would blame them for the policy’s failure. Meetings with union leaders highlighted their 
absolute opposition to mandatory controls, their deep mistrust of business leaders and 
concern that they would not be able to persuade their membership to support 
government policy in their pay settlements.895 In May 1978 the administration was able 
to gain union support for its policy provided there were no fixed-figure targets for pay 
settlements.896 This was a major achievement for the government and ensured that the 
unions were locked into the policy by their membership of tripartite committees with 
business and the government. However, even with full cooperation there was no 
guarantee that a voluntary policy would work, and as the inflation rate continued to rise, 
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the pressure on the government to toughen penalties for non-compliance increased. 
This would lead at the end of 1978 to a very public disagreement with Meany. 
 By September 1978 the White House was seeking to tighten wage controls. The 
unions were concerned about being blamed for inflation when wage-price guidelines 
were policed by the employers. They also argued that business could adjust its prices to 
inflation regularly whilst the unions were usually committed to three-year wage deals.897 
The AFL-CIO became publicly critical of Carter’s inflation policy and refused to support 
the proposed September 1978 guidelines which were based around seven percent wage 
settlements. Meany’s action was as much about his inability to control his own members 
on wage settlements as it was a disagreement with the White House.898 The public 
dispute with Meany was resolved by early 1979 but disagreements persisted over wage 
settlements and wider economic policy for the remainder of Carter’s term in office. 
Labour continued to argue that Carter’s anti-inflation policy was fundamentally unfair 
because, unlike wages, the controls being applied to prices were so flexible as to be 
almost non-existent. There was also a suggestion that Marshall had made himself 
unpopular with leaders by continuing to defend Carter’s economic programme.899  
Despite the ultimate failure of Carter’s inflation policy, his administration 
continued to receive the union’s reluctant support until he left office. The AFL-CIO found 
it increasingly difficult to restrain its members in their settlements. In addition, the 
powerful independent Teamsters union ignored the guidelines in 1979.900 The 
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agreement between the government and union leaders announced on 28 September 
1979, known as the National Accord, enabled their continued participation in the bodies 
that monitored inflation in return for union involvement in government decisions. This 
ensured labour support for the annual agreement of the wage-price strategy. 901 The 
settlements made during this period were broadly in line with the guidelines set and so 
were, to a limited extent, an economic success. However, the overall anti-inflation policy 
was a major failure which brought no great benefit to the unions, its members or the 
working population. 
 After the passage of the ERP in 1977, the unions could point to few if any 
economic policy successes. The Carter White House could and did argue that the battle 
with inflation was in part for the benefit of union members but after the administration’s 
first year, little priority was given to labour’s twin goals of increased growth and full 
employment. The National Accord gave Meany’s successor, Lane Kirkland, a seat at the 
table in discussions on the draft 1981 budget but he could not stop the anti-recessionary 
slant of public spending and the increased expenditure on defence.902  
 Some policy initiatives from Carter could be linked to the unions who had 
supported him in the 1976 campaign. The National Education Authority (NEA) was a 
strong supporter of the creation of a separate Department of Education. Carter was 
unable to increase funding for education significantly during his term of office due to 
economic constraints, but he was determined to deliver on his campaign promise for a 
new Department of Education. He was faced with internal opposition from HEW 
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Secretary Califano, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the AFL-CIO and 
conservatives in Congress; and he was forced to intervene with Califano to stop him 
stalling and lobbying against the bill. 903  But he had strong support within his 
administration from Mondale and Jordan who recognised the importance of keeping the 
backing of the NEA’s two million membership.904  The new Department of Education was 
finally signed into law on 17 October 1979, and despite subsequent campaign promises 
and threats of closure from Carter’s GOP successors, the department has remained in 
place to this day.  
Another union who supported Carter in 1976 was the UAW under the leadership 
of Douglas Fraser. This partnership proved less sustainable as Carter was unable to 
deliver on his campaign commitment to pass a National Health Insurance bill. Carter 
kept Fraser informed of the bill’s development even though he supported Kennedy’s 
more liberal plan. Fraser was critical of the conservative nature of Carter’s tax reform 
plans,905 but he was able to maintain his influence on the White House on various issues, 
including the enforcement emission standards under the Clean Air Act.906 On other 
policy issues that involved labour the government was more successful. A promise to 
consult regularly with Meany ensured AFL-CIO support on Civil Service Reform.907 On 
the other hand effective use of public opinion enabled the administration to overcome 
the joint opposition of unions and management in delivering airline deregulation in 
October 1978.908 
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 Marshall argued strongly in favour of Carter’s labour legislative record, stating 
that the president had defended protective labour laws, strengthened occupational 
safety, created job growth in the private sector and expanded youth and minority 
training.909 But some of the bills sent to Congress by the administration that had strong 
union support failed, notably Labor Law Reform and Health Insurance. The AFL-CIO 
News described the result of the first Congress in 10 years under a Democratic president 
as ‘not a monument to forward looking legislation but a tombstone.’910 This was an 
unfair criticism of Carter. Whilst not heavily engaged in supporting labour legislation, he 
did honour his campaign commitments and ensured his staff fully co-operated with the 
union lobby. The reason for failure lay not with the president at all but the makeup of 
Congress and the decline in union influence. The new committee structure and 
‘sunshine rules’ hampered the ‘closed door deals’ on which union lobbyists thrived. The 
increase in the number of conservative interest groups also resulted in a countervailing 
pressure on individual members of congress. Andrew Biemiller, AFL-CIO legislative 
director, noted in 1979 that ‘more than ever before you have to see practically every 
member of congress if you are to have any hope of success.’911  Carter’s liaison team had 
quickly found out that this was the normal practice but for the union lobbyists this was 
something totally new. 
 Although labour’s political influence was declining, it had become important to 
their leaders, particularly Meany, that they were seen to have regular access to power, 
especially as there was a Democratic president. The AFL-CIO felt threatened by the 
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independent actions of the more liberal unions which had backed Carter earlier in the 
1976 campaign and had tried to persuade the White House that they should be the first 
point of contact for all unions.912 This was never accepted by Carter who continued to 
invite union leaders like Jerry Wurf and Doug Fraser to meetings when he sought a range 
of views on policy matters.913 Meany expected access to Carter not only on economic 
and labour issues but some foreign policy matters that concerned him.914 When he 
thought he was being ignored he reverted to a confrontational style which often took 
the form of personal attacks.915 Carter ensured that Meany was given as much access as 
he could and sent him personal notes,916 but there was no rapport between them. Carter 
was once upset over a draft letter due to go to the AFL-CIO President that addressed 
him as ‘President George Meany.’ Carter told his staff, ‘I don’t call him George.’ 917 
Eizenstat met with the unions every six weeks but he also did the same with business 
groups.918 For Carter, the unions were just another interest group whose views had to 
be considered when formulating policy because they were major supporters. It was 
important that he kept all members of the Democratic coalition together on issues, 
particularly where there was potential conflict, but there was no meeting of minds.919  
  Early meetings between White House staff and the unions acknowledged the 
practical help that the AFL-CIO had provided during the transition and scheduled 
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briefings on the administration’s ERP and Civil Service Reform. 920 Although Carter’s 
legislative record did not deliver on key union priorities, the administration continued 
regular dialogue with union leaders on matters of interest. These meetings denoted a 
degree of ‘embedding’ of the unions in the administration’s consultation process, which 
was to increase when the National Accord was established. 921 Dialogue also continued 
outside the domestic policy sphere, with Carter seeking AFL-CIO support for the Panama 
Canal Treaty and Meany lobbying hard for greater congressional control of the Federal 
Reserve.922 After six months Carter’s staff provided him with a list of ‘significant actions’ 
that the administration had taken since coming to office. The section on labour covered 
a wide range of issues, including the minimum wage, trade quotas, the Teamster union 
pension fund support, health safety reforms, unemployment benefits, as well as draft 
labour legislation.923  However, there were tensions between the White House and the 
unions as neither party felt that their efforts were being reciprocated. Butler told Carter, 
‘The relationship between AFL-CIO and the administration cannot continue to be a one-
way street.’924 Carter was irritated when Meany’s criticisms of him appeared in the 
press. In response to an article in which Meany highlighted Carter’s alleged indecisive 
handling of the miner’s strike, bemoaned his lack of consultation and even hinted that 
he might switch his support to Governor Edmund Brown, Carter commented that, ‘I’m 
getting tired of this.’925 Butler’s attempt to reassure Carter that this was just Meany 
                                                          
920 Butler to Carter, 25 January 1977, SS Box 3, JCPL. 
921 Eizenstat and Butler to Carter, 3 March 1977, SS Box 10 and Eizenstat and Butler to Carter, 
13 January 1978, Eizenstat Box 136, JCPL. 
922 Jordan to Carter, 22 August 1977, SS Box 37 and Meany to Carter, undated, Chief of Staff 
Butler Box 86, JCPL. 
923 Summary of   actions taken by President Carter, undated, SS Box 33, JCPL. 
924 Roof, American Labor,156-61. 
925 Copy of article, 25 February 1978, SS Box 65 and Carter to Butler, 25 February 1978, Chief of 
Staff Butler Box 86, JCPL. 
225 
 
playing to negative comments from his mid-level union officials did not diminish the 
president’s disquiet.926 Two months later, Jordan encouraged Carter to voice his 
annoyance at a meeting with Meany about the union’s failure to acknowledge or 
promote to their members Carter’s efforts to support policies that helped them.927 
 There were efforts made by the White House to improve relations. In early 1978 
Butler recommended to Jordan that the president should allocate more time to meet 
with the unions by attending international labour conferences taking place in 
Washington and organizing a special White House dinner.928 Carter’s speech at the 
steelworkers’ convention that autumn was an attempt to promote the administration’s 
track record.929 Staff reviewed labour-related actions taken by the White House in the 
previous 18 months, which covered events for and invitations to union leaders. This 
included Carter attempting to call two or three union leaders a week.930 The breakdown 
in relations in September 1978 was due to tension between the administration on the 
one hand and labour and business on the other over wage-price controls. Union anger 
at business leaders who blamed them for wage inflation came to a head in July 1978 
when Fraser resigned from the Labour-Management group stating that he believed that 
‘leaders in the business community .... have chosen to wage a one-sided class war in this 
country.’ 931 The AFL-CIO’s increasing concern over Carter’s policy on wage-price 
controls was evident when Meany demanded a meeting with Carter the day before the 
announcement of the new inflation policy. Carter’s alleged refusal to meet prompted 
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three months of non-cooperation from the AFL-CIO. 932 This failed to cause any major 
crisis for the White House because Carter’s staff, supported by the vice president, 
worked assiduously to maintain contact with the individual union presidents who were 
members of the AFL-CIO. These contacts included invitations to White House dinners 
and briefings from Marshall and the OMB.933  
Cooperation was formally resumed in January 1979 following a meeting between 
Carter, Mondale and the president’s advisors with Meany, Kirkland and six union 
presidents. Consultation arrangements were agreed with monthly meetings between 
the AFL-CIO and Mondale.934 The continued failure of the administration’s inflation 
policy increased pressure for strong counter measures and therefore tension with the 
unions. The administration wanted greater flexibility from the unions if a new tougher 
anti-inflation policy was to be successful. The circumstances for a deal were helped by 
the declining health of George Meany who handed over day-to-day control to Lane 
Kirkland in April 1979 and formally stepped down the following November. Kirkland, an 
intellectual southerner, was to be more amenable to a deal but only at a price of greater 
union involvement in policy-making.935 
 The signing of the National Accord was regarded by the White House and the 
unions as a major contribution to improved relations. It was modelled on the European 
Social Contract and was principally negotiated by Kirkland and the recently appointed 
secretary of the treasury, William Miller. 936 The Accord‘s aim was, ‘To provide for 
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American Labour’s involvement and cooperation with the Administration on important 
national issues.’937 For the administration the Accord locked the unions into the anti-
inflation plank of its economic policy at the price of increased consultation on a wide 
range of issues, including some on foreign policy. For the unions it presented an 
opportunity to influence and to be seen to influence government policy. They also 
hoped that the tripartite board involving government and business would help ensure 
that the price of austerity was more equitably distributed.938 Carter’s staff established a 
series of regular meetings between Mondale and Marshall to keep the AFL-CIO 
leadership informed and undertook to consult them on major policy decisions at a 
preliminary stage. This would also give Meany and his successor Kirkland the 
opportunity to meet Carter to influence important government policies in advance of a 
final decision.939  
Despite the initial fanfare, the Accord had no meaningful sanctions on dealing 
with inflation and concern was expressed by Carter and some of his staff about its 
effectiveness. In June 1980, Eizenstat and Democratic Party Chair, Jon White, 
complained that the deal was a one-way street after the unions were perceived to have 
‘ambushed’ the administration over the renewal of Council on Wage and Price Stability 
(COWPS). Butler defended the unions, highlighting that they had largely complied with 
the wage guidelines and had tacitly supported Carter’s position on oil and gas 
deregulation. In addition, he argued that Kirkland had not supported Kennedy’s election 
campaign and the Accord had helped bring in union support during the primaries.940 
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Butler remained a convinced advocate of the Accord, stating that whilst it was at times 
on ‘very thin ice. …. unless some development occurs, I don’t expect it to break.’941 
Eizenstat was more realistic about its limitations but nonetheless urged Carter to 
support the Accord claiming it was a price worth paying to get union support. He also 
argued that it would be a signal that the administration was equitable to the unions and 
help gain their backing for the 1980 election.942 The Accord did provide an effective 
vehicle for the administration to engage with union leaders in the final year of Carter’s 
term in office. It was noticeable, however, that the work to establish the Accord was 
carried out by his labour advisors with little direct input from the president. The Accord, 
Landon Butler’s rather overblown defence notwithstanding, did help with the 
president’s election campaign by ensuring the union leadership’s support.  
The decision of Senator Kennedy to run against Carter caused a dilemma for the 
unions as Kennedy had been a long-standing friend of labour. Although the AFL-CIO 
maintained formal neutrality, many unions took sides. The more liberal unions such as 
the UAW, AFSCME and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) backed Kennedy 
whilst Carter received support from the majority of unions, many of which had 
benefitted from his policies.943 This support was not necessarily reflected on the ground 
during the primary campaigns as the Kennedy unions were often better organised.944 
During this phase of the campaign Carter maintained regular contact with Kirkland. 
White House staff believed that Carter’s sensitive response to Meany’s death in January 
1980 with his public statement, the lowering of the flag at the White House and the issue 
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of a commemorative stamp, had been appreciated by the AFL-CIO. Whilst officially 
neutral Kirkland had continued to speak in favour of Carter’s foreign policy and had 
refused to invite Kennedy to speak at the AFL-CIO conference.945 A series of early Carter 
primary victories resulted in White House staff seeking to build bridges with Kennedy 
unions in the summer of 1980. Butler reported that he was optimistic about the level of 
union support and that only a minority of unions would not support Carter in the coming 
presidential election. In the end only the air traffic controllers (PATCO) and the 
Teamsters union endorsed Reagan during the 1980 campaign although the support of 
some liberal union leaders was less than whole-hearted.  
In contrast to his attitude to interest groups in general, Carter was personally 
involved in a series of meetings with the unions in 1980.946 This would be part of a pivot 
strategy that was to focus his campaign resources on the anti-union policies of GOP 
candidate Ronald Reagan. 947 The Carter team remained confident throughout the 
campaign of strong union support. Writing to Jordan, Butler argued that the 
administration had better knowledge of the unions after nearly four years in power and 
had more union support at state level following primary campaigning.948 However, this 
was at the price of increased union influence over Carter’s policies. Union delegate 
representation at the 1980 Democratic National Convention had increased from 20 to 
29 percent. Kirkland played a key role in the dialogue between the Carter and Kennedy 
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camps to ensure the final agreement of the Democratic platform.949 This resulted in 
Carter accepting, against the wishes of his economic advisors, a commitment to spend 
$12bn on job creation.950 Kirkland continued to meet Carter under the umbrella of the 
Accord and sought to persuade the administration to increase spending on his proposal 
for a Re-industrialisation Finance Corporation (RFC). Kirkland also tried, less successfully, 
to change the tone of the Carter campaign to focus on positive messages as he felt 
uncomfortable with the anti-Reagan message.951 In return the unions contributed 
significant resources to the campaign, albeit with limited results.  Butler argued strongly 
that the White House had been very successful in gaining the backing of major union 
leaders.952 Unfortunately this support did not translate into votes for Carter from its 
members.  Union membership represented a third of the electorate in six key states such 
as Ohio and Pennsylvania, but in 1980 they were all were lost to Reagan. In comparison 
to 1976, Carter’s share of the union vote dropped 17 points to 46 percent and for non-
union workers it dropped 8 points to 35 percent.953 
Carter’s approach to dealing with labour in office highlighted some important 
differences from the way he was perceived in the media to have operated. His deep 
suspicion of interest groups could have been expected to cause tension with labour, but 
it did not result in any serious breach in their relationship. One of the reasons for this 
was that Carter delegated the management of the labour relationship almost entirely to 
Marshall, Mondale and the president’s White House advisors. This was the case when 
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there was a crisis, for example during the miners’ strike in early 1978. This strike affected 
large areas of the country and there was concern over the impact on energy supplies. 
Marshall worked hard to deliver a compromise acceptable to both parties and Carter 
was kept informed of his progress. It was Carter who made the final decision to invoke 
the Taft-Hartley Act that forced the miners back to work which eventually resulted in a 
settlement.954 In nearly all instances Carter accepted his advisors’ recommendations and 
this enabled the administration to meet most of its campaign commitments to the 
unions. Where union supported legislation failed it was not from a lack of effort by the 
White House, and his staff could point to policies that were passed due to Carter’s direct 
intervention to quell internal opposition; the transfer of Mining Enforcement and Safety 
administration (MESA) from Interior to Labor being a case in point.955 Where he was less 
successful, as in the case of the Labor Law Reform bill, union criticism of Carter was 
notably muted. George Meany said that, ‘I think if he were a stronger President, stronger 
in relation with Congress. I think he might have been helpful to us.’956 However, there 
was recognition from labour leaders that the decline in their influence was not a result 
of lack of interest or effort from Carter. Meany admitted that by the mid-1960’s workers, 
who had prospered in the 1950’s and began owning homes in the suburbs, had become 
more middle class in attitude and were less interested in labour issues.957 The unions 
became more focused on being seen to have the trappings of power. Leaders like Meany 
and Kirkland wanted both the government and business to acknowledge that the labour 
movement was a positive force in the economy.958 The National Accord was the 
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administration’s attempt to accommodate that need in return for their support for 
Carter’s inflation policy, and in the 1980 campaign Carter was comfortable enough with 
this strategy as he had to give up very little. 
There has been a strong theme in press coverage at  the time and in the 
historiography from authors like Hargrove and Mollenhoff 959 of painting Carter as a 
president who was obsessed with the minutiae of government. Comment was made on 
the volume of documents he read and his often quoted involvement in allocating use of 
the White House tennis court.960  This was used as part of a wider criticism on his 
seeming inability to step back from issues or even trust his subordinates. There is some 
evidence to support this premise in Carter’s approach to his first major policy initiative 
on energy. Whilst this fulfilled many of the behaviours reflected in the press not the 
least his in-depth involvement in policy, it was not representative of his administration 
as a whole. His handling of labour policy was more typical of Carter’s managerial style. 
He delegated to Marshal on all labour issues and the debates on strategy usually took 
place without his participation. He invariably took the advice of his advisors on labour 
issues. Meetings with union leaders and key members of congress were often initiated 
on their advice. His ‘hands-on’ approach to energy was also not in evidence on health 
and welfare policy or other domestic policy areas like transport, agriculture and housing. 
The image of him being involved in the detail of policy-making is therefore not supported 
by the evidence. This perception may well have been created by Carter’s preference for 
receiving comprehensive policy papers in writing. This was not something that his 
predecessor and certainly his immediate successor did. Reagan wanted all paperwork to 
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be kept to an absolute minimum for final decisions. Carter’s Democratic successor, Bill 
Clinton, was well known for being personally involved in White House policy debates, 
but Carter eschewed such dialogue. His engineering background and his ability to speed 
read encouraged his staff to provide technical detail in the final decision phase of a 
policy. This applied even when Carter had not been involved in the detailed discussions. 
This was the pattern followed by the president for most major policy decisions, including 
on labour. 
Carter’s labour policy demonstrated that his natural antipathy to interest groups 
was more nuanced than previously reported. Where an election campaign was involved, 
either through a campaign commitment or during the run up to the election itself, Carter 
worked diligently to accommodate labour’s views. Interest group or not, the politician 
in Carter recognised the importance of key stakeholders and did everything he could to 
retain their support. In fact, these interventions signified the actions of Carter the 
politician rather than the influence of any ideological or moral viewpoint. Early support 
from more liberal unions was a product of co-interest on specific policies, which soon 
dissipated if the policy failed. Labour may have been regarded as a liberal cause but to 
Carter his interest was not based on ideology but political expediency and the need for 
electoral support. This demonstrated a trait that contrasted with his supposed distaste 
for interest groups. Eizenstat observed how ‘a president who was so consciously 
apolitical in his governance … could turn on a dime when campaign season began.’ 961 
Carter’s overall labour strategy of cultivating union leadership to gain labour support in 
the country was based on a premise which was no longer valid and ultimately was 
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doomed to failure. National union leaders no longer had the influence at the ballot box 
they once enjoyed, and workers (whether unionised or not) were listening to different, 
often conflicting, messages from other sources. These was not just from conservative 
organisations but also from other more liberal groups who opposed the more traditional 
labour views on the environment, urban renewal, gay and women’s rights. This was one 
of the many shifts in American society that influenced the political scene in the 1970’s 
and the environment in which Carter sought to govern. 
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Chapter Six 
             Culture Wars 
  
The 1960s and 1970s was a period of profound change. It saw the rise of new social 
movements that had a major impact on both political parties. Interest groups, whilst 
national in scope, represented distinct and often conflicting views on social issues like 
race, women’s rights, the environment and religion. Given Carter’s natural suspicion of 
the Washington lobby in general, he would have been expected to be wary of their 
influence. However, in the case of these groups, he had not only received their strong 
support during the 1976 election, but also they represented views which Carter had 
espoused in one form or another. They were in 1976 Carter’s natural supporters, but 
they represented change. These social movements argued for more reform but also 
faced a serious challenge from conservative groups based on, according to writer Joe  
Queenan, ‘the widespread feeling America had taken a wrong turn in the 1970’s.’962 
These conflicting feelings both for and against further change appeared to be answered 
by Carter who stood as an ‘outsider’ from Washington.963 His track record as president 
in these areas of policy was in many ways impressive but could never match the 
expectations created in these movements by his election victory. For these groups, 
Carter’s record in office was never enough but for those conservatives who opposed 
change even the status quo constituted a bridge too far. 
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Since President Kennedy had defined the Civil Rights question as a moral one, 
this issue had become a question of character for all presidents; a test of their moral 
compass. It was an issue on which Carter was seen to be on the right side, despite his 
‘southerness.’ He came to the attention of northern Democrats in January 1971 when 
he announced in his inaugural speech as governor of Georgia that ‘the time for 
discrimination was over’ and by hanging a portrait of Martin Luther King in his office.964 
This marked him out as one of a new breed of southern Democratic politicians who were 
determined to accept desegregation and strive for equality. Although his primary 
campaign for governor in 1970 against the liberal former governor, Carl Sanders, was a 
calculated attempt to win the pro-segregation vote, 965 there were several examples 
from his early life when Carter had taken a personal stand against prejudice. His refusal 
in 1962 to join the White Citizens Council was widely noted but less so was his standing 
up for a black naval classmate, Wesley Brown, at Annapolis and as a result being accused 
of being ‘a God dammed nigger lover.’966 He also argued strongly against the exclusion 
of blacks from his church.967 Carter’s belief in equality of opportunity did not equate to 
support for radical change. He was not so much a quintessential liberal on race but more 
someone who wanted to expand opportunity within the confines of the current law. The 
declaration at his inauguration was not a call for change but a confirmation that change 
had occurred; it was time for the South to move on and the law to be enforced. Carter’s 
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commitment to social justice was genuine but he wanted to help all racial groupings to 
improve their social and economic status not just the one minority group.968 
Only a handful of black leaders had actively campaigned for Carter, for example 
Andrew Young from Atlanta, Mayor Coleman Young from Detroit, and Martin Luther 
King’s father, ‘Daddy’ King. Nevertheless black interest groups believed that they had 
been essential to Carter’s election victory and expected the first Democratic president 
since January 1969 to deliver on their agenda. Carter’s campaign as a Washington 
‘outsider’ implied criticism of the very government welfare programmes that poor 
blacks were dependent upon.969 He accepted that he needed the support of ‘Civil Rights 
Heroes’ to overcome the ‘stigma’ of him coming from the south.970 The irony of this 
situation was not lost on the New York Times which commented on a ‘South Georgian 
white man with a mint julep drawl being sent to the White House by the grandchildren 
of slaves.’971 Equally there was increasing pressure from conservative groups in the 
northern states concerned over being forced to bus their children to black schools and 
the level of taxation required to support welfare. In addition, whilst black groups 
continued to lobby Carter for fairer income distribution through measures like the 
Humphrey-Hawkins bill, they faced competition in a restricted economy from other 
groups like women, the disabled and environmentalists for government support.972  If 
the age of discrimination was over so was the age of major Civil Rights legislation. 
Attempts to improve the circumstances of poor blacks would have to be addressed as 
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part of a wider economic agenda which included welfare reform, urban renewal and job 
training. This did not preclude the use of symbolic actions by the White House to 
reinforce support for equality. These included ‘Daddy’ King’s presence at Carter’s 
inauguration and sending his daughter Amy to a local, mainly black, school in 
Washington.973 Such actions became matters of debate early in the administration when 
‘Roots’, a television programme about slavery based on a book by Alex Haley, was 
broadcast. Eizenstat saw the political value of Carter presenting an inaugural book to 
the author, commenting that, ‘Such action would have powerful symbolism and yet 
would not offend virtually anyone in the south.’974  
Whilst attuned to symbolism of black issues in general, the administration was 
slow to pick up on the implications of a university selection case being dealt with by the 
Justice Department. Alan Bakke had applied in 1973 to the University of California 
(UCLA) medical school but although he was, at 33, above the usual age for a new 
student, he scored highly in his application and was recommended to the school. He was 
turned down for a place both initially and on appeal. Bakke took the Regents of UCLA to 
court, arguing that the school’s policy of affirmative action, which reserved 16 percent 
of its places for minority (and by implication less qualified) students, denied him as a 
white man equal protection under the law.975 The case had been working its way, almost 
unnoticed, through the minor courts but in 1977 went to the Supreme Court for a final 
ruling. The issue, as seen by Carter’s Justice Department, was whether to submit an 
Amicus curiae brief to the court giving the government its view as an interested party. 
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It was reluctant to do so because UCLA had mismanaged the selection process and 
therefore Bakke would not make a good test case. When Attorney General Bell did 
decide to proceed, he dismissed any concerns about the political implications for 
affirmative action programmes and delegated the work to Wade McCree, whom Bell 
described as ‘the best black lawyer in America.’ However McCree, only recently 
appointed, delegated the brief  to a holdover from the Nixon administration.976 Whilst 
happy to show the draft brief to Carter, Bell did not want any involvement from liberals 
in the White House but that was exactly what happened.977 Concerns had been raised 
with Eizenstat in February 1977 on the potential impact on schools of a negative decision 
on the Bakke case that would set ‘back affirmative action programmes 3-5 years.’978 
Eizenstat responded by including Mondale in what turned out to be the first test of the 
vice president’s role in the White House. Mondale assessed the impact of a negative 
decision on other universities and, following advice from Jordan, persuaded Carter that 
the draft Amicus brief required wider consultation.979 
The domestic policy team received the draft brief at the end of August. 980 Once 
circulated it drew major criticism from not only White House staff but cabinet members 
Joe Califano and Patricia Harris. Califano’s written objections, which he sent to Carter, 
ran to 16 pages.981 There was concern expressed that a weak or neutral brief would 
result in a decision that would damage current affirmative action programmes and as a 
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consequence weaken the administration’s relationship with liberal and minority 
groups.982 Liberals within the administration such as Stuart Eizenstat argued that  Justice 
was focussed far too much on defending Bakke and not enough on supporting 
affirmative action.983 Carter had similar concerns about the draft brief but in addition he 
wanted it to reflect his views on affirmative action which he insisted must not include 
quotas as they were likely to be declared unconstitutional by the courts. This meant that 
Justice had to present a nuanced argument that proposed a solution that distinguished 
between evaluating the potential of disadvantaged groups and selection based on that 
potential; unlike quotas this would not be a rigid process.984 The other issue Carter was 
concerned about was Bakke himself. He wanted to ensure that whatever the result 
Bakke would not lose out and that there was a way to let him be accepted without 
compromising affirmative action programmes.985 During this process Carter was 
appraised of the wider risks involved. Jordan warned him that even though he was not 
involved in the detail, the case was important as it was being seen as symbolic of Carter’s 
personal commitment to equality. Jordan implied that Bell did not grasp the case’s 
importance and was inordinately comforted by the fact that the detail was in the hands 
of two black lawyers, McCree and Solicitor General Drew Days III. Jordan argued that 
even they would be discredited by their community if the message was poorly 
expressed.986 Concern expressed by the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) confirmed Jordan’s point.987 The decision which found in 
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Bakke’s favour did confirm the validity of taking race and ethnicity into account when 
making decisions. This encouraged the use of affirmative action to increase diversity, 
whilst confirming the unconstitutionality of quotas.988 The administration was therefore 
able to reflect positively on the result in the press and maintain the momentum on 
affirmative action programmes.989  
 In policy terms Carter had made only limited promises on Civil Rights issues in 
the 1976 election. In his view the Civil Rights battles of the 1960’s and early 1970’s were 
over and the emphasis should be on the interpretation of the law and increased 
regulation to enforce it. So whilst there was to be no new Civil Rights legislation, the 
enforcement unit of the Department of Justice was reorganised and its budget increased 
from $74.2m to $124m in to order to increase the pressure on employers.990 An early 
example of this was the enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act which forbade 
discrimination in any programme which received federal aid.991 Another major effort to 
consolidate African-American support was Carter’s intention to appoint more black 
officials. His Q & A at the National Black Network in July 1977 highlighted this, as did the 
appointment of Drew Days III and Eleanor Holmes Norton to the posts of Solicitor 
General and Chair of the Equal Opportunities Commission.992 This approach was 
reinforced by a series of personal notes to the cabinet and heads of agencies reminding 
them of their responsibility to appoint more people who were women and/or from 
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ethnic groups.993 The administration did try to accommodate the views of black interest 
groups in the development of policy but the Bakke case highlighted a weakness in 
Carter’s White House organisation: a lack of staff who dealt with the black lobby on a 
regular basis. Although this was resolved in August 1978 with the appointment of the 
Georgian Louis Martin as special assistant, Carter continued to rely upon the liberals in 
his cabinet and his staff for support on black issues. Martin was able to establish links 
and set up meetings with black groups, including the congressional caucus that Carter 
attended. These were often successful but frequently Carter delegated such meetings 
to Mondale or Eizenstat.994 The president, however, was conscious of the image of the 
administration with the black and minority communities. In an early meeting with his 
staff, Powell organised a photographer from Time magazine to take a team picture, but 
Carter ordered him out when he realised that there was only one black person in the 
group and the only woman was his wife. 995 He was also conscious of the need to ensure 
that the black viewpoint was considered by the cabinet in day-to-day policy decisions.996 
 As part of the programme of enforcement, Carter continued the policy of 
desegregating schools despite increased opposition from local white communities. In 
the early 1970’s it was possible to find solutions locally, often with the support of black 
churches, as was the case with Atlanta.997 But by 1977 any attempt to enforce 
desegregation would have entailed complex negotiations and a joint task force involving 
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at the very least the HEW and Justice Departments. The issue became politically 
sensitive in the north where cities like Chicago, at the time the third largest public-school 
system in America, refused to submit any plans to desegregate. Despite strong 
resistance from local Democratic politicians, the administration eventually took Chicago 
to court998 and a desegregation plan was eventually implemented in the summer of 
1981. The Public Works Employment Act was the main piece of legislation from the 
administration that supported minorities. Passed on 13 May 1977, it allocated 10 
percent or up to $4bn of the government’s procurement budget for minority 
employers.999 Carter wanted to incentivise minority businesses and continued to keep 
track of the act’s implementation after its passage. 1000 The main concern of black 
interest groups, not the least the black caucus, was to influence the administration on 
the economy. Congressman Parren Mitchell requested this type of access in February 
1977 but Carter though indicating he wanted to help, only offered cabinet member 
Harris as a liaison.1001 As Carter’s economic policy moved to a greater focus on austerity 
and fighting inflation there were increased black concerns, particularly as African-
American youth unemployment increased from 32.7 to 35.5 percent in March 1979.1002  
Such concerns about the administration’s economic policy continued right up to the 
1980 election. 
Harris and Martin were at pains to remind Carter of the importance of the black 
electorate. Harris highlighted the black vote in the 1976 election (Carter won 85-90 
                                                          
998 Days to Civiletti,21 April 1980, Justice Department, Attorney General Box 133, NARA. 
999 Stephanie A Slocum-Schaffer, America in the 70’s (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2003), 150. 
1000 Watson to Carter,16 August 1979, SS Box 127, JCPL.  
1001 Carter to Parren Mitchell, 8 February 1977, Harris Papers Box 112, LC. 
1002 Louis Martin to Carter, 12 March 1979 Louis Martin Papers, Box 2, LC. 
244 
 
percent of the vote) to emphasise the importance of a high turn out through effective 
urban policies. 1003 Although the administration emphasised its record on minority 
appointments, support for minority businesses ($3bn) and enforcement on Civil Rights, 
Carter mainly promoted his track record on the economy and promises of future 
investment.1004 Despite what was a comprehensive defeat in 1980, the Carter-Mondale 
ticket still managed to receive 83 percent of the black vote.1005 This result alone would 
suggest that Carter’s policy was successful in terms of maintaining black support, 
although he was helped by what was regarded by most blacks as an unsympathetic GOP 
candidate.  
In what was a valedictory address at a black leader’s luncheon on 5 January 1981, 
Carter highlighted his successes.1006 His appointment of 12 percent black officials, 
particularly to judgeships, compared favourably with that of his predecessors and his 
successor,1007 as was his support of minority businesses. The administration’s policy was 
to use affirmative action and regulation in federal appointments to reflect the 
demographics of society. Such actions, as indicated by the Bakke case, did not prove 
easy to enforce. The Justice Department found that this was the case with the 
enforcement of minority contracts as white companies often used small black 
companies as ‘fronts’ to get around the regulations.1008 Such policies, whilst perfectly in 
keeping with Carter’s vision of an efficient government, did not fulfil the dreams of black 
leaders of structural economic reform. It was not just Carter’s anti-inflation policies that 
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threatened the social programmes on which minority groups were dependent but also 
the growing tax revolt increased resentment over federal expenditure on welfare which 
was seen to favour blacks. He tried to reassure black groups 1009 but he did not change 
his policies. Carter may not have wanted radical change but his scope for even minor 
reform was severely limited. Given these constraints his record of achievement in Civil 
Rights was solid, if not spectacular. 
 One lesser known aspect of the Civil Rights legislation in the 1960’s was that 
discrimination was made illegal not just on the grounds of race but also of gender. The 
formation in 1966 of the National Organisation for Women (NOW) was just one example 
of a wider women’s movement that sought to encourage the role of women in all 
aspects of American life and to widen and deepen that influence economically and 
politically. By 1970 women made up 43 percent of the paid work force and this would 
grow to 52 percent by 1980. 1010 NOW, was successful at increasing its representation at 
the 1976 Democratic Convention. However, the growth of the women’s movement was 
faced in the 1970’s with a conservative backlash from women who felt threatened, not 
emancipated, by this new-found independence. Leaders like Phyllis Schlafly of the Eagle 
Forum often brought strong emotional arguments against what they saw as pro-feminist 
proposals. She testified at a congressional hearing against establishing domestic abuse 
centres because they would become ‘feminist indoctrination centres.’ 1011 Even at what 
was regarded as the high-water mark of the women’s movement, the National Women’s 
Conference in November 1977, conservative groups under Schlafly were sufficiently 
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organised to control one fifth of the seats. The majority at the conference, under the 
Chair of Bella Abzug, laid out an agenda for 1977 that assumed a major role for the 
Federal government, but conservative opposition would ensure that this would be 
challenged.1012 Carter and his wife were strong supporters of women’s issues, in 
particular on Federal appointments and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).  Also, unlike 
White House dealings with other interest groups, he appointed staff early in his 
administration to liaise with the women’s movement. The main contact was Midge 
Constanza, who was later to be replaced by Sarah Weddington. Her role could not 
always be regarded as an indication of Carter’s personal commitment to all women’s 
issues. Carter did regard Constanza as essential but only because, as he said,  ‘she takes 
a tremendous burden off me from nut groups that would insist on seeing me if they 
could not see her.’1013 Whilst Carter argued that he was, through his appointments 
strategy, a supporter of equality, his backing for the ratification of the ERA was seen 
more by the women’s movement as the authentic indicator of his equality credentials.   
 The constitutional amendment on women’s equality was supported by both 
parties, when it passed both Houses of Congress in 1972, but had to be ratified by the 
required 38 states before the 1979 deadline. The proposed amendment established 
gender equality before the law which would be enforced by Congress if required. It had 
bipartisan support when introduced under Nixon and was endorsed by Ford. By the time 
of Carter’s election 34 states had ratified the amendment and therefore only four more 
were required. This outwardly positive situation hid what had been more recently a 
largely negative trend. Since 1975 seventeen states had had the opportunity to ratify 
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the amendment but only one, North Dakota, had done so. In addition, during the same 
period two states, Tennessee and Nebraska, had rescinded their original decision to 
support the amendment. The impact of this would have to be tested later in the 
courts.1014 Most of the remaining states were in the south or the Sunbelt where there 
were fewer groups who were prepared to campaign for ERA.1015 The more negative 
political climate was linked to the growing concern articulated by Schlafly and others. 
Although she appealed to conservative men by arguing that ERA was nothing more than 
a Federal power grab, she gained even more support from married women who were 
worried that the amendment would remove their traditional protections. Whilst both 
sides were concerned about women’s economic vulnerability, the fear that ERA would 
weaken the commitment of men to family life and force women out of their ’normal 
lives’ was gaining support by the time Carter was elected.1016 This was particularly the 
view of religious groups, with 98 percent of opponents of ERA being churchgoers. 1017 
Carter’s ongoing support for ratification linked him in their eyes with the ‘anti-family, 
pro-lesbian ERA.’1018 
 Carter was not discouraged by the unfavourable political climate he inherited in 
1977. Early narrow defeats in North Carolina and Nevada, partly offset by victory in 
Indiana in March 1977, were followed by a pessimistic assessment of ERA chances in a 
further five states.1019 Yet Carter remained committed to the cause. He made numerous 
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speeches which equated ERA to Human Rights in his foreign policy and the Civil Rights 
legislation of another era. He was  also supported by the active involvement of his wife 
and daughter-in-law Judy Carter in the movement.1020 The overall campaign was 
coordinated by ERAmerica under Mary (Liz) Carpenter and Mildred Jeffrey but was 
helped by White House officials, particularly Sarah Weddington who organised help 
from the president and his cabinet in states like Illinois.1021 Ultimately with crucial ERA 
votes it was local politics that prevailed, despite many phone calls from Carter and his 
colleagues. The vital Illinois vote failed to pass because local Democratic politicians 
believed it was a vote loser in national elections and a court action brought by Schlafly 
based on erroneous charges that the administration had sought to bribe one of the 
legislators.1022 Carter and his wife continued to support local campaigns by attending 
events, making calls and even complaining when they felt they were not being used 
enough.1023   If he was unable to affect events locally, Carter was able to exert influence 
nationally by persuading Congress to extend the ERA deadline until 30 June 1982. He 
remained committed to ERA throughout his time in office, both in terms of direct 
intervention with state politicians and speeches across the country. Fundamentally, 
however, the success or failure of ERA was dependent on local campaigns. The states 
that were yet to endorse ERA in 1977 lacked the infrastructure of support that was 
available in the earlier ratification campaigns. These states were generally much more 
conservative. The extension of the deadline to 1982 proved no more than a gesture as 
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no other state ratified the amendment. Carter, in his White House Diaries, blamed 
church groups for the failure of ERA.1024  Whilst there was much misinformation created 
by conservatives, the end of gender segregation of prisons if ERA passed being just 
one,1025 the proposed amendment created genuine fears which conservatives were able 
to exploit successfully. 
 Other than ERA, Carter’s focus on women’s issues was on using his office to 
appoint more women. As with other minorities, Carter actively encouraged cabinet 
members and White House staff to appoint more women and engaged with women’s 
groups to establish a pool of good candidates.1026 Carter was particularly focussed on 
getting women into Federal Judgeships but bemoaned difficulties with Congress on such 
appointments.1027 On wider women’s issues the White House hosted a Women’s 
National History Day and established a cabinet level interdepartmental task force on 
women.1028 There were other bills in Congress on prevention of discrimination on 
pregnancy in the work place and establishing domestic abuse centres which the 
administration supported, albeit unsuccessfully.1029 The White House continued to 
encourage women’s groups to organise and establish an agenda for the future, the 1980 
White House Conference on the Family being a case in point. Many women’s issues 
became subsumed into the government’s economic policy but one that stood out and 
continued to be divisive for Carter personally was abortion. 
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 Whilst the President projected a liberal image on women’s issues in general, he 
remained consistently and personally opposed to abortion except where the health of 
the mother was at risk or where pregnancy was because of rape and incest. To Carter 
this was a matter of personal faith and as with all such matters, he did not hide his views. 
He continued to comply with the Supreme Court decision, Roe v Wade, which 
conservatives and religious groups wanted overturned. He also supported sex education 
for teenagers, better adoption arrangements and established women and infant 
children support programmes. But he opposed federal support for abortion. 1030 Carter’s 
attempt to distinguish his own views from public policy did not prevent major criticism 
from women’s groups and even his own staff. Califano, who as a Catholic had similar 
views to Carter, highlighted that Constanza had organised a petition in the White House 
in protest at Carter’s views on abortion which was supported by cabinet members’ 
Patricia Harris and Juanita Kreps.1031 This opposition was also reflected in women’s 
groups such as Carter’s own National Advisory Committee on Women (NCAW). He 
sacked its co-chair, Bella Abzug, in 1979 for being openly critical of the administration’s 
budget proposals.1032 Concern about lack of access to Carter, perceived lack of support 
on issues like ERA and abortion, and the removal of Abzug and Constanza, caused groups 
such as NOW to back Edward Kennedy in the primaries of 1980.1033 Attempts by Carter 
to regain the initiative in 1980 through the White House Conference on the Family badly 
backfired as damaging splits between liberal women’s groups and the recently formed 
conservative Eagle Forum disrupted the event. Despite attempts by Carter to maintain 
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a middle ground, an inability to agree on ERA, the abortion rights controversy and 
arguments about what constituted the family, forced the White House to divide the 
conference into three separate events which still failed to reach any consensus and 
sparked walk-outs from conservative groups.  1034 
 Carter’s personal commitment to support women’s equality was sustained 
beyond his presidency even when it touched on his faith. He and Rosalyn left the 
Southern Baptist Convention in 2000 over the issue and he spoke out again in 2009 in a 
speech entitled ‘Losing my religion for equality’1035 when he criticised all the major 
religions for their treatment of women. Decades earlier during his presidency his track 
record on appointments was impressive. The 40 new Federal judgeships, including 
future Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, quadrupled the number of women 
on the Federal bench.1036 However, the rise of feminism was never a natural part of the 
New Deal coalition and faced major opposition in both parties in Congress. Carter’s 
personal support did raise expectations in the Women’s movement that he was unable 
or, in the case of abortion, unwilling to deliver. In addition his fiscal policies were heavily 
criticised as they often weakened programmes that helped women, for example his 
refusal to endorse equal pay because of the risk of inflation.1037 It was also the case that 
he did not feel comfortable with the militancy of some of the feminist groups, often 
characterising them in private as ‘crazy’, and he was not supportive of the radical nature 
of the women’s policies espoused in the 1980 Democratic Platform.1038 Yet despite 
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unfair criticism of his performance on ERA, more women than men voted for Carter in 
the 1980 election and women’s rights were the only policy issue in the polls on which 
Carter led Reagan.1039 Carter’s administration had a credible record on women’s issues 
but the more radical changes wanted by many in the movement were not an option 
given the rising tide of conservative opposition and Carter’s own fiscal conservatism. 
 The environmental movement was a relatively new phenomenon when Carter 
was elected. It grew out of concern over the impact of the economic expansion of the 
1960’s. The celebration of the First Earth Day on 22 April 1970 triggered a reaction from 
politicians who responded with a series of environmental laws.1040  Carter  cared deeply  
about the environment .1041 In his inaugural address as governor in 1971 he talked about 
the environment being ‘threatened by avarice, greed, procrastination and neglect.’1042 
His books and diaries were littered with comments and concerns about the environment 
whilst his 1976 campaign biography, Why Not the Best, contained a chapter on his love 
for the Georgia outdoors.1043 As governor, with the support of environmental groups, he 
prevented the building the Spewell Bluff Dam on the Flint River even though it was to 
be fully funded by the federal government, and reclaimed the Chattahoochee River for 
recreation.1044 Carter therefore entered office with genuine environmental credentials 
and high expectations from the environmental lobby. He seemed determined to make 
a difference as president. Carter wrote in the afterword of his White House Diaries that 
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one of the three key themes of his presidency was the environment (including energy 
conservation).1045  In an early entry as president on a potential dispute on air pollution 
with auto manufacturers, he said that ‘my inclination when there’s a direct conflict is to 
stick with environmental quality.’1046  
The environment appeared to be an area where Carter enjoyed public support 
as well as the backing of the environmental lobby. This enabled him to appoint 
specialists to important positions and gave him the opportunity to secure congressional 
backing for new legislation. Unfortunately, the first battles Carter chose to fight on water 
projects and energy caused major problems with Congress and damaged his 
environmental credentials. The proposed reduction in the number of water projects 
across the country was environmentally and fiscally sensible. It also highlighted Carter’s 
deep mistrust of the Corp of Engineers based on his experience as governor. But despite 
the support of the Water Resources Council, the Council for Environmental Quality and 
74 congressmen, Carter’s political defeat and eventual retreat damaged his reputation 
with environmental groups.1047 On water Carter was unable to recover his position 
politically, with concessions made over the Tellico dam in September 1979 that gave 
priority to his economic and political concerns over environmental issues. The 
complexity of Carter’s energy proposals, sent to Congress on 29 April 1977, caused 
major splits within the environmental movement. Some groups wanted the elimination 
of fossil fuels, some the ending of nuclear energy, others promoted solar power, whilst 
some groups wanted priority given to conservation. Carter’s proposals included many 
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of these ideas but not to the satisfaction of any faction within the movement. The 
economics of energy policy caused the fragmentation of the coalition that supported 
Carter. He was forced to choose between allies such as environmentalists who wanted 
priority given to conservation and the labour unions who were focussed on protecting 
jobs. Whereas early in his administration he indicated he would lean towards protecting 
the environment, this position became politically less tenable as the economy 
deteriorated.   
 Although he had made no major speech on the environment during the 1976 
campaign, Carter did make his intention clear early in his administration that he was 
going to promote such policies. His environmental message sent to Congress on 23 May 
1977 was comprehensive;1048 it included all the recommendations made by his staff.1049 
In his legislative programme he was able to pass improved Clean Air and Water Acts 
which Ford had previously vetoed. He increased the responsibilities of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), made improvements to National Parks, 
established the National Heritage Trust, regulated strip-mining through the passage of 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and expanded coverage under 
previous legislation of National Trails and Wild and Scenic rivers.1050 Another major piece 
of legislation was the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation 
Liability Act, signed into law by Carter on 11 December 1980, that established a 
superfund worth $1.6bn to protect the public against the damage from toxic waste.1051 
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Not all of this legislation was straightforward. The Clean Air Act required the EPA, with 
Carter’s support, to steer a careful political path between the auto manufacturers and 
the UAW on the impact of tougher emission standards on fuel efficiency.1052 Similarly 
the establishment of the Redwoods National Park was only achieved by compromise 
over land usage in order to gain the support of the lumber industry.1053 In both cases 
Carter accepted the advice of his staff to enable the legislation to pass. However, despite 
having a credible legislative programme, the administration’s relationship with 
environmental groups was far from smooth. Part of the problem for the White House 
was logistical. Gus Speth, Carter’s Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, 
reported that there were over 50 nationally based environmental groups and between 
2,500 and 5,000 local groups which totalled some four million members. Speth stated 
that such groups were largely middle class, cohesive and politically active. Carter’s 
energy policies alienated many of them as they opposed his recommendations on 
synthetic fuels, coal and the creation of the Energy Mobilisation Board (EMB).1054 A 
sense of betrayal caused by Carter’s energy policies resulted in many groups 
campaigning actively against those policies, and some supported Ted Kennedy in the 
primaries.    
 The environmental lobby also had reservations about Carter’s signature 
environmental legislation, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) 
which was passed on 12 November 1980 and signed into law three weeks later. ANICLA 
provided, to varying degrees, special protection to over 157 million acres of land, 
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including national monuments, parks, wildlife refuges, rivers, recreational areas, forests 
and conservation areas. It was the most sweeping proposal of its type ever to pass 
Congress. It doubled the size of land designated as national parks and almost tripled the 
amount allocated to wilderness. It also, consequently, prevented exploitation by oil, gas 
and lumber companies as well as the state government. Carter called it ‘one of his most 
gratifying achievements.’1055 It was also a demonstration of his personal commitment 
and tenacity. He had continued to push for this legislation from his first environmental 
message in early 1977 until his eventual success at the end of his presidency. He faced 
some robust opposition, principally from Alaskan Senators Ted Stevens (GOP) and Mike 
Gravel (Democrat). Under the provisions of the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act of 
1971, Congress had until the end of 1978 to agree on which lands could be withdrawn 
from development for conservation purposes. Carter’s Secretary of the Interior, Cecil 
Andrus, shaped the administration’s proposals which sought to limit access to 
developers. Internal debate within the administration saw the OMB lobbying for more 
flexibility for developers but Carter supported Andrus.1056 However, by the end of 1978 
it had become clear that no legislation would be passed in time and so Carter acted on 
the advice of his cabinet and staff to use his executive powers under the Antiquities Act, 
and for Andrus to use his powers under the Land Policy Management Act to withdraw 
nearly 100 million acres in total pending legislation.1057 This was to give the 
administration breathing space but it prompted wide protests across Alaska which 
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included Carter being burnt in effigy and a serious civil disobedience campaign known 
as the Great Denali Trespass.1058  
Carter continued to press Congress for legislation and worked with Mo Udall, 
Chair of the House Interior Committee, in the House to pass a bill in May 1979, and with 
the Senate to pass their own bill in the following year. Carter maintained a high profile, 
supporting legislation by visiting Alaska and quoting in press briefings that he regarded 
the bill as ‘the top environmental priority of my administration, perhaps of my life.’1059 
But as the Senate debated the measure Carter was guided by his allies in Congress, 
principally Udall and Senator Paul Tsongas; often this was advice to stay quiet. 1060 He 
made calls to senators when requested, which were usually successful, 1061 and balanced 
the demands of the pro-environmental Alaska Coalition with the need to keep the 
support of Senator Stevens who, although Republican, was prepared to back a 
compromise. Although unable to pass the bill before the presidential election, the 
imminent arrival of a Reagan administration, with its threats of rolling back 
environmental protection, ensured that potential objections to a compromise from 
liberals both in and outside Congress did not materialise. Carter may have had a poor 
track record of persuading Congress to back many of his proposals but in late 1980 he 
was able to pass this landmark legislation. He succeeded by accepting his staff’s advice, 
working closely with his allies in Congress and being prepared to compromise. 
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 Eizenstat argued that Carter’s track record on the environment was 
impressive.1062 He built on the trend of environmental reform established by his 
Republican and Democratic predecessors. Yet this still failed to give him the 
wholehearted support of those in the environmental lobby who were opposed to his 
energy policy. Staff such as Bert Carp were highly critical of these groups, calling them 
’impossible to deal with.’1063 This opposition did not last when faced with a potential 
Reagan presidency and despite the initial support of some for Kennedy in the primaries, 
environmentalists rallied behind Carter in the 1980 election. Carter’s personal 
commitment to the environment was matched by a legislative record that not even the 
Reagan administration could eradicate. At the very least his presidency built on and 
surpassed the record of the Johnson administration and no subsequent president until 
Barak Obama could claim a more substantial record on the environment.1064 
 Social change in the 1970s was reflected not only in liberal social movements but 
also in the politicisation of religion, principally through conservative evangelicalism. For 
Carter, as a man of faith, this related directly to how he used the issue of his character 
in the 1976 election. When he presented himself to the American people, he put his 
character front and centre of his campaign by describing the roles he had played: a 
scientist, a farmer and a governor, but he always ended by saying that he was a Christian. 
His faith influenced his behaviour both as a politician and president. He had become a 
‘born again’ Christian in 1966 and he played an active part in his Church life, holding 
minor office, teaching Sunday School and going on outreach missions to Massachusetts 
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and Pennsylvania. He continued to affirm his faith in his speeches despite any potential 
political disadvantages and concerns from liberal advisors like Eizenstat that over-
emphasising his ‘born again’ or evangelical credentials (Carter preferred the former 
term) would turn off many voters. Carter did not accept this argument. His faith was an 
integral part of who he was, and it was politically relevant as he was standing on the 
issue of his character. He believed that being an active Christian helped his campaign. 
He stood as someone who could be trusted; hence his campaign line, ‘I will never lie to 
you.’ Carter believed his character and faith tapped into the electorate’s desire for moral 
leadership following Watergate and Vietnam.1065 His faith was reflected in many of his 
speeches, not the least the 1976 convention address which was described as the 
‘language of the pulpit, not the podium and yet it fired a worldly crowd.’1066 Carter came 
from a progressive strain of evangelicalism which emphasised the need for social 
improvement of the poor, supported Civil Rights and promoted the role of women. This 
was particularly reflected in his Law Day Speech at the University of Georgia on 4 May 
1974.1067 He was also unusual in that during the 1960’s evangelicals did not actively 
participate in politics. But Carter believed, having studied the Christian writer Rheinold 
Niebuhr, that it was possible to be a politician without compromising his beliefs.1068 He 
believed by focussing on his moral character, he could earn the trust of the American 
public. There was a part of the electorate to whom Carter’s faith was of real interest and 
these were his fellow evangelicals. To an evangelical movement that was beginning to 
develop a conservative political agenda, Carter seemed to be the ideal candidate. But as 
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was soon to become apparent there were fundamental differences between his 
approach to faith and political power and their own.  
 During the 1960’s and 1970’s there was a revival in interest in religion with a 
tripling in the number of Americans who talked of the growing role of faith in their lives. 
In addition, 1976 was declared by Time magazine as the ‘Year of the Evangelical’. Leaders 
like Pat Robertson, James Robinson, Jim Bakker and Jerry Falwell had an estimated 100 
million followers. Pat Robertson set up Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) which 
focussed on fundamentalist issues and had five million viewers.1069  It was Falwell who 
established the ‘Moral Majority’, a lobby group that grew to two million supporters and 
campaigned for pro-God and family policies. Despite the growth in evangelicalism there 
was an initial reluctance to become involved in politics. In the 1960’s Falwell spoke out 
against evangelicals campaigning 1070 but this started to change in the 1970’s with 
progressives such as Carter campaigning for social justice whilst conservatives 
responded to what they saw as their fundamental values being challenged by the state. 
1071 This fear was triggered by Supreme Court decisions on prayer in school (1962) and 
abortion (1973).1072 As a political force, they joined conservatives within the Republican 
Party who campaigned in 1974 against Ford’s choice as Vice President, Nelson 
Rockefeller, a liberal and divorcee. They subsequently formed with business an effective 
pressure group to defeat pro-labour legislation, campaigned against the ratification of 
the ERA, abortion and school bussing, and supported capital punishment. Despite this 
move to the right, the evangelical movement had political expectations of their fellow 
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believer. Carter seemed to be ‘one of their own’ with impeccable ‘born again’ 
credentials and they voted for him in large numbers in 1976, helping to secure the south 
for the Democrats. They were to be severely disappointed by the end of Carter’s term 
of office but the clues to their differences were to be found in the 1976 campaign.   
Carter emphasised moral leadership during his campaign which was supported 
by his simple style and candour about religion. This was appealing to the religious right 
and in the south, but Carter recognised that his ‘born again’ beliefs could be regarded 
as strange in some quarters.  His attempt to address this and other questions about 
himself, including his perceived vagueness on issues, resulted in his interview in 
September 1976 in Playboy magazine. Perhaps it was also a misguided attempt to 
emphasise that he was ‘normal’ and appeal to a younger, more liberal audience. His 
choice of Playboy for the interview - Californian Governor Jerry Brown had used this 
successfully - and his professed admiration for Bob Dylan, which were his sons’ 
obsession not his, were other examples of this.  But the language he used in the 
interview shocked his Christian supporters and reinforced an image of strangeness with 
the rest of the electorate. The electoral impact of the Playboy article was exaggerated. 
Carter’s early lead in the polls was a false one as the gap with Ford had started to close 
long before the interview was published. Conservative Christians were clearly upset by 
the language and the choice of the medium to publicise his views but what they should 
have been more concerned about was what he said in the main interview. He made it 
clear that whatever his personal faith, he was not proposing an evangelical political 
agenda.1073 Carter’s campaign reinforced this point: he promised few if any changes to 
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the liberal social legislation already in place. Nevertheless, this ultimately did not erode 
the widespread support of evangelicals across the south that enabled him to win the 
election.  
 Carter may have wanted to downplay the influence of the religious right on his 
presidency, but it was a matter of supreme irony that it was the actions of his 
administration that did most to politicise the movement. This was caused by the 
initiation of a policy which one conservative strategist described as having the effect of 
kicking ‘a sleeping dog.’1074 The issue was the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) decision to 
enforce the Green v Connally court ruling of 30 June 1971 which allowed the IRS to 
withdraw tax allowances on segregated schools.1075 The ruling was designed to penalise 
schools that had been established in the south to avoid desegregation legislation and 
put the onus on these schools to prove non-discrimination. Carter’s new IRS 
commissioner, Jerome Kurtz, believed enforcement would prevent education 
establishments like Bob Jones University in South Carolina from blatantly refusing to 
accept black students. This was consistent with administration policy of enforcing Civil 
Rights laws. It was an administrative decision that required no political authorisation 
from the White House. However, many of the affected schools had been established in 
response to genuine concerns about their children’s education such as the court 
decisions on banning prayer in school and decisions by the Federal government on sex 
education. These parents not only felt under attack for their beliefs but bitterly resented 
the implication of racism.1076  As a result of its decision the IRS was inundated with 
                                                          
1074 Freedman, ‘Religious Right’. 
1075 Balmer, Redeemer, 103. 
1076 Borstelmann, The 1970s, 250. 
263 
 
protests. Kurtz received 126,000 letters of complaint and was forced to request secret 
service protection.1077 Christian Right activists such as the Moral Majority co-founder 
Paul Weyrich and Director of National Christian Action Bob Billings Sr. were able to frame 
IRS action as an attack on religious freedom and mobilised support across the country. 
They were also able to utilise this activism for wider political action against the 
administration on other conservative issues. Billings was quoted as saying that ‘Jerome 
Kurtz has done more to bring Christians together than any man since St Paul.’1078 
Although the IRS produced modified guidelines in 1979, the protests continued. Carter 
himself was criticised with Republican Congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio finishing a 
letter of protest to him by saying, ‘You must not desert your religious followers by 
inaction.’1079 But Carter did not respond and continued to leave any decision to the IRS 
despite reservations from some of his advisors.1080 Carter’s inaction on this issue 
‘galvanised the religious right. It was the spark that ignited their involvement in real 
politics.’1081 
 Carter’s inaction is explained by his attitude to his faith and politics. His desire to 
separate his personal beliefs from political decisions meant he often saw religious 
groups just as fellow believers not as political actors. He did meet some moderate 
religious leaders at the White House but in his diaries expressed concern about 
evangelists using television to politicise Christianity.1082 By the end of his second year in 
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office the White House had developed a sophisticated outreach programme targeting 
all the key interest groups, but Carter did not appoint a special assistant for religious 
affairs until May 1979. Bob Maddox had known Carter since the 1960’s and had applied 
for a religious liaison role in the White House twice but had been turned down, once by 
Carter himself. This was despite White House staff acknowledging that they needed 
Maddox’s contacts in the evangelical movement.1083 This suggested that Carter was 
reluctant to acknowledge the religious right as a political force. Maddox spent the 
remaining 18 months of the administration trying to rebuild Carter’s support among 
religious groups. He travelled widely meeting evangelicals but only persuaded Carter to 
see them in January 1980. The meeting went well but in a press conference afterwards 
Falwell distorted what Carter had told them about his attitude to gay rights.1084 Despite 
this and Carter’s comment that they had sounded ‘really right wing,’ he still believed 
that these leaders were fundamentally supportive of his presidency.1085 This 
demonstrated a basic misunderstanding by Carter of their position on political issues. 
The Christian right now had a political agenda and like any other interest group they 
expected Carter, as a fellow believer, to deliver on it. For example, when Carter was 
interviewed by Robertson for CBN, he agreed to consider evangelical candidates for jobs 
in his administration but none of the twenty CV’s Robertson sent over were ever 
considered.1086 They also became increasingly frustrated by Carter’s treatment of them 
in terms of political access. His negative attitude to interest groups was well established 
but other groups, particularly supporters, received serious consideration of their 
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priorities. To Carter religion was essentially a private not a political matter. This 
approach was reflected throughout his presidency.   
In January 1977 Jimmy Carter became America’s third Baptist president after 
Harding and Truman. There were many visible signs of his evangelical background during 
his presidency from the careful choice of biblical quotes in his inaugural address, his 
secret service code name, Deacon, his regular attendance at his new church in 
Washington and insistence on teaching Sunday school there. There were also more 
subtle signs of the influence of his Baptist background. He attempted to take the 
ceremony out of the presidency by walking with his wife to the White House after his 
inauguration, reducing the use of ‘Hail to the Chief’ when he arrived at events, and even 
carrying his own bags onto Air Force One. But his faith did not translate into concrete 
policies in his new administration. Carter’s position on his beliefs and his role as 
president was reflected in a press conference he gave in November 1978. He explained, 
‘I have been very careful not to inter-relate my Christian beliefs with my responsibilities 
as President. But it is a great personal gratification for me to have that religious faith.’1087 
Whilst reinforcing the importance of faith to him personally, he carefully drew a line 
between his beliefs and his responsibility to the office. He argued that he had a rational 
approach to the presidency that was not affected by faith or for that matter ideology. 
On policy he said that he tried to analyse each question individually: ‘I’ve taken positions 
that to me are fair and rational.’ 1088 In effect he was arguing in personal terms for the 
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separation of Church and State. This would prove to be a lot more difficult than he had 
imagined.  
On no issue was this more controversial than abortion. The evangelical 
movement started to move away from a previously sympathetic position on abortion in 
the 1970s and began to form an alliance with Roman Catholics on the issue. The 
landmark Supreme Court decision, Roe v Wade, established in January 1973 the legality 
of abortion in certain circumstances. Although women’s groups sought to widen the 
criteria, religious groups wanted the ruling overturned.  In an increasingly volatile 
climate, Carter maintained his position of refusing to overturn Roe v Wade whilst making 
clear his personal opposition to abortion. He supported the Hyde amendment which 
restricted the use of Federal funds for abortion except when the life of the mother was 
threatened. Carter’s attempt to separate his personal beliefs from his public position 
was directly challenged by fellow evangelicals.1089  Bob Maddox believed that Carter was 
blindsided by how emotive the abortion issue was because as governor he had not faced 
it as a problem in Georgia.1090 But it was just one of many issues on which evangelicals 
felt Carter was letting them down. These included the IRS tax exemption on religious 
schools, ERA, prayer in schools, the White House Conference on the Family and gay 
rights, where Carter had criticised California’s Proposition 6   which sought to ban gay 
people from teaching.1091  To the religious right these were not just policies but matters 
of conscience and they could not accept that a president who was ‘born again’ would 
not act on them. They proved to be much more forgiving of Reagan who had actively 
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campaigned against Proposition 6. They were also prominent in the conservative right’s 
targeting of Senator Dick Clark of Iowa in the 1978 mid-term elections. It was the 
campaigning of religious groups on the issue of abortion that proved a significant factor 
in Clark’s surprise defeat.1092 They reinvigorated their alliance with conservative 
Republicans that had flourished briefly at the 1976 GOP convention. This time they were 
committed to a much broader conservative agenda. 
 To ensure the support of religious groups, the Republican Party shifted its 
position on ERA and the IRS rulings on religious schools to align with their agenda. In 
addition, as presidential candidate, Reagan promised to appoint ‘Godly men’ into his 
administration.1093 Republicans were rewarded with strong support during the 1980 
election. Evangelical groups sent out 840,000 leaflets. The Christian Voice raised 
$500,000 whilst the Moral Majority Political Action Committee (PAC) supported 12 
Republican congressional challengers, 11 of whom were elected. Their impact went 
beyond the south and the evangelical movement as their support ensured the victory of 
Catholic candidates in Alabama and Oklahoma.1094 The politicisation of the religious 
groups was symbolised by Bob Billings Sr. who had led the fight against the IRS and 
became the Moral Majority’s first  Executive Director and later President Reagan’s 
religious affairs advisor.1095  Maddox believed that despite his efforts on Carter’s behalf 
to engage with the evangelical movement, the tide had turned against him as early as 
1979 with some groups even questioning whether the president was a  Christian.1096 
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Personal attacks against Carter also extended to his family with a particularly vicious 
campaign against his evangelical sister, Ruth Carter Stapleton.1097 In the 1980 election 
Reagan picked up more of the evangelical vote than Carter and in the 96 most Baptist 
counties, Carter ran 18 percent down on his performance in 1976.1098 This contributed 
heavily to Reagan’s gains in the south. 
Carter’s religious beliefs were reflected throughout his political career in his 
behaviour and approach to government. His speeches were often delivered in the style 
of a preacher and laced with moral themes. His marked reluctance to strike political 
bargains was largely a Baptist trait.1099  His beliefs did give him a sense of inner calm and 
detachment from the pressures he would face as president. He was unable to convert 
his public profession of faith into political support from the growing influence of the 
conservative Christians. He failed to recognise them as an interest group and although 
he was always willing to discuss matters of faith, he was not prepared to change his 
policies. To Carter, his faith was ultimately a personal matter unrelated to politics. His 
anger at a photograph of him appearing in the press attending church was symptomatic 
of this.1100 The separation of faith and politics was incomprehensible to many fellow 
believers who felt under attack by changes in society. They expected as a matter of 
conscience for Carter to act politically on their core issues. His lack of action on policies 
like abortion and the IRS rules on religious schools was viewed as nothing less than an 
act of betrayal. It was unsurprising therefore that in the 1980 election they swung their 
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support behind Reagan who promised much of what they wanted, although when in 
office delivered little.  
 The interest groups discussed in this chapter were movements that campaigned 
for social change during this period. Although they were Carter’s natural constituency 
and voted for him in large numbers in 1976, they also represented a major challenge for 
his administration. His perceived espousal of their causes created huge expectations for 
his presidency. While he agreed with many of their views, he took a moderate rather 
than radical line on reform. Faced with the ideological divide between the liberal and 
conservative views on policy, Carter invariably stood on the middle ground but ended 
up being attacked from both sides.  As a moderate he sought to build on previously 
enacted legislation through active enforcement and using increased government 
oversight to ensure that these movements were more represented in his administration. 
But Carter did not initiate radical change; every action reinforced or supplemented 
measures that had gone before. His famous quote that ‘the time for discrimination was 
over’1101 was typical of this approach. Civil Rights has long been regarded as a moral 
issue where presidents were expected to demonstrate leadership. Carter’s nuanced 
stance, focussing on incremental change, did not fulfil such expectations. This moderate 
response was deemed inadequate by minority groups who saw their cause as a moral 
necessity.  
The problem for Carter was that whilst he endorsed the broad aims of these 
groups’ his support was neither impassioned nor unqualified. He did not have the luxury 
of wholeheartedly supporting one cause as other factors had to be considered. This did 
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not mean that his character did not influence his relationships with these groups. His 
decision to proceed with cutting the water projects budget in 1977 may have been 
economically and environmentally driven but he also opposed these projects on moral 
grounds.1102 His fraught relationship with fellow evangelicals was caused by Carter’s 
fundamental belief in the separation of his faith from politics. Such beliefs were never 
understood by these groups who often saw issues in one-dimensional terms. This 
resulted in reactions from activists that ranged from disappointment to even a sense of 
betrayal. Much of this disenchantment came from liberals who expected a Democratic 
president to follow an agenda based on progressive social values. Carter may not have 
been a liberal in its broadest sense, but his genuine attempts to implement many of 
these core policies were hampered by his own fiscal conservatism.  Many of these 
programmes involved increased government expenditure which conflicted with an anti-
inflation strategy that Carter prioritised. Finally, all these groups faced opposition from 
a conservative movement which was gaining popular support. Conservatives were 
leading protests on a wide range of issues against tax increases, affirmative action, ERA 
and government regulation in general. This backlash was effective in pushing back 
reform, particularly when such policies were taken up by the Republican Party by the 
end of 1978.  
Given this, Carter found himself in the middle of warring interest groups on 
almost every issue with little room for manoeuvre. Despite these inherent difficulties, 
the administration could claim some major successes, especially in environmental 
protection. In terms of how Carter managed these issues, there was little evidence of 
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his alleged antipathy to working with interest groups. This was possibly because they 
were natural supporters and he generally approved of their goals. In the case of ethnic 
minorities, women and environmental groups he had members of staff who understood 
and sympathised with their objectives and liaised closely with them. It was his advisors 
who guided Carter in dealing with these groups so, despite general disappointment with 
Carter’s lack of radical action on their behalf and a brief dalliance by some with Kennedy, 
he was able to maintain their support in the 1980 campaign.  
The exception to this was the evangelical movement: despite their common 
faith, Carter did not collaborate with them politically as he did not recognise them as a 
political force. It was paradoxical that he lost the support of the one interest group with 
whom he had the most in common personally. The Christian right continued to support 
Reagan but much of their social programme, including the repeal of Roe v Wade, was 
not implemented during Reagan’s time in office. The other liberal groups were to have 
reason to mourn Carter’s electoral passing as under Reagan many of his administration’s 
achievements in energy and the environment were reversed. Some relatively minor 
changes survived, such as the appointment of minorities to the federal bench and 
deregulation. The most notable exception was the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act which proved to be the greatest long-lasting domestic policy 
achievement of Carter’s presidency. 
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Chapter Seven 
1980 Election: The Battle against Kennedy and Reagan  
 
On 15 July 1979 Carter gave a television speech about the latest energy crisis but he 
went on to talk about what he saw as a much deeper problem in the country. He stated 
that ‘the erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and 
the political fabric of America.’1103 This pessimistic assessment was followed by the 
expression of confidence that a solution was possible, and he outlined his plans on how 
this could be achieved. This address was dubbed by the media the ‘malaise speech’ 
although this was not a term he used. The speech was intended by the White House to 
be a watershed moment for the administration. It was designed to signal a new 
approach on how Carter was going to govern in the run up to the 1980 presidential 
election, which was only sixteen months away. As part of this new approach he made a 
series of organisational changes designed to make his administration more effective in 
addressing policy failures on the economy and energy. The roots of this speech and the 
subsequent organisational changes related back to polling completed in late 1978 which 
touched upon two different aspects of Carter’s character: his faith and his belief in 
rational analysis. 
In October 1978 Carter’s newly appointed religious liaison, Bob Maddox, wrote 
to Carter about his discussions with religious leaders. He reported that all of them had 
highlighted the need for the president’s moral leadership because they believed that 
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the country was ‘at a crisis point in our spirits.’1104 This view was reinforced by Carter’s 
pollster Pat Caddell whose ‘State of the Nation’ survey conducted from the end of 1978 
to January 1979 made for gloomy reading for the administration. The survey described 
a pervading sense of pessimism in the country. The number of voters who were 
pessimistic about the future had doubled since January 1977 and now outnumbered the 
optimists 48 to 16 percent.  This trend was accelerating and represented the worst 
figures since Watergate.1105 Carter was seen to lack relevance, the public had ‘tuned out’ 
of his messages and, most troubling, whilst his personal qualities continued to be 
appreciated, the majority did not believe that he was a competent president.1106 It was 
these findings that Caddell used in April 1979 to produce his report ‘Of Crisis and 
Opportunity’1107 which heavily influenced both the tone and content of Carter’s energy 
speech in July 1979. Caddell argued that there was an underlying pessimism in the 
country that Carter needed to address before trying to solve the energy crisis. Not 
everyone in the White House agreed with this analysis, particularly its inherent 
pessimism; some staff dubbed Caddell’s paper ‘Apocalypse Now.’ However, from April 
1979 onwards, few in the White House would disagree that the administration was in 
serious trouble. The latest fuel crisis sparked by the revolution in Iran had resulted in 
the doubling of the price of oil in twelve months. Increases in petrol prices triggered a 
trucker’s strike and widespread queues at gas stations. Between April and early July 
1979, the White House was focussed on drafting what would be the president’s fifth 
speech on energy.  Carter’s advisors were split on the approach he should take. His 
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speechwriters were worried, noting that the mood in the country was ‘grim’ and that 
‘hatred for the oil companies is only matched by the lack of confidence in the 
administration.’ For his latest speech they warned of the dangers of Carter’s preachy 
style and argued for ‘no more berating the American people for waste and selfishness. 
‘1108 Eizenstat and other liberals in his administration were more optimistic that a 
focussed energy speech could work. During the 1976 election and his early years as 
president, Carter prided himself on his connection with the American people but there 
were signs in April 1979, before he left for an economic summit in Japan, that he was 
increasingly frustrated by his inability to convince the public on energy policy. He 
described the draft speech he received before he left as the worst he had ever seen.1109 
His uncertainty persisted when he returned to Washington. He called Lance and said, ‘I 
came back from my meeting in Tokyo and it all seemed to be falling down around me in 
the White House. I don’t know what to do about it.’1110 These were the signs that Carter 
was suffering from his own personal ‘crisis of confidence.’  
His solution was to cancel the speech and invite a wide range of prominent 
Democratic Party figures, members of Congress, governors, labour leaders, academics 
and clergy to Camp David from 9-12 July 1979 to confer on the state of the nation. The 
feedback received from the participants reflected the internal debate within the White 
House. They told him that he had to convince the American public that the 
administration had credible solutions to solve its energy problems whilst addressing the 
underlying ‘crisis of confidence’. This debate was reflected in the drafting of the speech 
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after Camp David. Eizenstat, Mondale and other liberals argued for a practical energy 
programme matched by a speech to the public that was not ‘too much like an old scold 
and grouch’ and ‘instead … play to their better instincts. ‘ 1111 Eizenstat was highly critical 
of Caddell’s ideas, describing him as ‘Rasputin like,’ whilst Mondale was ‘visibly angry’ 
both with Caddell and Carter. Mondale told the president at a meeting that ‘you’re very 
tired and this is affecting your thinking’.1112 Caddell argued that addressing the 
underlying pessimism was the only way to regain the public’s attention and gain their 
active support. The final speech was a compromise and reflected both perspectives. 
Carter delivered his speech to a television audience of 65 million, twice the number 
compared with recent speeches. The initial response from the public and the press was 
positive. Carter’s approval rating went up 11 percent.1113 Letters into the White House 
ran 85 percent in favour with a positive reaction to his call to rebuild the American 
spirit.1114 The press was generally supportive, some praising it as his best speech, but 
conservative media remained critical. The Wall Street Journal commented sarcastically 
on Carter that, ‘You roam America in your Boeing 707 and helicopter seeking insight into 
the nation’s soul.’1115  
The ultimate success of the speech was dependent upon the administration’s 
ability to pass meaningful energy legislation after the congressional summer recess, but 
the initial goodwill had largely dissipated before then. Carter’s aggressive energy speech 
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in Kansas the following day1116 and the sudden removal of five members of his cabinet 
appeared to contradict his message of unity. The problem for Carter was as well as trying 
to address the country’s crisis of confidence, he was also trying to deal with the second 
negative element in the Caddell polls, his leadership. The public wanted strong 
leadership from their president which they did not believe Carter was providing.1117 The 
administration response to this was to refresh the cabinet and reorganise the White 
House. The intention was not only to improve the administration’s effectiveness but also 
to demonstrate Carter’s strength as a leader. The manner and timing of the cabinet 
departures of Griffin Bell, Michael Blumenthal, Joe Califano, Brock Adams and James 
Schlesinger were heavily criticised in the press. 1118  The decision to request pro-forma 
resignations was originally supposed to include undersecretaries and White House staff 
but the targeting of the cabinet so soon after his keynote speech created the impression 
of a crisis.1119 Some of this criticism was unfair as Bell and Schlesinger had already 
indicated their intention to leave and Adams’ indecisiveness on whether he would stay 
forced Carter to remove him. The only substantial dismissals therefore were those of 
Califano and Blumenthal, both of whose poor relations with White House staff had made 
their long-term future untenable. The new additions to the cabinet, particularly Bill 
Miller at the Treasury and Charles Duncan at Energy, did improve the relationships 
within the administration. There was one appointment that did have a profound impact 
on not only the presidency of Carter but his successor: Paul Volcker’s arrival at the 
Federal Reserve, and his subsequent policies, resulted in the defeat of inflation. But 
                                                          
1116 Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Counties, 16 July 1979, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32597&st=&st1=  
1117 Nelson, Presidency and the Political System, 16. 
1118 Joseph Kraft, ‘Self-inflicted Wounds, Washington Post, 29 July 1979. 
1119 Jordan to Carter, 17 July 1979, C of S Box 37, JCPL and Carter, Diaries, 345-46. 
277 
 
unfortunately for Carter, the initial impact of Volcker’s policies of high interest rates 
triggered a recession that would last beyond Carter’s term in office.  
The staff changes within the White House, which established a streamlined 
structure under a chief of staff, did improve efficiency. The appointment of Jordan to 
the role of chief of staff caused some initial problems particularly as he remained 
unpopular with members of congress, but he left the detailed work to his deputy Alonzo 
McDonald. 1120  McDonald was one of three experienced advisors brought into the White 
House after the 15 July speech. Lloyd Cutler became Counsel to the president and 
Hedley Donovan a senior advisor. All three improved the administration’s efficiency but 
it was McDonald who had the greatest impact, streamlining White House operations 
from issue management to speechwriting.1121 This improvement would continue until 
the end of Carter’s term in office with Jack Watson replacing Jordan as chief of staff in 
June 1980 when he left to join Carter’s campaign team.  
For White House staff like Jordan, the 15 July speech was an opportunity for 
Carter to reassert his leadership, supported by a streamlined organisation and a more 
effective cabinet. Although these personnel changes were acknowledged as successful 
by staff,1122 the envisaged ‘relaunch’ of Carter’s presidency did not materialise. The 
‘post-malaise’ mood continued into August. Adding to the sombre atmosphere was the 
departure of Carter’s United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young who was forced to 
resign for meeting secretly with representatives of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation. In addition, Jordan was investigated by the FBI for taking cocaine. 
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Although this charge was false, the speculation was damaging to the administration.1123 
Symbolic of this sense of disappointment was the ‘thank you lunch’ held by the White 
House at the end of July for the 150 people who participated in the Camp David Summit. 
Barely half attended as many did not want to be associated with what was now 
perceived to be a failure.1124 Carter began his speech on 15 July with, ‘This is not a 
message of happiness or reassurance,’ but by 1979 this was not what the public wanted 
to hear. Conservatives such as Ronald Reagan refused to accept that there was a crisis 
of confidence in America. They believed the pessimism was caused by a failure of 
presidential leadership and Republicans would fight the 1980 election on that basis.1125   
Carter also soon realised that the speech had failed to reassure the liberal wing 
of his party, and hence he would be dealing with an internal challenge before he could 
face the Republicans. Ted Kennedy, in launching his campaign in Boston on 7 November 
1979, focussed on leadership and touched on Carter’s July speech. He said, ‘Before the 
last election, we were told that Americans were honest, loving, good, decent and 
compassionate. Now the people are blamed for every national ill and scolded as greedy, 
wasteful, and mired in malaise.’1126 Kennedy’s analysis of Carter’s speech from a liberal 
perspective was to be the same as Reagan’s view, although their solutions to the 
country’s problems were to be markedly different. Carter would therefore be faced with 
a political war on two ideological fronts.  
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Carter’s relationship with the Democratic Party had always been problematic. 
His campaign in 1976 had mainly bypassed national and state organisations using local 
volunteers to reach the state electorate. Carter said in an interview in 1982 that, ‘Very 
few of the members of congress or members of major lobbying groups or distinguished 
former Democratic leaders had played much of a role in my election.’1127 This view was 
not entirely accurate as many Democratic groups at state and national level provided 
invaluable support during the election. His attempts to shape the party after 1976 were 
at best sporadic and not always successful. His wish to make fellow Georgian Philip Wise 
national chair was unsuccessful and he often supported local opposition to key party 
leaders like Mayor Richard Daley in Chicago.1128 Alonzo McDonald argued that from the 
party viewpoint, Carter appeared unreliable because he was so independent. In 
addition, being non-ideological in a party where philosophy mattered, made him 
vulnerable to attack by both conservative and liberal wings.1129 It was the liberals, oddly 
Carter’s most consistent supporters in Congress, who felt the most disappointment with 
their president. Liberal uncertainty over Carter’s ideology went back as far as the 1976 
primary campaign when the entry of the liberal, Jerry Brown, resulted in five primary 
victories for the Governor of California.1130 But it was Carter’s perceived failure to deliver 
on key liberal policies like labour law reform, health care, ERA and especially on the 
economy that caused the most anger. Some of this criticism was unfair because with the 
country becoming more conservative, much of the proposed liberal legislation did not 
have public or even congressional support. The liberals, however, remained in the 
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majority in the party and they used its mid-term conference in December 1978 to 
criticise the president publicly. The appointment of Anne Wexler as Special Assistant for 
Public Outreach in September 1978 did improve the level of engagement between the 
party and his administration.  But Carter reflected in his diary after the 1980 election 
that due to his nervousness about interest groups, he paid too little attention to his party 
and did not do enough to prevent liberal defections during the election.1131 Carter did 
work hard, however, to court the party’s liberal standard bearer, Ted Kennedy.  
Carter and Kennedy had always been seen as rivals who aspired to lead the party. 
Carter’s speech at Georgia University’s Law Day in May 1974 was arguably designed not 
only to enhance his growing reputation nationally but also to upstage Kennedy, his 
fellow speaker on the day.1132 Kennedy had decided not to run in 1976, largely due to 
the illness of his son Teddy, but he left open the option to run in 1980 or 1984. An Atlanta 
reporter alleged that Carter had said on winning the nomination in 1976 that he was 
pleased to have won the nomination without ‘having to kiss Ted Kennedy’s ass to get 
it.’1133 There was a view in the White House, especially amongst the Georgians, that 
Kennedy would not wait until 1984 and would use policy issues such as health as a 
means of differentiating himself from the administration. This rivalry contributed to the 
White House staff’s suspicion of Secretary Califano because of his close relationship with 
the Kennedy family. Califano’s dismissal in July 1979, following White House advisor 
Peter Bourne’s departure the previous year, deprived the president of the only informal 
channels he had to the Kennedy camp. Despite this, during Carter’s presidency, 
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Kennedy’s voting record, at 84 percent in favour of the administration’s legislation, was 
exemplary.1134 Kennedy was also fulsome in his praise of Carter’s support for his 
initiative on Northern Ireland.1135 Kennedy did vent his frustration on occasion, for 
example he called Carter’s 1978 Revenue Act ‘the worst tax legislation approved by 
Congress since the days of Calvin Coolidge and Andrew Mellon.’1136  
It was disagreements over health-care policy that finally brought about 
Kennedy’s split from Carter. Kennedy believed that comprehensive health care was a 
fundamental right and not something that should be dependent upon the state of the 
economy. In June 1979 Carter’s long-awaited reform plan recommended only a phased 
implementation of comprehensive health-care which depended upon the prevailing 
economic conditions. His fiscal conservatism and fear of inflation prevented him giving 
a guarantee of automatic implementation. Kennedy argued that ‘health care and health 
insurance were the issues that damaged our relations beyond repair.’1137 The inference 
that this was the reason Kennedy decided to enter the Democratic primaries was 
supported by Eizenstat who argued that Kennedy could not accept the Carter proposal 
as it would lose him the support of the labour unions which represented his natural 
constituency.1138 But even Kennedy was not definitive about the source of the rift. In his 
autobiography he highlighted Carter’s failure to appoint his friend Archibald Cox to a 
Federal judgeship, despite a personal appeal, and his negative reaction to Carter’s 
‘malaise speech.’1139 Carey Parker, Kennedy’s policy director, argued that conflict 
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between the two men was inevitable once Kennedy realised Carter’s agenda was 
conservative in its nature. Kennedy’s speech at the mid-term convention in December 
1978 which talked about liberals ‘sailing against the wind’ was the first signal to the party 
of an alternative to Carter in 1980.1140 To Jordan, the reason Kennedy stood was much 
more straightforward. He argued that healthcare had nothing to do with Kennedy’s 
decision to run. It was just the simple belief that he could beat not only Carter but the 
likely GOP candidate, Ronald Reagan. Jordan said, ‘He thinks we’re weak, and he has 
reason to believe from the polls that he would win. That’s why he’s going to run.’1141 
Kennedy formally launched his campaign on 7 November 1979 following discussions 
with his family that summer. His decision to run ensured that Carter was committed to 
campaign for the next year against two formidable opponents.  
In the twelve months before the election, Carter had to deal with two foreign 
policy crises that would have a major impact on his campaign: the taking of US embassy 
hostages in Tehran and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Two days before 
Kennedy declared his candidacy, the deterioration in relations between Iran and 
America following the overthrow of the Shah culminated in students storming the US 
embassy in Tehran and the taking of 52 American hostages. Despite the administration’s 
best diplomatic efforts, as well as an attempted military rescue authorised by Carter in 
April 1980, the hostages were not released until after Reagan’s inauguration on 20 
January 1981. The hostage crisis affected the Carter campaign in several ways. Whilst 
his opponents did not make direct political capital out of the crisis, it became a symbol 
of Carter’s perceived ineffectiveness and lack of leadership. The diplomatic situation was 
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highly complex which hampered Carter’s attempts to resolve the crisis and there was as 
a result several alleged breakthroughs which raised false hopes. It would also prove a 
distraction not only for Carter personally but for Jordan, his chief campaign strategist, 
who the president used during the crisis as an unofficial envoy.1142 The hostages further 
impacted on the nature of presidential campaigning as Carter and his advisors decided 
that he would not campaign in person but remain in the White House to deal with the 
crisis. Dubbed the ‘Rose Garden’ strategy, this had been used successfully by previous 
presidents when standing for re-election but in Carter’s case, with him languishing in the 
polls, this did not prove to be an effective strategy. This was abandoned at a press 
conference on 30 April 1980 where Carter rather lamely suggested he could start 
personal campaigning as the challenges the country faced were ‘manageable enough’. 
1143 
The second foreign policy crisis that Carter faced was the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979. This was a major blow to Carter’s policy of detente 
and virtually killed all hope of Congress passing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
(SALT II). The invasion was not only a gift to conservative Republicans like Reagan who 
had always demanded a much harder line with the Soviet Union but caused Carter to 
reverse his policy on defence spending. His request to increase military expenditure by 
6 percent in the proposed 1981 budget had major implications for the administration’s 
economic policy. The increased expenditure all but removed any hope of Carter fulfilling 
his commitment to a balanced budget without dramatic cuts in social spending which 
would be opposed by Kennedy and other liberals in the party. These two crises did not 
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have an entirely negative effect on the Carter re-election bid as public support, at least 
initially, for a president in a time of crisis did help him in the primary campaigns. Whilst 
in presidential elections foreign policy issues do not always become major factors, the 
hostage crisis and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were used by Republicans to highlight 
their view of Carter as a weak and ineffective leader.    
Carter also had to deal with a deteriorating economy and pressure on his 
commitment to balance the budget.  The initial White House forecast for the 1981 
budget became unsustainable with pressure from labour to help the poor and 
unemployed against recession, and the impact of Carter’s decision to increase defence 
spending because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In January 1980 inflation rose 
to 19.2 percent which caused a panic on Wall Street. Eizenstat admitted that the White 
House was ‘proposing a budget program which is unachievable as well as undesirable in 
the present recessionary climate.’ As a result, Carter recalled the budget from Congress 
and tried to impose further spending cuts, but these would still result in a deficit of 
$16.5bn. Even so Congress humiliatingly rejected this revised budget.1144 
Despite these difficulties the White House had always remained confident of 
defeating Kennedy in the primaries. The president’s leaked comment to congressmen 
on 25 June 1979 about ‘whipping his ass’ if he ran was stage-managed, according to 
Mondale, to make Carter seem tough.1145 Carter’s campaign tactics for the primaries 
were in line with his ‘Rose Garden’ strategy. This involved not actively campaigning but 
instead using surrogates like Vice President Mondale, other senior Democratic Party 
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figures and Rosalyn Carter, by now a formidable campaigner in her own right, to visit 
the states concerned. Carter’s position within the party also started to improve. Wexler 
reported on a poll of party chairmen in December 1979 that showed an improvement in 
the president’s standing.1146 Carter also sought to build campaign momentum by 
bringing forward the dates of primaries in the southern states which were his natural 
constituency.1147 This tactic was largely successful in that Kennedy had no significant 
primary victories until two wins in New York and Connecticut in late March 1980. Carter 
was helped by some lacklustre electioneering from Kennedy. His campaign launch in 
Boston, just three days after the taking of the hostages in Tehran, was viewed as 
insensitive. More damaging to his electoral image was a televised interview with Roger 
Mudd of CBS, broadcast on 4 November 1979, in which Kennedy seemed unable to 
answer a basic question about why he wanted to be president.1148 Kennedy’s policy 
director admitted that his staff were simply not prepared for the campaign in November  
and were not properly organised until the following February. 1149 Unfortunately, by 
then Kennedy had slid further in the polls as the public rallied round the president 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Initially at least, Kennedy found it difficult 
to attack Carter’s leadership at a time of national crisis. He sought to maintain the 
support of business by downplaying his liberal agenda.1150 However, in a campaign that 
was to bear some striking similarities to Reagan’s primary campaign against Ford in 
1976, Kennedy started to win primaries by breaking free of such constraints to focus 
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more on a liberal agenda. Victories in Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, California 
and New Jersey, all critical states for the presidential election, prolonged the race up to 
the Democratic Convention in August. Kennedy believed that this new momentum, 
where he was gaining support not only from liberals but from blue-collar and minority 
groups, could be enough to snatch victory at the convention. 1151 He was appealing to 
blue-collar voters in key states, those who would later become known as Reagan 
Democrats.1152 There was also polling which suggested that Kennedy was not only 
leading Reagan but was also more trusted to defeat inflation, the major policy issue for 
the electorate.1153  
By late May 1980, confident of victory, the White House had drawn up detailed 
plans to ‘reintegrate’ Kennedy backers, particularly his labour supporters, into the Carter 
camp.1154 But at a meeting with Carter in June, not only did Kennedy refuse to step down 
but his supporters began lobbying for a free vote at the convention. Kennedy believed 
he had momentum and that Carter delegates from earlier primaries would switch sides 
and throw the convention to him. In addition, Kennedy asked for a public debate with 
Carter. Neither of these options were realistic propositions but the president was unable 
to persuade Kennedy to step aside.1155 The White House position was further 
complicated by indications that Senator Byrd was involved in an attempt with other 
Democratic Senators to persuade Carter to step down. This may have been caused by 
Byrd’s anger with the president who had not told him in advance of the hostage rescue 
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attempt, but it was more likely prompted by Byrd’s fear of Democratic losses in Congress 
in November. 1156 So, despite having a clear lead in delegates, Carter was faced with 
uncertainty in the run up to the Convention in August 1980.  
 For a sitting president, the party convention in an election year is used as both a 
‘coronation’ and launch pad for the forthcoming campaign. This was not the case in 1980 
because most of the delegate and media attention was on Ted Kennedy. Attempts to 
unite the party were blocked by Kennedy’s team even after it was certain that the 
delegate vote would be lost. The convention, held in New York, became a battle over 
the party platform. To try and end a public split the White House agreed prior to the 
convention to many elements of the liberal agenda such as labour law reform, ERA, 
education funding, full employment and tax reform. Attempts to include policies on 
wage/price regulation and control of energy prices were successfully resisted by Carter’s 
supporters. However, Carter was forced to concede a platform commitment to spend 
$12bn on a jobs programme. This would undermine his own policy of achieving a 
balanced budget.1157 When Kennedy did finally concede defeat, he did it in such a way 
that further damaged Carter politically. Kennedy’s convention speech on 12 August 
1980, ‘electrified the delegates with a rousing New Deal, New Frontier style speech’1158 
which was indirectly critical of the administration’s policies. He said, ‘Let us pledge that 
we will never misuse unemployment, high interest rates and human misery as false 
weapons against inflation’ and ‘Let us pledge that unemployment will be the priority of 
our economic policy.’1159 Jordan was in no doubt of the impact of the speech, he stated 
                                                          
1156 Moore and Tate to Carter,10 June 1980, SS Box 165, JCPL. 
1157 Ranney, Elections of 1980, 116-19. 
1158 Haas, Politics of Frustration, 149. 
1159   http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/tedkennedy1980dnc.htm  
288 
 
that, ‘We may have won the nomination but Ted Kennedy had won their hearts.’1160 A 
second and perhaps more damaging incident was Kennedy’s late and unenthusiastic 
appearance on stage at the end of the convention. Such stage-managed events were 
meant to signify party unity but Kennedy’s late appearance, if anything, symbolised 
quite the opposite. White House staff, including Powell, were convinced that the slight 
was deliberate1161 whilst Carter alluded to Kennedy having had ’a few drinks.’1162 
Kennedy’s own version of these events some years later was at best confusing and 
certainly unconvincing.1163 What was clear was that Carter left his party’s convention 
weakened not strengthened by the Kennedy challenge and having failed to reunite his 
party.  
 Carter’s ability to bounce back from unfavourable poll numbers in July 1979 to 
beat Kennedy in the following year demonstrated his resilience but damaged his political 
credibility. Kennedy’s critique of the Carter White House was shared by Reagan. Like 
Kennedy, Reagan did not accept that there was a ‘malaise’ in the country and argued 
that fault lay in Carter’s weak leadership. Kennedy’s later success in the primaries was 
largely based on his promotion of liberal policies; he offered ‘a choice not an echo.’1164 
Kennedy’s nine primary victories represented 164 electoral college votes which Carter 
needed if he was going to win the election. He had to win back liberal voters. In a 
memorandum early in the campaign, Secretary of Labor Marshall described Kennedy 
supporters as more intense and committed than Carter’s but early polling at the 
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convention suggested only 23 percent of Kennedy delegates intended to vote for the 
president in November.1165 The Democratic platform was designed to attract liberal 
support but doubts about Carter’s commitment to this persisted. This was particularly 
true of how the platform commitment to spend $12bn on job creation squared with 
Carter’s own fiscal conservatism. The president’s challenge in winning back liberal 
support was further complicated when John B Anderson, decided to run as a new third-
party candidate. Anderson, a maverick liberal Republican congressman from Illinois, had 
run against Reagan in the primaries but he had been encouraged to run by positive 
national polling. Carter’s main opponent, though, was the formidable Republican 
nominee, Ronald Reagan, who unlike Carter had a united party behind him and had built 
an early lead in the polls. 
 In announcing his candidacy on 13 November 1979, Reagan chose to highlight 
the roles he had played in his life. He stated that he had seen America as ‘a sports caster, 
as an actor, officer of my labour union, soldier, officeholder and as both a Democrat and 
a Republican.’ 1166 He explained his life in this way, as Carter had done in 1976, to 
emphasise the range of his previous responsibilities and the rich experience he brought 
to his candidacy. He was especially keen to highlight his tough upbringing in small-town 
Illinois during the Depression. This was important to Reagan because for many of the 
electorate he was remembered just as a Hollywood actor. He was always 
underestimated by his opponents in his political career. Clark Clifford famously called 
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him ‘an amiable dunce.’1167 But his time as an actor gave him important skills for a 
politician; he could follow a script, handle the public and his producers and directors 
were his advisors. His move from a New Deal Democrat to a conservative Republican 
started with his involvement as a leader of the actor’s union during the anti-communist 
period of the 1940’s. His work giving speeches to the employees of General Electric in 
the 1950’s helped him develop a conservative philosophy that became the bedrock of 
his political career. Reagan’s optimistic view of America was supported by a belief in 
small government, low taxes, increased defence spending and strident anti-
communism. One of Carter’s aides said of Reagan’s philosophy, he ‘sees the world, I 
think, very simply. His great success as a politician and public figure is that his entire 
world is testable against four or five sentences, with the result that he ‘knows what he 
believes in and he believes it, and every time you ask him a question or decision he tests 
it against that.’ 1168 A historian described Reagan’s beliefs ‘as inerasable as grooves in an 
LP.’1169 
 He rose to prominence during the 1964 Presidential election as a supporter of 
the conservative Barry Goldwater. His recorded speech ‘A Time for Choosing’ raised not 
only his profile but also $8m for his cash-strapped party that year. He gained his first 
major electoral victory in 1966 by defeating the liberal incumbent, Pat Brown, for 
Governor of California. He served two terms and proved to be a successful, pragmatic 
politician who made deals with local Democratic leaders to pass legislation on taxes and 
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welfare reform.1170 In 1976 he ran unsuccessfully against President Ford, but he gained 
enough support to damage the incumbent president in his unsuccessful campaign 
against Carter. In his 1980 campaign he was riding a rising tide of conservative support 
funded by contributions from business leaders worried about stagflation, high taxes and 
regulation. Reagan’s mantra of less government interference and lower taxation met 
their needs whilst his successful courting of the Christian right on social policy ensured 
that he quickly became the only viable conservative candidate.1171 Reagan’s acceptance 
speech in Detroit on 17 July 1980 set the tone for his campaign. He was optimistic about 
America’s ability to succeed, rejecting Carter’s rather gloomy analysis of the country’s 
troubles. He saw no malaise other than that of the president’s ‘mediocre’ leadership.1172 
Unlike Carter, Reagan left his convention on a high.  
 The 1980 election has been characterised as not only a watershed but a meeting 
of diametrically opposed politicians in terms of ideology and personality, but this was 
not entirely the case. Both candidates had a similar perspective on the effectiveness of 
government in that they saw its inefficiencies and waste and agreed on the need for 
radical reform. But whilst Carter argued that a reformed bureaucracy could and should 
be an agent for good, Reagan stated that government itself was the problem and needed 
to be dramatically cut back. There were also striking similarities between their economic 
policies. Carter’s policies of long-term commitment to deregulation, controlling 
government spending and making fighting inflation his main economic priority was very 
similar to Reagan’s economic views.  Carter’s late espousal of monetary policy and 
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increased defence spending in response to Soviet aggression would become major 
policies of the Reagan administration.1173 In addition, some of their supposed policy 
differences did not play out in practice. Reagan’s social conservatism turned out to be a 
lot less extreme than predicted, as his new-found supporters on the religious right were 
to find out. The major distinction between the candidates was not so much about 
ideology or even policy but were related to personality and political skill. Reagan was an 
optimist who saw things in simple terms both personally and politically. His belief in the 
greatness of America was total and so he refused to accept Carter’s view of any limit on 
American power, let alone the presence of a ‘malaise.’ Whereas Reagan saw life in 
simple terms, Carter saw its complexity and nuance. He studied issues carefully, 
reaching conclusions based on logic. To him complicated problems generally did not 
have simple solutions. He accepted that US power had its limits and that there were 
restrictions on what could be achieved both at home and abroad.1174 Both men had 
different political strengths which were to be highlighted on the campaign trail. Yet 
Carter’s intellectual strength and capacity for hard work did not prove to be a major 
advantage over Reagan. As Bill Moyers said about Reagan, ‘we didn’t elect this guy 
because he knows how many barrels of oil there are in Alaska. We elected him because 
we want to feel good.’1175  Reagan was known as the ‘Great Communicator’ but this was 
largely based on his ability to project a positive image on television. In face-to-face 
situations like answering questions for the press or the public he was much less 
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comfortable. Paradoxically, Carter, known as a poor communicator, was highly effective 
in interactive environments like town hall meetings and phone ins. However, the main 
communication channel that would be used in 1980 was television and Reagan both as 
a former actor and TV performer, was a master technician. His clear, simple messages 
matched by his relaxed style and self-deprecatory humour helped him win over 
audiences. Carter’s preachy and convoluted speaking style was not regarded as inspiring 
and his television image, in contrast to Reagan’s, was rather unappealing. Reagan acted 
as if he was ‘born for TV’. This was to prove a major disadvantage for Carter who faced 
a charismatic, likeable, oratorically adept candidate who enjoyed an early lead in the 
polls.   
 As president, Carter faced a different type of campaign in 1980 compared to four 
years earlier. As a virtually unknown candidate he had run an ‘insurgent’ campaign in 
1976 which was four years in the planning. He and his team worked with volunteer 
activists not state party structures. In 1980 he was president and his skill in meeting 
people on the stump would be negated by limits on his time and the security restrictions 
that were imposed on an incumbent. In addition, he had a record in office to defend 
and, like Ford in 1976, he had already fought a dangerous opponent in the primaries. 
This all took place in the middle of the hostage crisis which meant his main campaign 
strategist Jordan was unavailable.1176 Kennedy’s delay in withdrawing from the 
campaign and the battle over the Democratic platform at the convention contributed to 
the disaffection of liberals. Such divisions encouraged the third-party candidacy of John 
Anderson, who benefitted from electoral discontent with both candidates. On the 
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important policy issues of the campaign, public opinion was concerned about the 
economy, inflation and taxation but Carter did not have a good track record on any of 
them. 1177 The major advantage that an incumbent president did have was the potential 
to use the power of his office for political advantage. Unfortunately, Carter seemed 
reluctant to do this. Anne Wexler, his lead advisor on outreach, argued that Carter did 
not focus on his re-election, often seeking GOP support to get his legislation passed. 
When she mentioned the negative political consequences of such action to Carter, she 
was firmly rebuffed.1178  
To defeat Reagan, two important sources influenced the Carter campaign 
strategy, the polling data of Caddell and political advice from Jordan. The Iran hostages 
had taken Jordan away from the campaign since November 1979 but by June 1980 he 
was back working full time on Carter’s re-election. His first task was to provide Carter 
with a brief on his Republican rival. Jordan talked to Jesse Unruh and Bob Moretti, 
leading Democratic politicians in California who had dealt with Reagan as governor. 
Jordan always maintained that he had underestimated Reagan as an opponent,1179 but 
in the memorandum to Carter in June, he accurately reflected both his opponent’s 
strengths and weaknesses. He described Reagan as ‘not dumb but shrewd,’ that his 
conservative beliefs could lead him to oversimplify but that he was more moderate than 
his rhetoric. He described him as an ‘uncanny communicator’ and that ‘people hear him, 
like him and believe him.’ Jordan later warned Carter against launching personal attacks 
on Reagan as it had wounded Carter when he used this tactic against Ford in 1976. At 
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first this advice was ignored by Carter which, just as Jordan had predicted, harmed his 
campaign. Carter may have done this in reaction to another part of the same Jordan 
memorandum. This stated that Reagan had a mean temper which although he had kept 
under control, would damage him if that became public knowledge. If Carter’s personal 
attacks had been an attempt to provoke Reagan, it proved misguided. 1180  
Jordan’s follow-up memorandum later that month outlined the damage that the 
Kennedy campaign had inflicted on Carter’s image and the negative perception of his 
administration, particularly amongst liberals. Jordan feared that there was a risk that 
liberal voters would switch to John Anderson. Also, at state level, he argued that the 
primary battles had divided the party in key states like Pennsylvania and New York. He 
believed that the electorate’s pessimism, highlighted in Caddell’s polling, meant that the 
public believed America’s problems were unfixable and that there was very little 
difference between the candidates.1181 Jordan, supported by Rafshoon and Caddell, 
argued for a low-profile, defensive campaign to continue until the Democratic 
Convention in August. He wanted to keep Carter out of the media glare and allow the 
press and Carter’s surrogates to focus just on Reagan. Then, after receiving the expected 
positive poll ‘bounce’ from the Democratic Convention, he recommended that the 
White House run a more positive campaign highlighting a clear choice between 
candidates, both in terms of Carter’s vision for the future and the dangers presented by 
Reagan’s policies.1182 This approach was not universally supported in the White House. 
Many of the domestic policy team, Eizenstat included, feared that the initial low-key 
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approach would not generate the sort of press coverage that the president required. 
Caddell projected in July 1980 that Reagan could have a 20-25-point lead in the polls 
after the GOP convention. Dave Rubenstein of the domestic policy team was concerned 
that the low profile and the expected post-convention ‘bounce’ would not be enough to 
close this gap in the polls given Carter’s poor ratings.1183 Carter’s aide Hedley Donovan 
argued that the ‘Rose Garden’ strategy encouraged a bunker mentality with the press 
ignoring good White House news stories and focussing on the bad.1184 
 Carter held healthy leads in the polls over Kennedy and Reagan in January 1980, 
but these had been reversed by July.1185 Jordan emphasised that, ‘Our worst fear all 
along had been that the race would ultimately become a referendum on Carter’s 
presidency instead of a choice between him and Reagan.’1186 Carter was not able to stay 
out of the headlines as a series of events forced him to be personally involved in the 
campaign. A scandal involving his younger brother Billy’s dealings with and travels to 
Libya prompted an independent investigation by the Justice Department. This 
compelled Carter to endure six weeks of hostile media questioning, including ‘how do 
you think you got into this big mess?’1187 Carter eventually dealt with all the issues 
arising from the investigation, but it proved to be a major distraction and damaged his 
image. A further round of OPEC oil price increases triggered another energy crisis that 
summer. This harmed the president’s reputation for competence as many of his 
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legislative proposals on energy that had been recommended a year earlier had still not 
passed Congress. The divisive Democratic primary campaign enabled the Republicans to 
utilise Kennedy’s campaign rhetoric of ‘no more Jimmy Carter’ in television adverts 
targeted at Democratic voters.1188 Jordan had assumed that a low presidential profile 
would encourage the press to scrutinise Reagan’s mistakes on the campaign trail, but he 
made very few. Errors such as an early speech defending state’s rights in Neshoba, 
Mississippi, near the location where three civil rights Freedom Summer campaigners 
were murdered and later describing the Vietnam War as a ‘noble cause,’ both called into 
question Reagan’s judgement. However, in general his campaign was disciplined and 
well run.1189 Reagan was also highly effective in courting the evangelical movement, 
culminating in his speech in Dallas on 22 August 1980 which led to an endorsement from 
Jerry Falwell.1190 Such was Reagan’s success in exploiting the anger of religious groups 
with Carter’s social policies that the Carter campaign were forced to respond with a 
television advert that reminded the public of the president’s deep personal faith.1191 
Carter’s ability to affect policy and govern during the long campaign was never 
more critical than with his handling of the economy. The Carter administration’s 
economic policy was in disarray by 1980. Historian Burton Kaufman described the 
president’s economic team as having ‘a bankruptcy of ideas rather than a concerted 
programme for dealing with a problem that threatened to consume the 
administration.’1192 Carter’s long-term commitment to a balanced budget prevented 
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him from deploying the traditional Democratic Party policies for managing a deficit. 
Carter’s credibility on fiscal restraint was damaged by the proposed $12bn increase in 
spending agreed at the Democratic Convention to fight recession and unemployment. 
His attempts to weave this into a coherent programme that would win public support 
were further hampered by the failure of his administration’s policy to curb inflation. The 
launch of the Carter administration’s fourth anti-inflation policy in March 1980 had been 
met with cynicism from reporters.1193 The White House was attempting, yet again, to 
control the wage price spiral without formal controls. The administration’s only effective 
tool to curb inflation was in the hands of the Federal Reserve and its new Chair, Paul 
Volcker. His control of money supply and interest rates did manage to bring down 
inflation to nearer 12 percent, but high interest rates militated against any feel-good 
factor in the country as economists became increasingly concerned about recession. 
Volcker was able to ease interest rates during the summer but in early October 1980 
Schultz, warned Carter of new interest rate increases later that month due to mortgage 
and oil price increases.1194 By the time of the election in early November, interest rates 
had reached nearly 20 percent, inflation stood at 13 percent and unemployment at 7.5 
percent. These were the worst election indicators that an incumbent president had 
faced in an election since Herbert Hoover in 1932. 1195  
There were opportunities for Carter to use his office to direct economic policy 
for political gain. Alonzo McDonald argued that Carter did have the political antennae 
to sense such prospects, but he always wanted to do the right thing. McDonald quoted 
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an occasion when Carter rejected a concession on energy for the Pennsylvanian steel 
industry, just before that state’s primary election, even though it was supported by the 
Justice and Treasury departments.1196  This approach was reinforced by Carter’s 
response to the pressure he faced in the summer of 1980 to submit a tax cut to Congress. 
The economic benefits of a major tax cut had long been the policy of the Republican 
Party but to Reagan it had become the major component of his campaign. Reagan had 
co-opted a Republican tax initiative in Congress, the Kemp-Roth bill, and promised to 
implement this on taking office. There was pressure from within the Democratic Party 
for Carter to respond with his own tax-cut proposals. This came from both conservatives 
and even from liberals like Ted Kennedy.1197 There was an expectation that as an 
incumbent president, he would pass tax cuts to help his party win re-election. Carter, 
however, refused to do so as he did not believe that it was right for the economy 
whatever the political benefits. He told Miller, ‘I just cannot flip-flop’ on taxes. 1198 He 
believed that a tax cut, whilst popular, was irresponsible and would necessitate a 40 
percent cut in non-defence government spending.1199 Carter continued to argue against 
the GOP proposed tax cut during the election and it became one of the major differences 
between himself and Reagan on the campaign trail. He argued for a more modest tax 
cut as part of his revitalisation programme with half of the benefit going on investment 
(as opposed to 10 percent in Reagan’s proposals). As a result, the Reagan-Kemp-Roth 
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tax plan with its focus on a cut in personal taxation would be inflationary whilst the 
president’s plan would reduce inflation.1200    
 The main parties’ economic platforms had some strong similarities, especially on 
issues such as deregulation and fiscal restraint. Carter’s description of Reagan’s 
economic policies as ‘Voodoo Economics,’ a slogan coined by George Bush, his opponent 
in the primaries, now running mate, did result in the Reagan campaign dropping several 
of its economic proposals. But Reagan still argued for a massive tax cut to revitalise the 
economy. Carter campaigned consistently against this and was supported by cogent 
economic arguments about the negative effects of a tax cut on inflation, the deficit and 
investment.1201 Although the tax cut remained the signature economic policy of Reagan 
it was not very popular with the electorate. The polls in July 1980 had Reagan 
considerably ahead of Carter (83-14) on economic issues, but the public were 53-43 in 
favour of Carter on the question of the tax cut.1202 The administration’s revitalisation 
plan was a response to public dissatisfaction with the economy. Carter’s plan would add 
$5.7bn to the 1981 budget, but journalist Elizabeth Drew said of Carter’s failure to 
communicate his proposal, ‘he doesn’t seem able to implant it in the national 
consciousness.’  Eizenstat was even harsher in his judgement on the campaign’s 
economic proposals: ‘We presented no attractive new alternative only thin gruel and 
more of the same.‘ 1203 To many, the programme did not seem credible given the 
president’s fiscal conservatism, and whilst there was no doubting Reagan’s absolute 
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belief in his proposed tax cut, Carter appeared to lack the same degree of conviction for 
his own economic proposals.1204  
Carter’s frustration over his campaign’s inability to get his message across led to 
a serious error of judgement that damaged his standing with the electorate. During 
1980, even in polls where Carter was not viewed favourably, 83 percent still believed 
that he was a man of moral principles.1205  The White House campaign, in seeking to 
highlight Reagan’s perceived weaknesses, had relied upon political surrogates, 
particularly the vice president, to attack those weaknesses. The campaign focussed on 
Reagan’s perceived inability to grasp complex issues, claiming that he proposed 
simplistic solutions to difficult problems and too often ‘shoots from the hip.’1206 
However, Carter’s advisors complained that such speeches were not receiving fair 
coverage in the media. This was not necessarily due to bias but the media’s difficulty in 
covering simultaneously three presidential candidates.1207 Despite earlier warnings from 
Jordan over the failure of similar tactics in 1976,1208 Carter, supported by Caddell, 
personally attacked Reagan in three important speeches. In Atlanta on 16 September he 
came close to accusing him of being a racial bigot.1209 At a labour conference in California 
on 22 September he argued that the election was a decision between war and peace, 
thus suggesting that Reagan would take America into war.1210 Finally, at a Democratic 
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fundraiser in Chicago on 6 October he argued that Reagan would be divisive and that if 
Carter lost the election ‘Americans might be separated black from white, Jew from 
Christian, North from South, rural from urban.’1211 The media heavily criticised these 
speeches.1212 Carter later argued that the press took these attacks out of context 1213 
but they damaged his public image as a moral man. The Reagan campaign responded 
with a television advertisement featuring Nancy Reagan defending her husband, and 
accusations of ‘meanness’ forced Carter in a TV interview with Barbara Walters to 
promise to tone down his remarks.1214 
 Another issue that Carter had to deal with during the campaign was press 
cynicism over his attempts to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis. He faced accusations as 
early as April 1980 from Kennedy that he was using announcements on the hostages for 
political purposes.1215 The press, already wary of being manipulated by Rafshoon’s 
communications tactics in 1978, hinted that a hostage release would be stage managed 
by the White House.1216 McDonald argued that every television network believed that 
Carter’s Rose Garden strategy was not a method to help deal with the hostages but a 
political tactic. The public shared this view. A poll on 30 September showed an increase 
from 19 to 44 percent of people who believed that Carter would manipulate the hostage 
crisis for political gain.1217 The press continued to build expectations of a hostage release 
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as Election Day approached.1218 The problem was further complicated for Carter by signs 
in September of a serious attempt by some in the Iranian regime to negotiate a 
settlement. Unfortunately for the White House this gave rise to a series of failed 
negotiations that continued right up until Election Day. Carter therefore was faced with 
the worst of both worlds. The media portrayed him as either a cynic manipulating the 
release of the hostages for political gain or as a weak president unable to secure their 
release.  
Despite these difficulties, the polls showed that Carter was gaining ground on 
Reagan. The White House message to the public that whatever Carter’s difficulties he 
remained the safe choice in comparison with Reagan was gaining some traction. So, 
despite having low job approval, the polls indicated that by 9 October the gap with 
Reagan had closed to just four points, 43-39.1219 It was Carter’s belief that in a televised 
debate with Reagan his superior ability and experience would enable him to overtake 
his opponent. Unable to agree on three debates as he had wanted, Carter had to settle 
for the one. This took place on 28 October in Cleveland, Ohio. As incumbent, Carter had 
not only to ‘win’ the debate but be seen to ‘win’ it. He sought to identify his opponent 
with a dangerous future but without appearing shrill or exaggerating the risks of a 
Reagan presidency.1220 He argued that Reagan was outside the mainstream of the 
Republican party and his attitude to nuclear arms control was dangerous. He also 
emphasised the complexity of the office and, by implication, his own experience. ‘I’ve 
had to make thousands of decisions, and each one of those decisions has been a learning 
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process.’ He was mainly on the defensive on his economic record, particularly high 
inflation, but did attack Reagan’s proposals for tax cuts claiming they would be 
inflationary. He did promote his economic programme and argued that he had created 
nine million jobs whilst in office. 1221 He was more positive in promoting his energy 
policy, highlighting the administration’s success in conservation.1222 The debate was 
watched by 80.6 million Americans, a record which lasted until the Hillary Clinton-
Donald Trump debates of 2016. Reagan was very well prepared, having debated John 
Anderson the previous month and by acquiring leaked copies of Carter’s briefing books 
for the debate. He handled detailed questions well, stood up to pressure and always 
remained calm and affable. In their closing statements Carter argued for his experience 
whilst Reagan focussed on the president’s record by asking Americans whether, since 
Carter’s election, they felt better off and more secure.1223  This was a telling intervention 
as it directed the public to examine Carter’s record in office. In his diaries Carter 
reluctantly admitted that Reagan had done better even though Carter felt that he had 
won all the key arguments.1224  
 After the debate, the White House focussed more on promoting Carter’s 
programme for the future. The campaign sought to contradict Republican 
advertisements which suggested that Carter was a do-nothing president and to 
emphasise those Reagan policies that he was already implementing such as increased 
military spending and deregulation.1225 Whilst Carter continued to argue that Reagan 
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was a man unsuited to the office, he also tried to promote his economic revitalisation 
programme with an emphasis on investment, job creation and reduced inflation. He 
argued that his programme would reap the rewards of the tough decisions that had 
been made during his presidency.1226 In his later speeches he sought to shore up his 
support in the Democratic Party by focussing on traditional Democratic audiences such 
as labour and the minorities.1227 To black leaders in Atlanta, Carter emphasised his 
administration’s help for the poor through energy policy and job creation (1.3 million 
additional black jobs).1228  On Labor Day his remarks focussed on  the work of the 
Economic Revitalisation Board, labor law reform, urban renewal and job creation 
programmes.1229 Carter’s main problem remained that he could not promote his 
domestic policy as a major success and continually had to fall back on a critique of 
Reagan’s policies. White House criticism of Reagan’s plans on tax or energy for example 
were framed in terms of why they would not work, rather than being contrasted with 
Carter’s own plans. The most telling indicator of where the Carter campaign team 
believed his strength lay was in their choice of television adverts. Most of the one-
minute adverts emphasised foreign policy and Carter’s experience, his role as 
peacemaker and the absence of war on his watch. In one advertisement Carter’s military 
service was even highlighted, something that he did not emphasise in 1976.1230 Carter’s 
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message to the American people on domestic policy was a negative one; it was that 
there were no easy answers to their problems and Reagan would make matters worse.  
The final days before the election saw the hostage crisis again take centre stage 
with the suggestion of new terms from Tehran raising hopes of breakthrough. This 
proved to be a false alarm. Carter had to go on television two days before the election 
to deny that there was any deal.1231 On the Monday before Election Day, the front page 
of every local newspaper showed Iranian students trashing the American seal at the 
embassy in Tehran. This visual reminder of his administration’s impotence was 
extremely damaging to the president.1232 Carter himself noted the symbolic importance 
of Election Day being the anniversary of the taking of the first hostage.1233  
 Both candidates elicited high negative feelings from the public with the result 
that many voters made their decision very late. It was in the period between 1 and 4 
November that Reagan dramatically increased his lead over Carter as most undecided 
voters opted for the Republican candidate.1234 On 4 November 1980 Carter suffered the 
worst defeat for an incumbent president since Herbert Hoover in 1932. Reagan won 44 
states, prevailing in the electoral college 489-49. He won the popular vote 51-41 
percent, with Anderson gaining 6.6 percent. Reagan, unlike Carter in 1976, had 
‘coattails’ with his party gaining 33 seats in the House and 12 in the Senate which 
resulted in a GOP majority for the first time since 1954. Republicans also gained four 
governorships and five state legislatures.1235 Post-election polling confirmed that there 
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was a late swing against Carter on all the main policy issues, and he lost support in all 
voter groups except non-whites.1236 In addition a Harris poll found that those who 
believed that the best government was one that governed least, a core Reagan message, 
had increased from one third in 1974 to three fifths in 1980.1237 Polls also showed that 
the result was less of a victory for Reagan and the GOP than a rejection of Carter and 
the Democrats. A Time magazine poll found that 63 percent of voters said they voted to 
reject Carter and only 25 percent saw it as a mandate for more conservative policies. 
Barely one in four voters supported Reagan in the ideological sense.1238 A measure of 
the lasting strength of the negative reaction to Carter was Reagan’s successful use of 
anti-Carter rhetoric in his presidential campaign against Mondale four years later.1239 
Carter, in public at least, was non-committal as to the reasons why he believed 
he had lost. He acknowledged, however, that his drop in the polls just before Election 
Day may have been due to the last-minute dashed hopes of the hostage release. When 
pressed, he accepted that the Kennedy challenge had ‘crippled him’ with core 
constituencies.1240  When talking to Jordan two months after his defeat, Carter was more 
forthcoming. He described 1980 as ‘pure hell, the Kennedy challenge, Afghanistan, 
having to put the SALT treaty on the shelf, the recession, Ronald Reagan and the 
hostages... always the hostages! It was one crisis after another.’1241 The idea that the 
1980 result was somehow certain has been promoted by authors like Skowronek.1242 He 
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argued that Carter’s defeat was inevitable as he was ideologically out of step with the 
conservative mood of the country, and therefore in trying to find moderate solutions he 
found himself attacked by both conservatives and liberals. However, the assumption 
that 1980 was a conservative landslide was not borne out by the figures. The electoral 
returns saw a two percent drop in turnout and the Democrats lost more votes than the 
Republicans gained.1243 Jordan did not accept that the election was a conservative 
watershed, arguing that ‘it was not an ideological tidal wave; it was instead an 
expression of frustration with the Democratic Party and doubt that it could provide 
solutions to America’s problems.’1244 The electorate was not conservative and even 
strongly liberal on some social issues. It followed therefore, in ideological terms, that 
promoting the middle ground could have been a winning strategy. Carter could have 
tried to use the Democratic Party as a vehicle for such a centrist strategy but, as he 
acknowledged, the party was ‘never his’, and the Kennedy challenge sapped 5-6 percent 
of that vote away from him.1245  
If Carter’s defeat was not ‘inevitable’ what were the factors that contributed to 
his failure? The hostages appear to have been in the minds of White House staff. Aide 
Tim Kraft complained that the money spent on a largely ineffective media campaign 
would have been better used on ‘two more helicopters in Iran’ for the abortive rescue 
mission.1246 In separate interviews in 1986 and 1997, Carter endorsed the view that if 
the hostages had been released he would have won. He also spoke of general press 
                                                          
1243 Kaufman and Kaufman, Presidency of James Earl Carter, pp. 244-5 and Ranney, Elections of 
1980, 216-17.  
1244Jordan, Crisis, 378. 
1245 George C Edwards, ‘Exclusive Interview: President Jimmy Carter’,1-13. 
1246 Rafshoon Interview, Miller Center, 52. 
309 
 
cynicism and the television news broadcasts of Walter Cronkite and Ted Koppel. They 
highlighted in every broadcast the length of time the hostages had been held whilst 
questioning the administration’s motives in seeking their release.1247 Rafshoon found 
that the hostage crisis (444 days) received more television coverage than the US 
involvement in the Vietnam War (ten years). 1248 Carter did receive public support for 
his handling of this crisis and it certainly benefitted him early in his campaign against 
Kennedy. However, the stalled negotiations in early November 1980 were a further 
reminder to the American public of Carter’s failure to secure their release, and this 
almost certainly widened the margin of Reagan’s victory. But it should be noted that 
Reagan himself believed that the hostages were not the main factor in his success and 
that their release would not have changed the result.  
 Another important factor in Carter’s defeat was the ineffectiveness of his 
campaign. Unlike in 1976, the 1980 campaign did not have the benefit of Jordan’s 
detailed planning. Although Jordan’s absence was attributed  to the hostage crisis, 
advisors like Lance argued that the White House and Jordan should have been actively 
planning for 1980 as soon as Carter took office.1249 Jordan admitted that he was 
distracted by Iran but argued that his increased involvement would not have affected 
the result.1250 However, there were mistakes made by the White House that contributed 
to the president’s defeat. Carter’s fundamental problem was that he did not have a 
positive record in office to sell to the electorate and so he was always going to be on the 
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defensive unless he could focus the election on Reagan himself. A major error was 
Carter’s decision to make personal attacks on Reagan to demonise him. This failed and 
only damaged Carter’s image as a moral leader. Whereas in 1976 he stood on his good 
character, in 1980 he was being painted as mean, remote and indifferent. To win Carter 
had to convince the electorate that not only was Reagan a threat domestically and 
abroad but that his vision for a better future was less compelling than his own. In his 
convention speech, Carter summarised his problem. He argued that presidents must 
look to the long term and hence ‘sometimes ask for sacrifice when the listeners would 
rather hear the promise of comfort.’ 1251 Rafshoon argued that the president needed to 
portray ‘hope’.1252 Carter attempted in the run up to the election to create a programme 
for long-term change. The Commission for National Agenda for the Eighties established 
a programme modelled on a similar initiative under Eisenhower. Although its final report 
was not produced until December 1980, it was evident by August of that year that any 
hopes Carter had of reaching a consensus on a wide range of national issues that could 
be used in his campaign were to be dashed by sectional and interest group dissent.1253 
Reagan’s success in building an early lead in the polls forced Carter to rely on the more 
liberal elements of the party and resulted in a liberal platform being foisted on him. This 
included an economic plan which was seen as too liberal for Carter and the electorate. 
His attempts to explain this programme lacked the conviction, clarity and the simple 
optimism of Reagan’s message. Hence the public was often confused and even bored 
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with Carter’s vision for future prosperity, and liberals were unconvinced whether Carter, 
if elected, would really implement such a programme.   
 The Jimmy Carter of 1980 portrayed himself as the same character who had run 
in 1976 but had now, as president, gained experience. But the public remained confused 
about his ideology and in 1980 he had a record to defend which was vulnerable to attack 
from his opponents. He therefore needed even more of the support of a liberal 
Democratic Party than he did in 1976. His basic approach to politics had not changed. 
His political competitiveness, which resulted in personal attacks on Reagan, was not a 
new phenomenon; he had been equally harsh on Ford in 1976 and Carl Sanders in 1970. 
His approach to the nation’s problems also remained unchanged. He continued to 
articulate the complexity of issues and the need for sacrifice. This may have struck a 
chord with the public in 1976 but by 1980 they longed for a simpler, more optimistic 
vision for the future. This was something that Carter, with his engineering background 
and his ‘preachy’ style, was unable to provide.   
 The critical factor in the campaign for his opponents was Carter’s leadership as 
president, particularly on the economy. Reagan’s comment at the end of the televised 
debate about whether the public felt better off under Carter 1254 drew attention to the 
administration’s poor economic performance since taking office. Unemployment was 
higher (7.6 v 7.0 percent), interest rates were higher (15.3 v 6.4 percent) and above all 
inflation was higher (12.5 v 5.8 percent).1255 Polling data from Gallup suggested that the 
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reasons for voting were mainly economic, especially concern about inflation.1256 This 
coupled with the president’s failure to bring home the hostages put the White House on 
the back foot for most of the campaign. The Carter of 1976 promised to make 
government work, but the electorate saw little evidence of this. His campaign tried to 
focus on Reagan’s weaknesses and his own good character and experience. But it soon 
became reliant upon the electorate’s pessimism that no-one in office could fix the 
country’s problems and perhaps Carter was the safer option. This was a high-risk 
strategy as voter apathy could easily change to discontent with unhappy voters opting 
for change.1257  
  The economic gloom added to the atmosphere of negativity that pervaded 
Carter’s presidency following his ‘malaise’ speech in July 1979. The continuing hostage 
crisis added to this general pessimism. The wrecking of the US embassy’s seal in the final 
days of the election highlighted Carter’s perceived lack of leadership and became a 
symbol of his failure. Reagan ran an effective campaign with few mistakes and gave a 
masterful performance in the TV debate. The focus on Carter’s record resulted in the 
electorate deciding that Reagan’s more positive message was a risk worth taking. The 
perception of Carter as a good man doing his best was no longer enough. As a result, 
their rejection of the Carter presidency was comprehensive. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1256 Ranney, Elections in 1980, 227. 
1257 Jordan, Crisis, 34 -39. 
313 
 
    Chapter Eight 
      Conclusion  
 
 Jimmy Carter’s comprehensive election defeat in November 1980 was a bitter 
blow for any politician to take, particularly as it was against an opponent who appeared 
to be diametrically opposed to everything Carter stood for. His relationship with Reagan 
after the election was not helped by a tense transition meeting at which Carter felt 
(perhaps incorrectly) that Reagan was not paying attention to the detailed briefing he 
was giving. As Reagan built his team for what promised to be a conservative ‘revolution’, 
Carter’s final State of the Union message to Congress was a forty-page self-justification 
of his policies.1258 During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, Carter’s post-presidency was 
marked politically by major Democratic politicians trying to avoid being associated with 
what was widely regarded as a failed presidency. Walter Mondale, standing in 1984 
against Reagan, was linked by the GOP campaign with Carter’s economic failures. Bill 
Clinton, despite being elected in 1992, was reluctant to hire ‘Carter re-treads’1259 even 
when their experience would have been helpful. As president, Clinton often found 
himself being compared to Carter when his policies were seen to have failed. 1260 It was 
during the 1990s, however, that media focus moved away from Carter’s ‘failed’ 
presidency to his actions as a private citizen. Initially it was activities such as working as 
a volunteer carpenter building houses for the poor as part of Habitats for Humanity, a 
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non-profit Christian organisation, that were highlighted. The press contrasted this with 
ex-President Reagan who was earning $2 million on speaking tours in Japan.1261 A more 
positive profile was also helped by the Clinton administration’s use of Carter’s mediation 
skills in Haiti and North Korea in 1994. These missions made use of Carter’s diplomatic 
strengths. A journalist described him as being able to ‘deal regularly with inhabitants of 
godforsaken villages and renegade leaders whom American officials ordinarily refuse to 
touch.’1262 Underpinning this new positive image of Carter was the work of the Carter 
Center. Founded by Carter and his wife in partnership with Emory University in Atlanta, 
this organisation’s remit was ‘to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and 
democracy, and improve health.’1263 Over the years the Center has established 
programmes to eradicate diseases such as guinea worm and river blindness, as well as 
immunization campaigns. In addition, Carter has been involved in mediating disputes 
and supervising elections in countries all over the world. He has also spoken out 
increasingly on women’s rights, leaving his own church, the Southern Baptist 
Convention, in October 2000 over the issue and establishing a Women’s Forum in 
February 2015.1264 Carter received recognition for his work in October 2002 when he 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Thirty-seven years after he left the White House, 
Jimmy Carter is now receiving the public recognition for not only the work of the Carter 
Center but for his personal qualities and character on many of the issues he campaigned 
for in 1976. This new-found respect as both a private citizen has not been followed by 
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positive public recognition of his presidency. The conservative press has continued to 
use the image of Carter as a failed president to criticise his Democratic successors.1265 
 The view of Carter as a failed President is partly rooted in his electoral defeat in 
1980 and the subsequent success of Reagan but it is also based on the perceived 
‘failures’ of his policies. Carter created an expectation that his administration would not 
only be competent but would make substantial reforms. In his inaugural address he did 
try to dampen expectation by saying that, ‘We cannot afford to do everything,’1266 but 
his inability to prioritise greatly hampered his legislative programme. On the critical 
issue of the economy his administration failed to deliver any substantial improvements. 
His 1977 stimulus package did help the poor initially but the population in poverty grew 
from 11.4 to 15 percent during 1978-80. However, it was his failure to control inflation 
that cost him dearly in the 1980 election. Carter tried to persuade the American public 
of the value of his numerous anti-inflation initiatives but to no avail. It was his 
appointment of Volcker to head the Federal Reserve that did result in bringing inflation 
under control. However, this was at the cost of recession that damaged Carter in the 
1980 election. Carter’s public commitment to balance the budget was also a failure as 
the impact of a recalcitrant Congress, oil price rises, and the Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan made this objective impossible. The one economic programme that Carter 
was publicly committed to was tax reform but again the eventual legislation passed 
proved to be a victory for congressional conservatives as it failed in the main to remove 
few of the tax loopholes and delivered a tax cut that mainly benefitted the well off.  
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Carter’s energy policy was an example of his administration attempting to pass 
comprehensive legislation that addressed a complex problem facing the country. This 
demonstrated the scope of Carter’s ambition but also his naivety in expecting such a 
complicated bill to pass without amendment. The final legislation was a significant step 
forward for energy conservation and in establishing a new Department of Energy, but it 
did not measure up to the expectations set by Carter. It also demonstrated Carter’s 
inability to persuade the American public of the seriousness of the problem in contrast 
with Reagan’s success in convincing voters that government should not be interfering 
with the energy market.  
Carter was equally unsuccessful in his goal of reforming healthcare and welfare 
as both bills never got out of committee stage. The complexity of these issues was 
matched only by the strength of the opposition from both wings of his own party. The 
failure of Carter’s Health bill would prove to be damaging to his chances of re-election 
as it provoked a major split with the liberal wing of his party. There was legislation that 
Carter did successfully steer through Congress, such as government reform, 
deregulation and Social Security reform, but none of these, whilst important, had a high 
public profile. However, there was one major area of policy where Carter was successful 
and that was on the environment. His administration passed a raft of legislation that 
reinforced environmental safeguards such as the Clean Air and Water Acts, 
strengthened the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and established a national 
environmental compensation scheme. Carter’s signature legislation was the Alaskan 
Lands Act passed just before he left office. Many of Carter’s environmental policies were 
overturned by his successor but Carter’s Alaskan legislation, which protected over 157 
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million acres of land, would stand as a legacy of his administration’s environmental 
credentials. In some ways Carter’s legislative record can be regarded as credible, 
particularly given the parlous state of the economy and divisions in Congress, but not 
when measured against the goals he publicly set himself.         
The historiography on Jimmy Carter’s administration has been mainly negative. 
A case in point is the conclusion of Burton and Scott Kaufman: 
‘The events of his four years in office project an image to the American people 
of a hapless administration in disarray and a Presidency that was increasingly 
divided, lacking in leadership, ineffective in dealing with Congress, incapable of 
defending American honour abroad and uncertain about its purpose, priorities 
and sense of direction.’ 1267 
Where he has received plaudits on his policies, it has been largely on foreign policy, 
specifically the Camp David agreement and the Panama Canal Treaty. Early writers like 
Haynes Johnson and Barbara Kellerman commented on Carter’s failure of leadership. 
The Kaufmans and Betty Glad have emphasised his lack of skills, particularly his inability 
to articulate a vision, establish a coherent agenda and broker deals with Congress. This 
view of Carter implied that given the right political actions, it was possible for a more 
adroit president to steer a successful path between conservative and liberal viewpoints. 
Revisionist writers such as John Dumbrell and Julian Zelizer, whilst acknowledging 
Carter’s skills deficit, have argued that he had major successes despite the highly 
unfavourable circumstances. The most recent autobiography by Stuart Eizenstat has 
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supported that view. Some historians have referred to Skowronek in justifying Carter’s 
difficulties in gaining support. They have argued that Carter was a Democratic president 
at a time when the hegemony of liberal ideas was being replaced by a new 
conservativism led by Ronald Reagan. Later biographers of Carter, notably Douglas 
Brinkley, focussed not on his presidency but his character and his actions after 1980. 
This more favourable view of Carter in the 1990s has been influenced not only by his 
policies but a criticism of Reagan’s actions over the Iran-Contra affair and scandals in Bill 
Clinton’s personal life.  
The difficulty with the argument made by earlier historians is that whilst there is 
strong evidence to support criticism of Carter’s leadership style and tactics, the idea that 
a middle way was possible with a more effective leader does not stand up to scrutiny. 
Carter’s mishandling of his relationship with Senator Long, for example, did damage his 
legislative strategy but it was doubtful whether given Long’s views on taxation it would 
have changed the fate of his administration’s Tax Reform bill. The assumption that 
Carter was attempting to steer an ideological path between liberal and conservative 
factions assumed that he saw politics in ideological terms, but he always denied this and 
there is little evidence in his behaviour as president to support such an argument. The 
concept of Carter as a transitional president and therefore having restricted options has 
some merit but the evidence of the 1980 election did not show the dawning of a new 
conservative era as the electorate was still supporting liberal solutions on social policies 
such as welfare and abortion. There is strong evidence to support the arguments of 
Erwin Hargrove in Jimmy Carter as President and Charles Jones in Trustee President that 
fundamentally Carter was non-ideological, dealing with each policy on its merits. Carter 
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believed that the president represented all the American people, in line with Jones’s 
concept of a ‘Trustee President’.1268  This was reinforced by Carter’s belief that as 
president he better represented the public good than both interest groups and even 
members of Congress. His early communication strategy of town hall meetings and radio 
phone-ins supports a ‘Trustee’ approach; however, it should be noted that the 
administration’s strategy of reaching out directly to the public, known as the ‘People 
Programme’, was largely abandoned by the end of 1978. Carter believed that no matter 
how complex the problem there was a solution that could transcend ‘normal’ politics 
and gain public support. He was as president dedicated to delivering a solution on policy 
that was comprehensive, simple and easy to sell to the public. It often resulted in Carter 
attempting to integrate opposite views on policy rather than transcend them, but this 
approach, with its focus on solutions, was consistent with Hargrove’s concept of Carter 
being a ‘policy politician.’1269 The consensus amongst historians that the Carter 
administration was unsuccessful, due in part to his personal failings, is sound given his 
record as president. However, the argument that a more effective leader could have 
created a path between competing ideologies is not supported by any strong evidence 
and appears to be based on a misunderstanding of both Carter’s ideology and character.   
In many ways Carter was a misunderstood president, and this was caused by 
confusion over the question of his ideology. In the 1976 election Carter argued that he 
was neither conservative nor liberal, and that he took policy positions that ‘to me are 
fair and rational.’ 1270 As president he saw policy issues in technical terms and perceived 
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his role as ensuring that ‘a good process open and comprehensive would provide wide 
ranging policy options, the best of which would prevail on the strengths of their merits.’ 
1271   To Carter the process of study and rational argument with experts, not interest 
groups, to enable him to provide the best solution was more important than ideology. 
To many politicians facing a national audience, the straddling of the ideological divide 
by taking a neutral stance was often used as a tactic to increase support, but with Carter 
this was a core belief. It followed, therefore, that despite some similarities in terms of 
policies, it would be a mistake to regard him as an early New Democrat as suggested 
most recently by Eizenstat.1272 The concept of a ‘middle way’ between competing liberal 
and conservative ideologies simply did not fit with his total focus on establishing the 
right solutions to complex problems. To a president trained in engineering there was no 
such thing as a ‘third way’ only the right way. The difficulty for Carter was that although 
he was clear about his non-ideological stance, this did not prevent other politicians, 
journalists and historians from trying to ‘label’ him both during the 1976 campaign and 
subsequently in office.  
 To the press and the public Carter was an enigma, and so during the 1976 
campaign he was criticised for being all things to all men. His attempt to deal with this 
perception of ‘fuzziness’ on issues prompted his interview in Playboy 1976. Attempts to 
frame him ideologically against perceived policy stances often resulted in confusion. A 
good example of this was on Civil Rights. Carter’s inaugural speech as governor of 
Georgia announced the ‘end of segregation,’ and appeared to northern politicians to 
introduce a new liberal politician from the south to the national stage. Carter may have 
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seemed to signify radical change - he certainly was not a George Wallace - but his speech 
merely confirmed the new realities for the South. His presidency did not bring any major 
changes in legislation or reform other than positively enforcing the law. Despite this 
approach, as his presidency developed disputes over policy increasingly took on an 
ideological tone. Issues like healthcare and taxation were bellwether policies for liberals 
and conservatives respectively, with the Carter administration caught in the middle 
trying to appeal to a shrinking centre over the heads of both parties and interest groups. 
Historians and former White House staff remain divided on Carter’s ideology with a 
range of labels being associated with his presidency from conservative to liberal, 
populist, neo-liberal Democrat, New Democrat and even conservative liberal.’1273 The 
need to define Carter ideologically has resulted in him being linked with the New 
Democrats of the 1990s. This was an attempt by members of the Democratic Party to 
frame policy that responded to a more conservative electorate. Some of Carter’s policies 
certainly reflect this, his fiscal conservativism in conjunction with being socially liberal. 
However, Carter did not have an ideological template to make any policy decision. He 
saw policy only in terms of technical effectiveness and it being in line with his personal 
moral compass.  
 Carter’s non-ideological stance did not preclude him supporting some policies 
that could be ideologically labelled or from taking into account trends in public opinion. 
The strategic direction of his economic policy may have shifted in his early presidency, 
but he could be described as a fiscal conservative. Equally he maintained a consistently 
liberal stance on issues such as women’s rights, protecting the environment and, 
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internationally, on human rights. He recognised the conservative trend in the electorate 
on issues such as the need for a strong military and dissatisfaction with government 
inefficiency. This would often make him more comfortable with conservative members 
of congress than liberals, even though it was the latter who voted for him more 
frequently.1274 The major difficulty for Carter was that the Democratic Party had become 
more liberal and the party platforms in 1976 and particularly in 1980 did not fully reflect 
his own views.    
The consequence of Carter’s non-ideological stance was that he became 
increasingly isolated from the ideological ‘tides’ that were polarising America in the 
1970’s. Many of the social movements that supported him in 1976 had by 1980 become 
radicalised. He did not understand the depth of ideological conflict. Carter’s chief 
weakness, as one historian put it, ‘seems to have been an inability to appreciate the 
seriousness of the contradictions that confronted him, a belief that all good things must 
be compatible.’1275 To Carter, Phyllis Schlafly and Bella Abzug’s rhetoric were equally 
incomprehensible.  Nowhere was this demonstrated more than in his dealings with the 
religious right. He could not accept that this group were now a political force with strong 
conservative views. Their expectations of Carter as president were based on his ‘born 
again’ credentials but he refused to base his policies on their ideology. Carter’s 
consistent refusal to stake out an ideological position led many to misunderstand his 
views and resulted in their disappointment and often anger. The desertion of a number 
of liberal voters to Anderson and evangelicals to Reagan in the 1980 election were good 
examples of this phenomenon. Carter’s failure to recognise the political dangers of 
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ideological conflict and what was to become his untenable position in a fast-shrinking 
political centre contributed to his defeat in 1980. A possible solution to this problem 
could have been found if Carter had mapped out a coherent vision for the future that 
linked all his policies. However, as one of his successors, George H W Bush, said of 
himself, he did not ‘do the vision thing.’ Even if he was inclined to such an approach, 
Carter would have faced a major difficulty in articulating a coherent story without 
exposing the ideological contradictions of his positions. So, Carter’s presidency cannot 
be described effectively in ideological terms. What, though, was the impact of his 
character? 
Thomas Reeves, in his book on John F. Kennedy’s presidency, A Question of 
Character, asserted that a president needed a strong moral compass to be effective.1276 
This argument has been used by other historians to focus on flaws in the character and 
private lives of presidents such as Nixon and Clinton. What would be the impact of a 
president with a strong moral character; would that enhance his presidency? To win the 
1976 election, Carter promoted his suitability for the presidency by highlighting his good 
character.  His emphasis on his faith, his promise ‘to never lie’ to the American public 
and to make the government work for the people perfectly suited the needs of an 
electorate that both mistrusted Washington politicians after Watergate and were 
concerned about ‘big government.’ Carter claimed that he would be a president who 
would always do the right thing for the American people and would provide rational 
solutions to that nation’s problems that would not be influenced by ‘selfish’ interest 
groups.  Carter often described the nation’s problems in moral terms, one example being 
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the energy challenge which he described as the ‘moral equivalent of war.’ Whilst he kept 
his religious beliefs separate from presidential decisions, his Baptist upbringing did 
pervade his behaviour as president. This was reflected in his speeches, his attempt to 
remove ceremony from the office and a sense of always doing the ‘right thing’. Yet to 
pass legislation as president he had to bargain with Congress, and this he was reluctant 
to do. His aversion to interest groups, which he regarded with suspicion, extended to 
members of Congress whom he believed were servants of the local as opposed to the 
national interest. His mistrust of the motives of such groups continued throughout his 
presidency and was even reflected in his Farewell Address.1277 He believed that if the 
correct process was followed the policy recommended would not only be the best 
solution but one which everyone would accept. Early in his administration he told 
cabinet members who were developing a specific policy to ignore the political 
consequences of their proposals; he would deal with such issues. This was a naïve 
attitude that bemused and annoyed important congressional leaders like Senators Byrd 
and Long. Throughout his presidency Carter remained determined to do the right thing 
whatever the political consequences. His policy agenda, which included major complex 
reforms on energy, health and tax, could not be delivered even with a workable majority 
in Congress, which he rarely had. Eizenstat stated that, ‘He seemed sometimes to like 
going against the political grain to do that was right.’1278 This trait was seen in the way 
Carter took personal responsibility for policy failures rather than allowing his 
subordinates to take the blame. As his friend Bert Lance commented, because of this 
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moral stance, ‘he never made a popular decision.’1279 Carter’s image was as someone 
with a strong moral compass who could be trusted but who could also deal with 
Washington politics, and so that moral stance did appear to waiver at times.  
Carter was once asked by a pastor, when he first ran for the Georgia Senate, why 
he was getting into the ‘sordid’ world of politics. He answered, ‘How would you like to 
be the pastor of a church with 80k members?’1280 His ambition and competitiveness 
overcame his distaste for operating ‘in the hothouse of Washington… where politics is a 
contact sport.’1281 He had a strong sense of his self-image but not so much how others 
saw him. He was not above striking deals with members of congress, particularly near 
election time. However, his stubbornness did damage his effectiveness as president. For 
example, he continued to refuse any form of ‘coaching’ on improving his speaking style 
because he feared it would change his accent which he regarded as important to his 
identity. He also became frustrated about his failure to persuade the public on his 
policies, especially on energy. This resulted in him developing a hectoring tone which 
appeared to blame his audience for policy failures. Another side of this frustration 
became apparent when he felt he was not being believed. An example of this was the 
story of him being ‘attacked’ by a rabbit whilst fishing. The story of the ‘killer rabbit,’ 
which developed a life of its own during the summer of 1979, damaged Carter’s 
presidential image as he became the subject of satirical comment.1282 The story should 
have been ignored, but Carter kept raising the subject as he was upset that no-one 
                                                          
1279 Lance Interview, Miller Center, 43. 
1280 Rick Perlstein, The Invisible Bridge (New York: Simon and Schuster,2014), 589. 
1281 Eizenstat, White House Years, 197. 
1282  https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=jimmy+carter+paws+cartoon&tbm=isch&source 
326 
 
appeared to believe him. To him it was more important that he was believed than 
stopping a story that was damaging him politically. 
An equally important side to his character was his pride in his competence. He 
argued that by taking a rational approach to solving the country’s most serious problems 
it would result in the best solutions. This technocratic persona was established during 
the 1976 campaign when Carter chose not to exploit his military service as an officer on 
a nuclear submarine but to highlight his engineering and scientific background. This was 
a significant decision because he was giving up a major advantage as the only twentieth-
century president who had longer military service than Carter was Eisenhower. He 
became the candidate who would bring competence back to government, make it more 
efficient and eliminate waste. Like Reagan, Carter recognised the problems of ‘big 
government’ but retained his faith in it as a force for good. He believed that with reform 
the government would deliver better solutions for the country. The difficulty with the 
solutions that Carter sought to deliver was that they were complex and not easily the 
subject of compromise. His energy policy, for example, could not sustain changes to any 
part of the package that were suggested by Congress because it would compromise the 
whole policy. Carter was confident that he could gain public support by explaining these 
complex issues but often his powers of persuasion were found wanting. Also, his policies 
were attacked if not as a whole then piecemeal by interest groups who often used 
emotional and simplistic arguments that Carter found difficult to counteract. Ultimately 
the difficulty with emphasising his competence as president was that to sustain this 
image, Carter had to demonstrate a track record of success and this he could not do.  
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One of the factors that hampered Carter’s effectiveness in Washington was his 
personal isolation in the White House. Elected as an outsider, Carter made little attempt 
to engage personally with the Washington elite in contrast with his successor. It was a 
characteristic that he did not like mixing with ‘unsavoury politicians’ and his wife talked 
of the disdain he had for the social engagements expected of him as president.1283 His 
solitary nature was part of his character. It was reflected in his failure to attend Navy 
reunions1284and his decision-making process which invariably had him reading 
documents on his own. He was a loner in a highly social profession.  
In the 1976 election Carter highlighted elements of his background and character 
to gain public support. His emphasis on his morality, his faith and his competence were 
exactly what the American public wanted from their presidential candidates after the 
trauma of Vietnam and Watergate. Carter may have emphasised some elements of his 
character and background over others, for example scientist over military, but he was 
clear about who he was, and this did not change during his presidency. Character traits 
that were strengths on the campaign trail were not necessarily as effective when he was 
in government. His belief that campaigning was a positive political activity, whilst deal-
making after the election with politicians and interest groups was tawdry and hampered 
his ability to legislate. For a modern president moral character is not enough to be 
successful; a high level of political skill is also necessary.1285  Carter, as a moral exemplar, 
fitted the public need in 1976 but the American public required something different in 
1980. The electorate wanted clear answers to the nation’s problems and a positive 
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vision of the future. They had grown tired of the explanations of the complexity of 
problems and the calls for self-sacrifice. They wanted to see their lives improved after 
four years. For Carter to ‘sell’ that message would require not only changes in policy but 
also a level of pragmatism that would have been out of character from someone who 
remained unchanged in his core beliefs throughout his presidency. Carter saw the 
presidency as an opportunity for him to provide rational solutions that would solve the 
underlying problems faced by the United States. He did not feel constrained by ideology 
or the need to satisfy interest groups because he believed that he had the character, 
skills and detailed knowledge to convince the public that he would find the right 
solutions. Given that he chose to address such substantive issues as energy and 
healthcare, this required a presidential leadership that was transformational. He needed 
to be able to change public opinion and have the practical skills to persuade an 
ideologically-divided congress to pass key legislation. 
The political, economic and social environment of the 1970’s had an impact on 
Carter’s presidential effectiveness. Unfortunately for Carter very few of these factors 
were favourable to him. The power of his office since Watergate had been constrained 
by the legislature. He inherited a Congress that was jealous of its powers and governed 
by a new complex committee structure that made the legislative process unwieldy. To 
achieve success, he had to be able to sell his policies to the public and negotiate with 
senior members of Congress. This was to prove a major problem for Carter. His ability 
to reach out to the public was limited by his lack of effectiveness on television and the 
cynicism of both public and press. He was further hampered by the fragmentation of the 
old New Deal coalition in the Democratic Party and the rise of conservative sentiment 
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across the country. This created a vacuum that was filled by well-funded interest groups 
which by their nature took a narrow position on political issues. Carter’s refusal to take 
a consistent ideological stance made it very difficult for him to build a base of support 
in Congress and the country.  
Another major factor which Carter inherited was the weakness of the economy. 
He was the first modern Democratic president to operate under the restriction of very 
low growth and had to face oil price rises that drove up inflation. ‘Stagflation’ was a new 
problem for America and one to which his neo-Keynesian economic advisors had no 
effective solution. As well as all these factors of which Carter had little or no control, any 
new president would need at least some luck. Carter had none, as Robert Strauss, the 
chair of Carter’s 1980 campaign committee, colourfully said: ‘Poor bastard, he used up 
all his luck getting here. We’ve had our victories and defeats, but we’ve not had a single 
piece of luck.’1286 His term of office saw the oil price rises, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and above all else the hostage crisis in Tehran. Whilst Carter was hindered 
by the environment in which he operated he was by no means helpless and did have 
resources that would give him the potential to deliver a credible programme. Yet one of 
the consequences of Carter’s ideological neutrality was that he created expectations on 
both sides of the ideological divide, conservative evangelicals being a case in point. He 
was further hampered by his failure to articulate a prioritised agenda supported by a 
vision of what he was attempting to achieve for the country. His legislative proposals 
were trying to address either serious underlying problems such as energy and healthcare 
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which were very difficult to pass or technical issues like deregulation and government 
reform which although more straightforward, excited very little public interest.  
The perception of a president’s record, particularly in terms of domestic policy, 
is judged by their ability to pass legislation, but as Hargrove asked: ‘when less skilful 
leaders lack political support, is the failure due to limited skills or to political 
circumstances?’ 1287 Carter did make mistakes in his legislative strategy, especially on 
prioritisation and his management of relationships, but his scope for achieving major 
reforms was limited by the ideological and regional divide in Congress. The public 
perception of Carter as demonstrated by Caddell’s polling data, was that he had no 
major achievements domestically but there was a general view that no-one could have 
done any better particularly on the economy. This was not a compelling 
recommendation for a politician who stood in 1976 on his competence. In the 1980 
election Carter did not substantively defend his domestic record and even in his 
memoirs most of his book is focussed on foreign policy. Carter could not point to a 
domestic policy equivalent of a Middle East Peace deal. But in discussing such failures 
as healthcare and welfare reform, consideration should be given to the subsequent 
policy failures of later Democratic presidents who benefitted from much greater 
congressional support.  
The limits on presidential power in the 1970’s meant that to be successful any 
new president had to be able to reach out and persuade the American public and deal 
effectively with key congressional politicians and interest groups. The support of a 
Democratic Party would have been helpful to the president but as early as June 1977 
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Rafshoon was describing the Democratic National Committee (DNC) as a ‘foreign 
power.’1288  To enable Carter to be successful he needed not only the right personal skill 
set but to have the support of a well-run White House organisation. There were many 
criticisms of the early Carter administration. These included a congressional liaison 
which had been under resourced, confused policy coordination and the inexperience of 
the Georgians he brought with him into the White House. This criticism was largely 
unfair and often tinged with snobbery from the Washington elite. As with many new 
administrations, Carter’s took time to bed in but certainly by 1978 the White House was 
operating well as subsequent comments from former staff bear out. As the quality and 
the experience of staff improved, units like congressional liaison, the press office and 
especially outreach became highly effective and their roles and processes were to be 
replicated by subsequent administrations. This was despite the continuing perception in 
Washington that Carter and his staff were outsiders. This view was fuelled by the 
reluctance of the Carter team to engage personally with the Washington elite.  One 
Carter decision that did have a significant legacy was the role played by the vice 
president. The trust and the formal responsibilities given by Carter to Walter Mondale 
became the benchmark for subsequent politically active vice presidents like Al Gore, 
Dick Cheney and Joe Biden. Also, and to a lesser extent, the role of Rosalyn Carter 
became the model for the political as well as personal partnership of Bill and Hillary 
Clinton. Whilst Carter’s White House organisation became more effective in supporting 
his policy initiatives, it was still dependent upon the president’s decision-making and 
ability to persuade the American public and key politicians of the wisdom of his policies. 
                                                          
1288 Rafshoon to Carter, 14 June 1977, SS Box 34, JCPL.  
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Carter was a highly intelligent, self-disciplined president who worked extremely 
hard. He was often criticised for being indecisive and too involved in the detail, but this 
was based upon a misunderstanding of how he took in information. It was the case that 
he wanted to understand the detail of any policy, believing this analysis or homework 
would enable him to balance conflicting views. He was comfortable with complexity and 
needed to understand the detail, so he could come to a rational decision and explain it 
to the public. Carter’s preferred method of assimilating information was reading. He was 
intelligent enough to understand technical detail and his skill at speed reading meant 
that he digested large documents quickly. The assumption that these substantial policy 
papers were examples of Carter’s inability to delegate and delayed his decision making 
was erroneous. It was ironic that his successor, Ronald Reagan, was to be criticised for 
making decisions on single page memoranda.  As for delegation, Carter used his cabinet 
to develop new policies such as health reform, labour relations and Social Security with 
limited intervention from himself. Carter, however, made errors in his approach to 
legislation which demonstrated both a lack of understanding of how Washington 
operated and a general naivety. He did not have a structured agenda which was essential 
to pass legislation. This was despite the efforts of his staff to provide one. He did not 
prioritise. The result of this was his legislative programme was stuck in Congress and 
under the control of congressional leaders whom he was unable to influence. He might 
have been successful if he was more effective in persuading the American public and 
building coalitions to support his programmes, but this would prove to be his greatest 
personal weakness. 
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Historians have studied the skills needed for presidents to be successful leaders. 
Many have focussed upon the importance of a president’s ability to persuade the public 
and senior politicians to support them. Carter was an excellent campaigner and effective 
in interactive environments like press conferences, town hall meetings and radio phone-
ins. Yet his speeches in set piece environments such as television were not persuasive. 
His speaking style often came across as ‘holier than thou’ and even Carter had 
recognised by April 1979 that his television addresses were not working. Rafshoon and 
the speechwriting team attempted to compensate for this weakness by trying to 
manage his message and the communications channels he used but this was criticised 
as media manipulation by the press. Carter skilfully resisted attempts to persuade him 
to articulate a vision for his administration that linked his programmes together and 
could be communicated to the public. His message of rational but complex policies could 
not be sold to a public that craved simple solutions and a positive vision for the future. 
This rhetorical deficit became a major issue when Carter faced Ronald Reagan in 1980 
because Reagan’s message provided a clear, simple and optimistic vision for America’s 
future. Carter had many of the skills required to be a successful president. He had 
intelligence, a strong work ethic, and, after some early problems, a strong organisation 
to support him. His inability to persuade his audience, be it the public or members of 
congress, was a major weakness as a leader. A change in speaking style or creating a 
vision he simply did not have was never an option for a stubborn man proud of his 
southern heritage and convinced that he was proposing the best policies for the country. 
Facing someone with the rhetorical ability of Reagan, Carter was always going to be at 
a disadvantage, but it was difficult to run an effective campaign when his track record 
as president delivered few positive achievements. 
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Jimmy Carter is currently viewed by historians as a ‘below average’ president.  In 
the C-Span survey of 2017, Carter was ranked 26th out of 43 and below every post-war 
president except Richard Nixon and George W Bush.1289 His successor influenced his 
immediate legacy. His heavy defeat to Ronald Reagan was followed by what was widely 
regarded as two successful terms of office, and the dismantling of many of Carter’s 
policies. Reagan is ranked 9th in the same survey. Confusion over the ideological 
significance of his administration has also affected Carter’s rating. Conservatives and 
liberals criticised him severely for failing to deliver on their agendas, even though Carter 
did not ever endorse these programmes in their entirety. He therefore suffered and has 
continued to suffer for his insistence on what he regarded as a rational approach to 
policy.  His record in terms of domestic policy, whilst containing both major and minor 
achievements, was largely unsuccessful in comparison with the ambitious programme 
he set out in 1976. It would be difficult to argue, however, that this was largely due to 
Carter’s personal failings. The political environment inside Congress and in the nation 
was not amenable to Carter’s remedies for the nation’s ills. His failure to prioritise and 
his inability to persuade his audience did not help but it could equally be argued that he 
was unlucky with crises that he faced that were beyond his control.  His election in 1976 
was a major personal victory but it would be difficult to envisage Carter winning at any 
other time. What was required for victory in 1976 had changed in 1980, and Carter was 
far too moral a man and, truth be told, too stubborn to change his policies and his image 
to challenge Reagan effectively. It is possible, even probable, that the view of historians 
in time will change if for no other reason that his eventual death will bring even more 
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recognition of his post-presidential activities with the Carter Center and his insistence 
on doing the right thing on issues whatever the political consequences. However, whilst 
his reputation may, indeed should, improve in relation to other presidents, analysis of 
his record domestically should not change his position dramatically. History should come 
to regard Jimmy Carter as a good, possibly even a great man but never better than an 
average president which if nothing else demonstrates the disconnection between 
presidential character and performance. 
This suggests that the post-revisionist interpretation of Carter is the most 
persuasive; and that is what this thesis argues. To be sure it does support the revisionist 
claim that many of Carter’s achievements have been underrated and that some of the 
criticism of his failures has been unfair, as they were due to factors beyond his control. 
However, there is a risk of historians being seduced by the ‘afterglow’ of Carter’s post-
presidency with insufficient weight being given to the opportunities that he missed in 
seeking a more substantive legacy. There were errors of judgement on issues that he 
could influence. These included his failure to engage effectively with key politicians in 
Congress, his reluctance to prioritise legislation for an already overloaded legislature 
and his unwillingness to articulate a clear vision for the country. This, therefore, 
associates this study with the work of post-revisionist historians such as Scott 
Kaufman.1290 In addition, this thesis concludes that many of Carter’s difficulties with the 
political elite, interest groups and the media arose from their misunderstanding of who 
he was and how he thought. His refusal to accept a ‘label’ often resulted in an inaccurate 
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and Son, 2016) 
 
336 
 
picture of the ideological orientation of his policies.  This misleading portrayal resulted 
in expectations that Carter could or would not fulfil and consequently an adverse 
reaction from a wide range of political groups which felt his action or often inaction 
represented a betrayal of their values. This misreading of Carter extended to myths 
about his leadership style. Descriptions of a president who was mired in policy detail 
and indecisive are not supported by the evidence. In his domestic policies he delegated 
widely on all major issues except energy and made clear cut decisions throughout his 
term in office. Nevertheless, whatever his personal qualities, Carter’s overall record in 
domestic policy was more often disappointing than commendable. 
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